Now, don’t get me wrong, I am strong supporter of drone strikes. I believe that they are, in fact, an effective means that efficiently eliminates a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties and without putting American boots on the ground. Indeed, they have been at the forefront of the elimination of various terrorists, including several high ranking members of al-Qaeda and their allies.
Looking at this chart (here), we can get an idea of just how effective they are at eliminating a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties. Since 2006, some 2,500 members of various jihadist organizations have been killed while only 153 civilians have been killed. I say “only” like I don’t care about civilians dying—I do—it’s just the numbers are incredibly low when compared to how many actual, or suspected, militants we have killed.
Let’s also look at Yemen’s chart: here. It should be noted that the drone program in Yemen is relatively new compared to the one in Pakistan. However, besides 2009, the same basic pattern continues. Please understand that the numbers in both of these charts are a very well educated guess. The reporting in Taliban or allied controlled areas is very minimal, at best.
Drones also have another beneficial aspect to their use: The disruption of enemy movements. Drone strikes are incredibly good at shaking up enemy movements, which subsequently, hinder their ability to coordinate attacks either on the regional scale or the global scale. This disruption of enemy movement is, in itself, a good thing; however, like my good friend and colleague Tom (military theorist) points out:
“While it's useful in that is constantly disrupts A.Q. and insurgent leadership, there are situations where a strike may do more harm than good. Especially when you are dealing with strikes on low level peons and the such.
Killing terrorists isn't the endgame in itself, but rather a method to mitigate the effects of a terrorist organization. The endgame is to render the group operationally neutered and to significantly lower growth. That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization. Sometimes this isn't always possible, so the drone strikes at the very least disrupt operations.”
I could not agree more with his assessment. While impacting movements disrupts operations, it does nothing for our end goals. Before I move on to why my opinion is changing, I’d like to elaborate on what he said here: “That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization”. This is, in essence, what needs to happen in order to successfully counter the terrorism threats; however, like he also pointed out, that isn’t always possible. Take Pakistan, for example, either out of unwillingness or incompetency, they do not do hardly enough to curtail the jihadist threat they face in their country—which often spills over into Afghanistan. In places like Pakistan, it may be in our best interests to use drones to try and curb the jihadists, rather than to wait and rely on Pakistan to do it themselves.
However, like Mr. Bill Roggio points out in the first link, our drone policy has essentially become a substitute for an actual comprehensive strategy to deal with terrorism. Under the Obama Administration, the drone program has increased substantially, when compared to when it was first started in 2002. To quote Mr. Roggio: “One problem I have with the administration’s view on this is that it seems to think that just killing some of al Qaeda’s top leaders will cause al Qaeda to collapse. But the organization just isn’t going away - it’s evolved over time to include other terrorist groups …”. This couldn’t be truer in how the current Administration sees the use of drones and our current strategy.
While drones have taken out a multitude of terrorists, including senior leaders, have the groups disbanded or otherwise collapsed? Not really. So where does that leave us? It leaves us with a severe conundrum in our counter-terrorism strategies. Either continue the over-reliance on drones or form a new, comprehensive strategy that entails every aspect of terrorism and how drones may be used appropriately. With our over-reliance on drones, it leaves us with a few disadvantages.
First off, like Mr. Rodriguez (former CIA) points out here: click
As the result of our cancellation of the detainee program and because we no longer capture anyone, we’ve instead turned to killing everyone. Because of this, we can no longer obtain valuable information from held militants. This information can include anything from future plots, coordination, key players, relationships between terrorist organizations, and a wide range of other questions—all of which, we can no longer ask. Mr. Rodriguez brings up the Boston Bombings and how if we could question those held at G-Bay or if we still captured people, we could then cross-reference what held militants know in correlation to Tameralan Tsarnaev or the larger North Caucasian jihadist movement. He ends the article by saying: “The U.S. also cannot ask recently captured terrorists whether they have heard of Tsarnaev, whether they have seen anyone matching his description or whether they know of any of his associates. We can’t do any of these because we don’t capture terrorists anymore. In order to avoid the challenges of detention and interrogation – and to escape the harsh judgment of human rights activists – by and large we simply kill them.”. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg.
Drone strikes can also encourage sympathy for terrorist organizations, which in turn, can lead to recruitment opportunities for the very same groups we’re targeting. Not to mention, they are an excellent propaganda piece for AQ and Co (plus all the public anger that is attributed to drone strikes. But, one should know, that while leaders in Pakistan or Yemen publicly denounce the strikes, they secretly support them or even sign off on them—source).
Let me reiterate before I end: I am not calling for an end to the drone program, as I am big supporter of their utilization. Instead, I am calling for a change in drone policy; one that looks at certain considerations when using drones and how to appropriately use them. Our over-reliance on drones might have more long-term strategic consequences than what various figures in the Obama Administration may think. A serious change needs to happen in our counter-terrorism policies, and the first step is creating a comprehensive strategy: Something the last two administrations have failed at doing.
Sunday, August 4, 2013
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
Interoperability Between U.S. and Japanese Forces
With the rising tide of the People's Republic of China in the Pacific region, and a movement in Japan's LDP government to increase defense, it seems paramount that U.S. and Japanese forces be able to properly operate with each other during a combat scenario. For a strong and visible shield against China to exist, the United States must be able to work closely with each ally--a close defense cooperation between Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, America, Australia and New Zealand would be ideal, but is unlikely due to unfortunate political realities. So, it seems as if America will have to settle with being able to individually work with each nation.
This month is a testament to the idea of interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, as each nation's respective maritime forces are collaborating with each other to improve bilateral capacity to conduct amphibious operations. According the key U.S. and Japanese defense officials, building up Japan's ability to conduct amphibious operations is crucial to maintaining a strong defense amid territorial disputes--this includes a possible Island Assault Unit.
So far, it seems as if the future of Japanese and American interoperability will focus on three things: being able to operate coherently to defeat mainland China's navy (and air force), to recapture an island seized by the PRC Army or Marine Corps and missile defense.
The United States and Japanese navies have long been able to cooperate together, showing a theoretical ability to coherently conduct operations during wartime. The American and Japanese air forces are working together to achieve interoperability. While chief strategists have agree'd on the future of American and Japanese strategy--America is working on its Joint Operational Access Concept and Japan has its Dynamic Defense. All in all, the militaries seem to be to set up a strong defense network capable of facing, and hopefully defeating, China's navy and air force.
That said, peace time operations are crucial to readiness for actual wartime. Japan's role in its strategic partnership with the United States should increase focus on surveillance operations in the South China Sea. Furthermore, America should also defend increased strategic reach by Japan on the global stage. Japan has multiple interest riding in, for example, the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both the United States and Japan if the JMDSF deployed minesweepers to conduct operations in the Strait of Hormuz.
The focus on cooperation between America and Japan has historically been focused on maritime strategy, not ground combat. The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force has typically focused on disaster relief and peacekeeping operations--both have been proven in actual scenarios. Now that China has a substantial ability to possibly seize an island, Japan is mulling over the need for an amphibious force. Establishing their own branch for amphibious is likely unnecessary, but creating their own "Expeditionary Force" is a good option Japanese politicians are considering. Ultimately, though, any sort of amphibious strategy should take into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of the American and Japanese militaries (and possibly other nations like the United Kingdom and Australia, which would likely participate in combat operations).
Finally, you have the issue of missile defense. In the author's opinion, missile defense is a crucial aspect of regional defense that needs to be worked on. In several war games, China has been able to gain the upper hand, close down the South China Sea, and push America back to San Diego by utilizing their missile forces. Since the author isn't extremely well read on how to fix this problem, he encourages readers to throw ideas out there in the comment section below.
--Tom
This month is a testament to the idea of interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, as each nation's respective maritime forces are collaborating with each other to improve bilateral capacity to conduct amphibious operations. According the key U.S. and Japanese defense officials, building up Japan's ability to conduct amphibious operations is crucial to maintaining a strong defense amid territorial disputes--this includes a possible Island Assault Unit.
So far, it seems as if the future of Japanese and American interoperability will focus on three things: being able to operate coherently to defeat mainland China's navy (and air force), to recapture an island seized by the PRC Army or Marine Corps and missile defense.
The United States and Japanese navies have long been able to cooperate together, showing a theoretical ability to coherently conduct operations during wartime. The American and Japanese air forces are working together to achieve interoperability. While chief strategists have agree'd on the future of American and Japanese strategy--America is working on its Joint Operational Access Concept and Japan has its Dynamic Defense. All in all, the militaries seem to be to set up a strong defense network capable of facing, and hopefully defeating, China's navy and air force.
That said, peace time operations are crucial to readiness for actual wartime. Japan's role in its strategic partnership with the United States should increase focus on surveillance operations in the South China Sea. Furthermore, America should also defend increased strategic reach by Japan on the global stage. Japan has multiple interest riding in, for example, the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both the United States and Japan if the JMDSF deployed minesweepers to conduct operations in the Strait of Hormuz.
The focus on cooperation between America and Japan has historically been focused on maritime strategy, not ground combat. The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force has typically focused on disaster relief and peacekeeping operations--both have been proven in actual scenarios. Now that China has a substantial ability to possibly seize an island, Japan is mulling over the need for an amphibious force. Establishing their own branch for amphibious is likely unnecessary, but creating their own "Expeditionary Force" is a good option Japanese politicians are considering. Ultimately, though, any sort of amphibious strategy should take into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of the American and Japanese militaries (and possibly other nations like the United Kingdom and Australia, which would likely participate in combat operations).
Finally, you have the issue of missile defense. In the author's opinion, missile defense is a crucial aspect of regional defense that needs to be worked on. In several war games, China has been able to gain the upper hand, close down the South China Sea, and push America back to San Diego by utilizing their missile forces. Since the author isn't extremely well read on how to fix this problem, he encourages readers to throw ideas out there in the comment section below.
--Tom
Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Should the United States Intervene in Syria?
In the author's previous post on Syria, he explained the utilization of naval forces in establishing a no-fly zone over Syria and the costs associated with such an endeavor. Now, he will explain his opinion on intervention into the country.
America has strategic interests in Syria, of that there is no doubt. Not only does the collapse of Assad's regime knock out a major terrorist supporter in the Middle Eastern region, it also undermines Iranian influence in a time where the clerics in Tehran trying to establishing the groundwork for a hegemony in the Middle East. Moreover, the flood of terrorist groups into the country is cause for worry in policymakers. The last thing the United States wants is another Afghanistan, where non-state actors roam the countryside unopposed, giving them large swathes of area to organize, train, and plot attacks or even offensives in other countries. Therefore, we have an inherent interest to insure that order is restored and moderate militias within the Free Syrian Army take control of the nascent government.
However, policy should be constrained by harsh political, economic, and military realities. Having strategic interests doesn't mean that you should pursue them. Engaging in a conflict where your strategic goals are unobtainable is foolhardy, and often results in your own national security being further undermined.
At this point, the so-called golden opportunity for American intervention has passed. Extremist groups have seeped their way into the country, and are now providing a host of services to the local people, from food stores to security to governance. Had Obama gotten involved earlier, and provided arms to the more moderate groups, the presence of extremist groups could have largely been mitigated. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Initially, the U.S. used Qatar and Saudi Arabia as middlemen to supply weapons to the rebels. The C.I.A. has even been reported by the Economist to have helped ensure these transactions went smoothly. While this sounds beneficial, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both have goals in post-Assad Syria that are counter-intuitive to American interests. The majority of supply given to the rebels by the emirates are to extremist organizations.
That said, there is still potential for the West to gain the upper-hand. Salim Idris, Chief-of-Staff for the Free Syrian Army, has been outspoken about his wishes from the United States and her allies: first, he wants the establishment of a no-fly zone. Second, he wants more arms. Doing both drastically helps the moderates in the opposition. We could also go farther than that by training militias with moderate attitudes. Al-Nursa provides bread to the hungary masses? We give them meat. Giving moderates more provisions that help local populations greatly helps their image, thus undermining extremists.
So yes, the author believes that the United States should become more involved in helping rebels. At the very least, U.S. forces should supply weapons and copious amounts of food to vetted militias.
America has strategic interests in Syria, of that there is no doubt. Not only does the collapse of Assad's regime knock out a major terrorist supporter in the Middle Eastern region, it also undermines Iranian influence in a time where the clerics in Tehran trying to establishing the groundwork for a hegemony in the Middle East. Moreover, the flood of terrorist groups into the country is cause for worry in policymakers. The last thing the United States wants is another Afghanistan, where non-state actors roam the countryside unopposed, giving them large swathes of area to organize, train, and plot attacks or even offensives in other countries. Therefore, we have an inherent interest to insure that order is restored and moderate militias within the Free Syrian Army take control of the nascent government.
However, policy should be constrained by harsh political, economic, and military realities. Having strategic interests doesn't mean that you should pursue them. Engaging in a conflict where your strategic goals are unobtainable is foolhardy, and often results in your own national security being further undermined.
At this point, the so-called golden opportunity for American intervention has passed. Extremist groups have seeped their way into the country, and are now providing a host of services to the local people, from food stores to security to governance. Had Obama gotten involved earlier, and provided arms to the more moderate groups, the presence of extremist groups could have largely been mitigated. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Initially, the U.S. used Qatar and Saudi Arabia as middlemen to supply weapons to the rebels. The C.I.A. has even been reported by the Economist to have helped ensure these transactions went smoothly. While this sounds beneficial, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both have goals in post-Assad Syria that are counter-intuitive to American interests. The majority of supply given to the rebels by the emirates are to extremist organizations.
That said, there is still potential for the West to gain the upper-hand. Salim Idris, Chief-of-Staff for the Free Syrian Army, has been outspoken about his wishes from the United States and her allies: first, he wants the establishment of a no-fly zone. Second, he wants more arms. Doing both drastically helps the moderates in the opposition. We could also go farther than that by training militias with moderate attitudes. Al-Nursa provides bread to the hungary masses? We give them meat. Giving moderates more provisions that help local populations greatly helps their image, thus undermining extremists.
So yes, the author believes that the United States should become more involved in helping rebels. At the very least, U.S. forces should supply weapons and copious amounts of food to vetted militias.
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
The Rising Sun
 |
| Riding upon the euphoria of Abenomics and nationalism, Japan is scheduled for a massive shift in it's national security paradigm |
What's most striking about Prime Minister Abe is his focus on national security. Abe's plans for defense policy strongly disrupts the status quo. The Liberal Democratic Party aims to amend the constitution, allowing the Japanese to take out the "Self" in "Japanese Self Defense Force" A gesture that in part may be symbolic; a reference to a new commitment to a tougher stance on issues relating not only to its immediate geographic area, but to the greater globe as well.
Of course, making a symbolic gesture doesn't always mean that actual action will occur. Abe's plans also involve pragmatic evolutions to both Japan's defense and foreign policies. Not only does Abe want a military that's more capable of deterring China's increasing rise, he also wants one that can project Japanese force abroad and affirm Japan's position as an international player capable of protecting its global interests.
This is a fairly rapid shift from the country, which has been isolationist since the end of World War Two. The JSDF has only deployed small contingents of service members overseas. Two notable deployments were the soldiers deployed to Iraq in 2003 and the destroyers currently deployed on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. It will be interesting to see if Japan, which has one of the most capable navies in the world, begins to sign mutual defense treaties with other nations, deploys more troops overseas or acts more aggressively with its military in the coming years.
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Summer Vacation and the Blog
In approximately 20 minutes, I will be let out of school for summer vacation. For the most part, I will be relatively free the entire summer. However, it is very likely that I will be gone for 2-3 weeks for Sea Cadet trainings. If this is the case, I will do my best to set up a system with a friend to post pre-written blog posts. My main goal is to increase the amount I post, hopefully to maybe two or even three posts a week. Anyways, just a PSA.
- Tom
- Tom
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
How Much Resources Should We Put Into Europe?
As the author established in his previous post, the strategic necessity of Europe is rather questionable in the post-9/11 era. As of late, the United States military has roughly 70,000 service members stationed in a variety of posts around the country. Aside from the taxing cost of these soldiers in a time of fiscal austerity, one must also consider the reorientation of the United States from West to East and our inability to project enough resources to cover immediate areas of concern globally. If the United States has learned anything in the past decade, it's that good tactical cohesion is useless unless a large scale strategic vision is properly implemented. So even if our troops are exceptionally trained, they aren't being applied in a manner that provides the U.S. with benefits when stationed in Europe.
For the most part, our forces in Italy can stay. Combat aircraft, naval bases, and Airborne infantry forces have provided a large array of strategic options to U.S. commanders in regards to the surrounding region. Aircraft and naval assets based in Italy were exceptionally useful in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. With the environment in Syria heating up, these units may prove to be useful again (the author will address this in a future post). Further, these units periodically deploy in bilateral training exercises with NATO members in an attempt to foster interoperability. As we learned from Libya, creating a system that allows for joint missions to occur when using different technologies is crucial to NATO success during a wartime operation.
As ComNavOps pointed out in a comment, our bases in Europe provide the U.S. strategists with assets close enough to the Middle East to be used, but far enough to be safe. The author agree's with the Commander's analysis, but believes the utility of Europe offensively extends itself to countries bordering the Mediterranean (Libya, Syria, Egypt, etc.)* While European based forces (EUCOM) were involved in operations in Iraq (and simultaneously the Balkans, if memory serves), was the geographic proximity essential to operational success? In the author's opinion, it was not. The majority of EUCOM's substantial contributions to the Iraq mission were in the post-invasion environment. Geographic origin of the deploying unit didn't matter, because low intensity conflict doesn't require rapid deployment of troops within a short amount of time (on the strategic level), as opposed to the high intensity scenarios we might have faced with the Soviets during the Cold War.
This isn't to say that bases in countries like Germany aren't useful at times. The U.S. Armed Forces hospital in Landstuhl, Germany offers a close, but secure, level four hospital to send our critically injured soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan. Ramstein Airbase offers NATO forces in general a nice logistical hub for operations abroad. Assets like these would ideally be kept. However, the vast majority of the 50,000 soldiers stationed in Germany can be relieved of their duties. As can the 10,000 service members in the United Kingdom.
So then, this is how the author thinks U.S. forces in Europe should be spread out:
Germany: 15,000-20,000 (Mainly Air Force and SOF personell)
Spain: 1,000 (The USMC QRF and naval personell)
Italy: 10,000 (Naval, Air Force, and Army Airborne personell)
Black Sea Rotational Force: 500 (SP-MAGTF to continue training countries around the Black Sea Area)**
Other: 1,000-5,000 (to conduct minor roles in various countries)
Total: 27,500-36,000 personell
The author strongly suggests anybody with operational experience to comment on the feasibility of such a structure. Obviously, the author has no military experience, and has a tendency to overestimate the utility small logistical outposts in supporting wartime operations.
*ComNavOps is an extremely experienced individual, the author is not. Remember that, readers.
**Make note that the BSRF isn't deployed 365 days a year, it's generally deployed for six month increments.
For the most part, our forces in Italy can stay. Combat aircraft, naval bases, and Airborne infantry forces have provided a large array of strategic options to U.S. commanders in regards to the surrounding region. Aircraft and naval assets based in Italy were exceptionally useful in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. With the environment in Syria heating up, these units may prove to be useful again (the author will address this in a future post). Further, these units periodically deploy in bilateral training exercises with NATO members in an attempt to foster interoperability. As we learned from Libya, creating a system that allows for joint missions to occur when using different technologies is crucial to NATO success during a wartime operation.
As ComNavOps pointed out in a comment, our bases in Europe provide the U.S. strategists with assets close enough to the Middle East to be used, but far enough to be safe. The author agree's with the Commander's analysis, but believes the utility of Europe offensively extends itself to countries bordering the Mediterranean (Libya, Syria, Egypt, etc.)* While European based forces (EUCOM) were involved in operations in Iraq (and simultaneously the Balkans, if memory serves), was the geographic proximity essential to operational success? In the author's opinion, it was not. The majority of EUCOM's substantial contributions to the Iraq mission were in the post-invasion environment. Geographic origin of the deploying unit didn't matter, because low intensity conflict doesn't require rapid deployment of troops within a short amount of time (on the strategic level), as opposed to the high intensity scenarios we might have faced with the Soviets during the Cold War.
This isn't to say that bases in countries like Germany aren't useful at times. The U.S. Armed Forces hospital in Landstuhl, Germany offers a close, but secure, level four hospital to send our critically injured soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan. Ramstein Airbase offers NATO forces in general a nice logistical hub for operations abroad. Assets like these would ideally be kept. However, the vast majority of the 50,000 soldiers stationed in Germany can be relieved of their duties. As can the 10,000 service members in the United Kingdom.
So then, this is how the author thinks U.S. forces in Europe should be spread out:
Germany: 15,000-20,000 (Mainly Air Force and SOF personell)
Spain: 1,000 (The USMC QRF and naval personell)
Italy: 10,000 (Naval, Air Force, and Army Airborne personell)
Black Sea Rotational Force: 500 (SP-MAGTF to continue training countries around the Black Sea Area)**
Other: 1,000-5,000 (to conduct minor roles in various countries)
Total: 27,500-36,000 personell
The author strongly suggests anybody with operational experience to comment on the feasibility of such a structure. Obviously, the author has no military experience, and has a tendency to overestimate the utility small logistical outposts in supporting wartime operations.
*ComNavOps is an extremely experienced individual, the author is not. Remember that, readers.
**Make note that the BSRF isn't deployed 365 days a year, it's generally deployed for six month increments.
Monday, May 13, 2013
Rest in Peace, Kenneth Waltz
This morning, one of the world's foremost thinkers in the field of international relations passed away. Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013) contributed greatly to his field, and will be sorely missed by those both inside and outside the I.R. community. Waltz is best known for his books Man, the State, and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979). I wish his family peace during their time of grieving. Kenneth Waltz was 88 years old.
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