Following the advice of Diana Weuger, I'm going to begin focusing most of my posts on a single issue. For the time being, that's going to be Security Sector Reform. I'm writing an essay on Security Sector Reform in transitioning democratic countries for a U.S. Institute of Peace contest, so it'll go hand in hand together with my project. I won't post my essay up here until late April, when the contest is over. However, between now and then I be will post my musings and ideas on the subject. So expect me to blog more and more on this issue in the coming weeks.
For now, I have an idea of how I think Security Sector Reform should go:
First, the international community should seek to create strong civilian oversight. The military is often seen as the most competent body in many transitioning countries, especially since they were probably the strongest branch of the government prior to whatever crisis caused the collapse of the indigenous political system. It's tempting to place them in charge, but you then run the risk of a military junta or dictatorship. Similar to what we've seen throughout South America or Egypt today.
Second, there needs to be dedicated advisors and units that form long lasting bonds with their counter parts in the host countries. Bringing back the same officers and units to these transitioning nations recurrently for bilateral operations and advising missions creates a group that understands the challenges the host country faces. Not only this, but the bonds build upon themselves. That way, the host country does not have to form new relationships with officers and NCOs they will never see again after six to twelve months.
Third, gender and security sector reform closely intertwined. Most men don'tt understand women's issues, let alone care about solving them in post-conflict countries. Obviously, women are affected by conflict just as men are. Rape is frequently used as a tool of war, and there aren't many opportunities for women in transitioning countries to begin with. This necessitates some sort of female oversight or involvement to get the job done (not to say that men shouldn't be involved in solving women's issues, of course). Moreover, women offer their own unique take on a variety of issues. Gender affects our perception of things, which in turn makes women very relevant in Security Sector Reform.
Fourth, the job of local security forces is to facilitate political, economic, and social engagement, by creating an atmosphere of security in the host country. This requires close cooperation between political and military entities. The overall goal is to create long-lasting stability, but this does not occur through the military alone. If the underlying socio-economic issues are not addressed, then the host country is doomed to a perpetual cycle of conflict.
That's just what I have for now. I'll go into more depth later on!
--Tom
Friday, November 22, 2013
Friday, October 18, 2013
Making Mountains Out of Mole Hills
It's that time of year again, folks. People are busting out their ornate decorations, I have to wear my ridiculously cool German camouflage jacket to stay warm, and the leaves are turning into wonderful shades of orange and red. Of course, my favorite part of Autumn is the holiday of freight: Halloween. There isn't anything better than busting out my copy of The Blair Witch Project on October 31st to give myself the spooks.
When I was a young boy, the frightful costumes of my sister's friends would scare me. I didn't necessarily understand that behind the masks, they were just regular people. So my Halloween fun was drowned out by my fear of empty threats. I think this has a valuable lesson for the national security apparatus; sometimes states and groups seem much scarier than they actually are. You have to peel back their mask in order to get a good look at who they really are. America has a tendency to over-exaggerate the seriousness of a potential adversary, resulting in either an unnecessary response or ill-placed resources.
The primary threat I usually like to talk about is terrorism. While terrorism is in no way an empty threat, the ungodly amount of resources we devote towards mitigating its effects is ridiculous. We've sunk tens of billions into creating massive domestic spying systems, over a trillion dollars in Afghanistan, and another trillion into various counter-terrorism Department of Homeland Security programs. None of this makes since economically, of course. As the Economist pointed out in 2011, to justify current levels of DHS-CT spending, we would have to prevent well over 1,500 domestic terrorist attacks per year. To give you some context, this would make us a more dangerous terrorist safe-haven than Pakistan. So if the United States government underestimated the threat emanating from terrorism prior to 9/11, then we have certainly overestimated its seriousness in the post-9/11 security environment. This has resulted in an atrophy of resources to our domestic ills. We've neglected basic duties of government--such as highway matinance, the lack of which kills 14,000 per year--in order to deter a literal boogeyman from attacking us again.
In reality, a sensible and economical counter-terrorism program would absolutely gut DHS spending, end NSA domestic spying, and withdraw conventional American forces from Afghanistan. Instead of massive, conventional responses, the U.S. government ought to further invest into indirect action, building partnership capacity programs, drone strikes, and an energetic diplomatic campaign to encourage multilateral solutions to complex problems. Despite my problems with Obama's foreign policy, he has put far more emphasis on creating such a strategy than his predecessor did.
However, there are certainly other examples. In 1953, one of the worst foreign policy mistakes of the Cold War was made as the U.S. government decided to aid Britain in its coup d'etat of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh. The British were motivated by oil interests in Iran, and managed to convince Eisenhower that there was a link between Mossaddegh and the Communists. There was, but the threat was far overstated. The Tudeh Party of Iran and the National Front had a mutual interest in liberating Iranian oil from the clutches of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but nothing more. Mossedegh desperately needed a political ally to support his goal of nationalization, and the Tudeh happened to be that ally. However, the relationship was fragile and weak at best. The long term viability of the Tudeh in Iran was nil, and Mossedegh pursued the relationship out of necessity.
Economically, Mossaddegh's vision was to put Iran on a level in which it could profit from selling oil, and allow for open, competitive markets to form in Iran. Politically, he wanted to fully democratize the Iranian government. Neither of which is particularly in line with Communist thinking. Unfortunately, the Red Scare mentality permeated American foreign policy thinking. Instead of adapting to the new political change in Iran, accepting the economic benefits of Iranian nationalization, lowering the incentive to work with Communists by offering an olive branch, and attempting to mediate a diplomatic solution to British-Iranian disagreements, we decided to implement forced regime change. This set the undertones for the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which created the Iranian government we now have to contend with as a major strategic adversary.
So ultimately, while threats should never be understated, overstating their significance and threat is equally as dangerous. Whether it be from the fear of a terrorist suicide bombing in the U.S., or political change in another country. It is important for rationality to dominate policy making, and for the intelligence community to peel back the masks of our enemies. Otherwise, we risk deadly foreign entanglements and unnecessary conflicts abroad.
--Tom
When I was a young boy, the frightful costumes of my sister's friends would scare me. I didn't necessarily understand that behind the masks, they were just regular people. So my Halloween fun was drowned out by my fear of empty threats. I think this has a valuable lesson for the national security apparatus; sometimes states and groups seem much scarier than they actually are. You have to peel back their mask in order to get a good look at who they really are. America has a tendency to over-exaggerate the seriousness of a potential adversary, resulting in either an unnecessary response or ill-placed resources.
The primary threat I usually like to talk about is terrorism. While terrorism is in no way an empty threat, the ungodly amount of resources we devote towards mitigating its effects is ridiculous. We've sunk tens of billions into creating massive domestic spying systems, over a trillion dollars in Afghanistan, and another trillion into various counter-terrorism Department of Homeland Security programs. None of this makes since economically, of course. As the Economist pointed out in 2011, to justify current levels of DHS-CT spending, we would have to prevent well over 1,500 domestic terrorist attacks per year. To give you some context, this would make us a more dangerous terrorist safe-haven than Pakistan. So if the United States government underestimated the threat emanating from terrorism prior to 9/11, then we have certainly overestimated its seriousness in the post-9/11 security environment. This has resulted in an atrophy of resources to our domestic ills. We've neglected basic duties of government--such as highway matinance, the lack of which kills 14,000 per year--in order to deter a literal boogeyman from attacking us again.
In reality, a sensible and economical counter-terrorism program would absolutely gut DHS spending, end NSA domestic spying, and withdraw conventional American forces from Afghanistan. Instead of massive, conventional responses, the U.S. government ought to further invest into indirect action, building partnership capacity programs, drone strikes, and an energetic diplomatic campaign to encourage multilateral solutions to complex problems. Despite my problems with Obama's foreign policy, he has put far more emphasis on creating such a strategy than his predecessor did.
However, there are certainly other examples. In 1953, one of the worst foreign policy mistakes of the Cold War was made as the U.S. government decided to aid Britain in its coup d'etat of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh. The British were motivated by oil interests in Iran, and managed to convince Eisenhower that there was a link between Mossaddegh and the Communists. There was, but the threat was far overstated. The Tudeh Party of Iran and the National Front had a mutual interest in liberating Iranian oil from the clutches of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but nothing more. Mossedegh desperately needed a political ally to support his goal of nationalization, and the Tudeh happened to be that ally. However, the relationship was fragile and weak at best. The long term viability of the Tudeh in Iran was nil, and Mossedegh pursued the relationship out of necessity.
Economically, Mossaddegh's vision was to put Iran on a level in which it could profit from selling oil, and allow for open, competitive markets to form in Iran. Politically, he wanted to fully democratize the Iranian government. Neither of which is particularly in line with Communist thinking. Unfortunately, the Red Scare mentality permeated American foreign policy thinking. Instead of adapting to the new political change in Iran, accepting the economic benefits of Iranian nationalization, lowering the incentive to work with Communists by offering an olive branch, and attempting to mediate a diplomatic solution to British-Iranian disagreements, we decided to implement forced regime change. This set the undertones for the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which created the Iranian government we now have to contend with as a major strategic adversary.
So ultimately, while threats should never be understated, overstating their significance and threat is equally as dangerous. Whether it be from the fear of a terrorist suicide bombing in the U.S., or political change in another country. It is important for rationality to dominate policy making, and for the intelligence community to peel back the masks of our enemies. Otherwise, we risk deadly foreign entanglements and unnecessary conflicts abroad.
--Tom
Monday, September 23, 2013
The Case for Owls
In the battlefield that is the question of America's future foreign policy, there seems to exist a sharp and clear divide between "Hawks" and "Doves." For those unfamiliar with foreign policy nomenclature, Hawks and Doves are terms that have been used to describe politicians since the early days of American history. Hawks advocate for a hard line foreign policy centered around military force, and Doves typically advocate for more diplomatic solutions to issues. In today's polarized world, there seems to be no room for a middle ground in the foreign policy debate. The peripheries of the political spectrum--which are radical--have become the driving force of all American policies, to great detriment to our nation. You are either Conservative or Liberal; Keynesian or Austrian; Hawk or Dove.
However, I'd argue that both Doves and Hawks hold relatively unrealistic foreign policies. Hawks typically jump towards any sort of chance to flex American foreign policy. Obviously, this is a dangerous mindset. Entanglement, imperial overreach, debt, and a tired military are the results of such a mentality. And we have seen this happen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What was initially a mission to root out extremists turned into a decade long struggle to build a central government in Afghanistan. Iraq was an ill-conceived war based out of bad intelligence, neoconservative lobbying, and post-9/11 paranoia. At the same time, you do a reemergence of doves within the parties. Notably, Ron Paul advocates the ludicrous position of withdrawing all 900 military bases abroad. Rand Paul, his son, offers similar, if not less extreme, defense policies as well.
Instead of being a Hawk or a Dove, we should strive to be owls (to keep with the bird theme). A magnificent creature, the owl patiently watches the forest. It never unnecessarily gets involved physically, but watches closely to sense impending dangers. When it sees an interest at stake--say, a potential lunch--it ferociously lunges with mighty talons to swoop up its prey. This simple creature can be the example for the future of American foreign policy. Our core defense policies, in my opinion, should be based around three pillars: First, we should not directly embroil ourselves militarily in a situation where the use of such force is either unwarranted or ineffective. Instead, we should look at other tools in a foreign policy box. Such as sanctions, diplomatic engagement, or even covert operations to support an ally (there are military options that do not have to directly embroil us in a conflict; intelligence or SF support, for example). Second, we should maintain a powerful intelligence apparatus to keep track of current and potential threats. Third, we should maintain a powerful military force as to defend our interests as needed.
While the term Owl may not be a politician's first choice for a foreign policy label, it's certainly the best one in today's world. An over-dependence on military resources has undermined American interests abroad, and has made us lose sight of how effective diplomacy, soft power, and economic engagement can be. At the same time, our prior mistakes with military force shouldn't scare us from using it in situations that call for such action.
--Tom
Wednesday, September 18, 2013
Transgenderism in the Military
Recently, I came across an interesting study on transgenderism in the military. According to the Williams Institute, transgendered Americans are twice as likely to join the military compared to the rest of the country. Which is, all things considered, an amazingly hilarious dose of irony. Easily, the most underrepresented and discriminated against social group in America is also one of the most likely to risk their lives for our country. Amidst the patriotic chants, pro-American fund raisers, and cries of anti-Americanism, that permeates much of the radical right movement today, a group that they consider a danger to the social fabric of the United States is also more than willing to protect our nation.
Now, I don't why they are so likely to join the military. At it's core, transgenderism goes against the social norms in the America. Whereas the military is about uniformity, the status quo, and (often) implementing policies that reflect such social norms. However, I do have a theory. Like the African American and Japanese American units during World War Two, which are among the most decorated, transgender individuals want to prove themselves. Even if they have to be quiet about who they are.
Disgustingly, though, their high rates of service are also coupled with a high rate of discrimination by the military (and society, too). Transgendered service members are prohibited from serving openly under mental health policies, which consider non-conformative gender identities to be a mental illness. These policies disregard the fact that transgenderism hasn't been considered a mental illness in over twenty years by either the American Psychological or Psychiatric Associations.
Hopefully, bans on service members being transgender will be lifted in the coming years. The major issues surrounding their service, in my mind, lies mostly in issues that are easily solvable. Plenty of distinguished people have served in the closet, and the military is doing itself no favors by polarizing a potential source of talent.
--Tom
Now, I don't why they are so likely to join the military. At it's core, transgenderism goes against the social norms in the America. Whereas the military is about uniformity, the status quo, and (often) implementing policies that reflect such social norms. However, I do have a theory. Like the African American and Japanese American units during World War Two, which are among the most decorated, transgender individuals want to prove themselves. Even if they have to be quiet about who they are.
Disgustingly, though, their high rates of service are also coupled with a high rate of discrimination by the military (and society, too). Transgendered service members are prohibited from serving openly under mental health policies, which consider non-conformative gender identities to be a mental illness. These policies disregard the fact that transgenderism hasn't been considered a mental illness in over twenty years by either the American Psychological or Psychiatric Associations.
Hopefully, bans on service members being transgender will be lifted in the coming years. The major issues surrounding their service, in my mind, lies mostly in issues that are easily solvable. Plenty of distinguished people have served in the closet, and the military is doing itself no favors by polarizing a potential source of talent.
--Tom
Sunday, September 15, 2013
Diplomacy, War, and Syria
The situation in Syria has seemingly taken a turn for the better. Following Kerry's non-literal remarks on how Syria could avoid military strikes by turning over its chemical weapons, the Russian and Syrian foreign ministers came out and endorsed the plan. Which is an exciting, but almost sad, development. The diplomatic route was viewed by the Obama Administration incredulously, given that the State Department quickly clarified Kerry's proposal as being one that illustrated the absurdity of Assad's regime, and wasn't to be taken seriously.
No doubt, this the development seems to be the result of our willingness to use force. The behavior of Assad's regime has seemingly been altered due to our threats, something that I thought was unlikely to occur. So I will congratulate the Obama administration for being willing to use force. Without that, Assad probably wouldn't have gone to the negotiating tables, and a plan to deal with the national security threat emanating from the instability of the war would have never begun to be drafted by major international players.
Now, this isn't to imply that the Obama administration deserves a round of applause for its Syrian policies in general. When it comes down to it, this diplomatic stratagem was not the endgame of our threatened use of force; rather, it was an accidental byproduct of an interview coupled with Syrian fears over our planned strikes. The Obama administration never intended for this to happen, and thus, we shouldn't consider this as an incident of competent and out-of-the-box foreign policy thinking from Obama. Instead, we should question why our leaders never seriously pursued this route in the first place following our initial threats.
Of course, negotiations are still in the early phases. And there are myriad of logistical, security, and political complexities surrounding getting those chemical weapons. For all we know, Assad might leave negotiations. Or, he might not hand over all his weapons. For now, though, I'm glad that Kerry accidentally came up with a good idea.
--Tom
No doubt, this the development seems to be the result of our willingness to use force. The behavior of Assad's regime has seemingly been altered due to our threats, something that I thought was unlikely to occur. So I will congratulate the Obama administration for being willing to use force. Without that, Assad probably wouldn't have gone to the negotiating tables, and a plan to deal with the national security threat emanating from the instability of the war would have never begun to be drafted by major international players.
Now, this isn't to imply that the Obama administration deserves a round of applause for its Syrian policies in general. When it comes down to it, this diplomatic stratagem was not the endgame of our threatened use of force; rather, it was an accidental byproduct of an interview coupled with Syrian fears over our planned strikes. The Obama administration never intended for this to happen, and thus, we shouldn't consider this as an incident of competent and out-of-the-box foreign policy thinking from Obama. Instead, we should question why our leaders never seriously pursued this route in the first place following our initial threats.
Of course, negotiations are still in the early phases. And there are myriad of logistical, security, and political complexities surrounding getting those chemical weapons. For all we know, Assad might leave negotiations. Or, he might not hand over all his weapons. For now, though, I'm glad that Kerry accidentally came up with a good idea.
--Tom
Sunday, September 1, 2013
How Would American Credibility Really Be Affected If We Backed down?
Whether we like politics or not, it's the defining factor in conducting military action. The utilization of force upon other nations absent political objectives is a dangerous game, which will oftentimes lead to a complex foreign entanglement or a failed military operation all together. We've seen this in multiple U.S. military operations over the past 15 years: both Operation Desert Fox and Operation Infinite Reach are prime examples that relate closely to our current predicament in Syria. Lobbing 25, 50, or even 100 missiles doesn't really do much to persuade another nation to submit to your will, especially when you're targeting infrastructure that isn't crucial to ongoing operations. All it does is make it look as if your administration is doing something tough. Given that this is the administration's current position--looking tough--I am against military strikes
However, many proponents of strikes against Syria argue that we need to "look tough" against Assad just to maintain regional credibility. This is a valid point. Credibility is important, especially for a hegemonic power like the United States. Without it, the effectiveness of American diplomacy falters as nations begin to question our word. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini might question American commitment to keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Given the climacteric importance of that issue right now in regional politics, it's obviously important to maintain our credibility in the eyes of Iran.
What advocates lose track of, though, is the fact that threats are partially validated by a nation's interests in a given scenario, and partially validated by the resources placed by that nation in the region. Our interests in preventing Assad from using chemical weapons on a small scale are questionable, and the resources we deployed to the region were primarily to protect allies--like Turkey--from being hit by chemical missiles; hence, why Assad flouted our threat.
Yes, the United States doesn't want a precedent for widespread use to be set. But Assad's use thus far hasn't begun to set such a precedent. His chemical attacks have been far less devastating than Saddam's gas attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, and are on par with the Egyptian artillery bombardments during the North Yemen Civil War. Neither country was punished for their actions, and, miraculously, no precedent for widespread use was set. So what makes two incidents of use by Assad any different? It doesn't. Unless Assad starts to conduct massive, World War One scale attacks on rebel positions, I'd say that he isn't changing the overall international dynamic on the use of chemical weapons.
Let's compare this to a nuclear Iran. Not only would that shift the power dynamic in the Middle East towards their favor, it would also give them more negotiating power in diplomatic talks. It would act as an anvil over the head of America that would decrease our ability to deal with their sponsorship of terrorism. There's also a good possibility that nuclear proliferation would become rampant in the Middle East, and a regional cold war could develop. Our credibility in the region would definitely be shot then, as the promise to keep Iran nuke free is crucial to our relationships. Then, of course, you have the potential use of a nuclear weapon against Israel, wiping out one of our closest allies. So it's obvious that we have major interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons, and backing down from our Syrian strikes doesn't change that obvious fact.
Furthermore, backing down from Syria wouldn't change the reality that we have a massive military force in the region posited towards striking Iran. Nor would it lessen the seriousness of the most stringent sanctions we have recently passed against Iran. Not only is it clear that American interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons exist, it's also clear that we are more than willing to use force to make sure that interest is met.
So while American credibility will be damaged, it will not be destroyed. We have shown time and time again that we will intervene on behalf of our interests, whether it be in the form of a drone strike, aerial intervention, or a cross border raid. Countries like Iran realize this, and thus backing down from striking in a situation where we have no interests will not existentially endanger our regional vision for the Middle East.
--Tom
However, many proponents of strikes against Syria argue that we need to "look tough" against Assad just to maintain regional credibility. This is a valid point. Credibility is important, especially for a hegemonic power like the United States. Without it, the effectiveness of American diplomacy falters as nations begin to question our word. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini might question American commitment to keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Given the climacteric importance of that issue right now in regional politics, it's obviously important to maintain our credibility in the eyes of Iran.
What advocates lose track of, though, is the fact that threats are partially validated by a nation's interests in a given scenario, and partially validated by the resources placed by that nation in the region. Our interests in preventing Assad from using chemical weapons on a small scale are questionable, and the resources we deployed to the region were primarily to protect allies--like Turkey--from being hit by chemical missiles; hence, why Assad flouted our threat.
Yes, the United States doesn't want a precedent for widespread use to be set. But Assad's use thus far hasn't begun to set such a precedent. His chemical attacks have been far less devastating than Saddam's gas attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, and are on par with the Egyptian artillery bombardments during the North Yemen Civil War. Neither country was punished for their actions, and, miraculously, no precedent for widespread use was set. So what makes two incidents of use by Assad any different? It doesn't. Unless Assad starts to conduct massive, World War One scale attacks on rebel positions, I'd say that he isn't changing the overall international dynamic on the use of chemical weapons.
Let's compare this to a nuclear Iran. Not only would that shift the power dynamic in the Middle East towards their favor, it would also give them more negotiating power in diplomatic talks. It would act as an anvil over the head of America that would decrease our ability to deal with their sponsorship of terrorism. There's also a good possibility that nuclear proliferation would become rampant in the Middle East, and a regional cold war could develop. Our credibility in the region would definitely be shot then, as the promise to keep Iran nuke free is crucial to our relationships. Then, of course, you have the potential use of a nuclear weapon against Israel, wiping out one of our closest allies. So it's obvious that we have major interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons, and backing down from our Syrian strikes doesn't change that obvious fact.
Furthermore, backing down from Syria wouldn't change the reality that we have a massive military force in the region posited towards striking Iran. Nor would it lessen the seriousness of the most stringent sanctions we have recently passed against Iran. Not only is it clear that American interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons exist, it's also clear that we are more than willing to use force to make sure that interest is met.
So while American credibility will be damaged, it will not be destroyed. We have shown time and time again that we will intervene on behalf of our interests, whether it be in the form of a drone strike, aerial intervention, or a cross border raid. Countries like Iran realize this, and thus backing down from striking in a situation where we have no interests will not existentially endanger our regional vision for the Middle East.
--Tom
Sunday, August 4, 2013
Guest Post: American Drone Policy
Now, don’t get me wrong, I am strong supporter of drone strikes. I believe that they are, in fact, an effective means that efficiently eliminates a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties and without putting American boots on the ground. Indeed, they have been at the forefront of the elimination of various terrorists, including several high ranking members of al-Qaeda and their allies.
Looking at this chart (here), we can get an idea of just how effective they are at eliminating a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties. Since 2006, some 2,500 members of various jihadist organizations have been killed while only 153 civilians have been killed. I say “only” like I don’t care about civilians dying—I do—it’s just the numbers are incredibly low when compared to how many actual, or suspected, militants we have killed.
Let’s also look at Yemen’s chart: here. It should be noted that the drone program in Yemen is relatively new compared to the one in Pakistan. However, besides 2009, the same basic pattern continues. Please understand that the numbers in both of these charts are a very well educated guess. The reporting in Taliban or allied controlled areas is very minimal, at best.
Drones also have another beneficial aspect to their use: The disruption of enemy movements. Drone strikes are incredibly good at shaking up enemy movements, which subsequently, hinder their ability to coordinate attacks either on the regional scale or the global scale. This disruption of enemy movement is, in itself, a good thing; however, like my good friend and colleague Tom (military theorist) points out:
“While it's useful in that is constantly disrupts A.Q. and insurgent leadership, there are situations where a strike may do more harm than good. Especially when you are dealing with strikes on low level peons and the such.
Killing terrorists isn't the endgame in itself, but rather a method to mitigate the effects of a terrorist organization. The endgame is to render the group operationally neutered and to significantly lower growth. That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization. Sometimes this isn't always possible, so the drone strikes at the very least disrupt operations.”
I could not agree more with his assessment. While impacting movements disrupts operations, it does nothing for our end goals. Before I move on to why my opinion is changing, I’d like to elaborate on what he said here: “That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization”. This is, in essence, what needs to happen in order to successfully counter the terrorism threats; however, like he also pointed out, that isn’t always possible. Take Pakistan, for example, either out of unwillingness or incompetency, they do not do hardly enough to curtail the jihadist threat they face in their country—which often spills over into Afghanistan. In places like Pakistan, it may be in our best interests to use drones to try and curb the jihadists, rather than to wait and rely on Pakistan to do it themselves.
However, like Mr. Bill Roggio points out in the first link, our drone policy has essentially become a substitute for an actual comprehensive strategy to deal with terrorism. Under the Obama Administration, the drone program has increased substantially, when compared to when it was first started in 2002. To quote Mr. Roggio: “One problem I have with the administration’s view on this is that it seems to think that just killing some of al Qaeda’s top leaders will cause al Qaeda to collapse. But the organization just isn’t going away - it’s evolved over time to include other terrorist groups …”. This couldn’t be truer in how the current Administration sees the use of drones and our current strategy.
While drones have taken out a multitude of terrorists, including senior leaders, have the groups disbanded or otherwise collapsed? Not really. So where does that leave us? It leaves us with a severe conundrum in our counter-terrorism strategies. Either continue the over-reliance on drones or form a new, comprehensive strategy that entails every aspect of terrorism and how drones may be used appropriately. With our over-reliance on drones, it leaves us with a few disadvantages.
First off, like Mr. Rodriguez (former CIA) points out here: click
As the result of our cancellation of the detainee program and because we no longer capture anyone, we’ve instead turned to killing everyone. Because of this, we can no longer obtain valuable information from held militants. This information can include anything from future plots, coordination, key players, relationships between terrorist organizations, and a wide range of other questions—all of which, we can no longer ask. Mr. Rodriguez brings up the Boston Bombings and how if we could question those held at G-Bay or if we still captured people, we could then cross-reference what held militants know in correlation to Tameralan Tsarnaev or the larger North Caucasian jihadist movement. He ends the article by saying: “The U.S. also cannot ask recently captured terrorists whether they have heard of Tsarnaev, whether they have seen anyone matching his description or whether they know of any of his associates. We can’t do any of these because we don’t capture terrorists anymore. In order to avoid the challenges of detention and interrogation – and to escape the harsh judgment of human rights activists – by and large we simply kill them.”. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg.
Drone strikes can also encourage sympathy for terrorist organizations, which in turn, can lead to recruitment opportunities for the very same groups we’re targeting. Not to mention, they are an excellent propaganda piece for AQ and Co (plus all the public anger that is attributed to drone strikes. But, one should know, that while leaders in Pakistan or Yemen publicly denounce the strikes, they secretly support them or even sign off on them—source).
Let me reiterate before I end: I am not calling for an end to the drone program, as I am big supporter of their utilization. Instead, I am calling for a change in drone policy; one that looks at certain considerations when using drones and how to appropriately use them. Our over-reliance on drones might have more long-term strategic consequences than what various figures in the Obama Administration may think. A serious change needs to happen in our counter-terrorism policies, and the first step is creating a comprehensive strategy: Something the last two administrations have failed at doing.
Looking at this chart (here), we can get an idea of just how effective they are at eliminating a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties. Since 2006, some 2,500 members of various jihadist organizations have been killed while only 153 civilians have been killed. I say “only” like I don’t care about civilians dying—I do—it’s just the numbers are incredibly low when compared to how many actual, or suspected, militants we have killed.
Let’s also look at Yemen’s chart: here. It should be noted that the drone program in Yemen is relatively new compared to the one in Pakistan. However, besides 2009, the same basic pattern continues. Please understand that the numbers in both of these charts are a very well educated guess. The reporting in Taliban or allied controlled areas is very minimal, at best.
Drones also have another beneficial aspect to their use: The disruption of enemy movements. Drone strikes are incredibly good at shaking up enemy movements, which subsequently, hinder their ability to coordinate attacks either on the regional scale or the global scale. This disruption of enemy movement is, in itself, a good thing; however, like my good friend and colleague Tom (military theorist) points out:
“While it's useful in that is constantly disrupts A.Q. and insurgent leadership, there are situations where a strike may do more harm than good. Especially when you are dealing with strikes on low level peons and the such.
Killing terrorists isn't the endgame in itself, but rather a method to mitigate the effects of a terrorist organization. The endgame is to render the group operationally neutered and to significantly lower growth. That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization. Sometimes this isn't always possible, so the drone strikes at the very least disrupt operations.”
I could not agree more with his assessment. While impacting movements disrupts operations, it does nothing for our end goals. Before I move on to why my opinion is changing, I’d like to elaborate on what he said here: “That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization”. This is, in essence, what needs to happen in order to successfully counter the terrorism threats; however, like he also pointed out, that isn’t always possible. Take Pakistan, for example, either out of unwillingness or incompetency, they do not do hardly enough to curtail the jihadist threat they face in their country—which often spills over into Afghanistan. In places like Pakistan, it may be in our best interests to use drones to try and curb the jihadists, rather than to wait and rely on Pakistan to do it themselves.
However, like Mr. Bill Roggio points out in the first link, our drone policy has essentially become a substitute for an actual comprehensive strategy to deal with terrorism. Under the Obama Administration, the drone program has increased substantially, when compared to when it was first started in 2002. To quote Mr. Roggio: “One problem I have with the administration’s view on this is that it seems to think that just killing some of al Qaeda’s top leaders will cause al Qaeda to collapse. But the organization just isn’t going away - it’s evolved over time to include other terrorist groups …”. This couldn’t be truer in how the current Administration sees the use of drones and our current strategy.
While drones have taken out a multitude of terrorists, including senior leaders, have the groups disbanded or otherwise collapsed? Not really. So where does that leave us? It leaves us with a severe conundrum in our counter-terrorism strategies. Either continue the over-reliance on drones or form a new, comprehensive strategy that entails every aspect of terrorism and how drones may be used appropriately. With our over-reliance on drones, it leaves us with a few disadvantages.
First off, like Mr. Rodriguez (former CIA) points out here: click
As the result of our cancellation of the detainee program and because we no longer capture anyone, we’ve instead turned to killing everyone. Because of this, we can no longer obtain valuable information from held militants. This information can include anything from future plots, coordination, key players, relationships between terrorist organizations, and a wide range of other questions—all of which, we can no longer ask. Mr. Rodriguez brings up the Boston Bombings and how if we could question those held at G-Bay or if we still captured people, we could then cross-reference what held militants know in correlation to Tameralan Tsarnaev or the larger North Caucasian jihadist movement. He ends the article by saying: “The U.S. also cannot ask recently captured terrorists whether they have heard of Tsarnaev, whether they have seen anyone matching his description or whether they know of any of his associates. We can’t do any of these because we don’t capture terrorists anymore. In order to avoid the challenges of detention and interrogation – and to escape the harsh judgment of human rights activists – by and large we simply kill them.”. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg.
Drone strikes can also encourage sympathy for terrorist organizations, which in turn, can lead to recruitment opportunities for the very same groups we’re targeting. Not to mention, they are an excellent propaganda piece for AQ and Co (plus all the public anger that is attributed to drone strikes. But, one should know, that while leaders in Pakistan or Yemen publicly denounce the strikes, they secretly support them or even sign off on them—source).
Let me reiterate before I end: I am not calling for an end to the drone program, as I am big supporter of their utilization. Instead, I am calling for a change in drone policy; one that looks at certain considerations when using drones and how to appropriately use them. Our over-reliance on drones might have more long-term strategic consequences than what various figures in the Obama Administration may think. A serious change needs to happen in our counter-terrorism policies, and the first step is creating a comprehensive strategy: Something the last two administrations have failed at doing.
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