On the Iranian Deal

While I would say that the general consensus on the recent Iranian deal has been positive, there are certainly a number of unhappy campers. And I'm sure that their numbers will only increase as the week drags on. Typical arguments include rehashed comparisons of Munich, lots of cries about appeasement, the Iranians made no concessions, etc.

Right off the bat, it's important to note that this is a tentative interim deal designed to build up trust between America and Iran. Hence, why its provisions only extend for half a year. It lays a foundation for further talks, something rather historic when you consider that this is the first time since 1979 that Iranian and American diplomats have left the tables not frustrated with each other.

 The deal freezes uranium enrichment past 5% for the next six months and chemically dilutes their 20% stockpiles. Couple that with the IAEA inspectors that will now be present at their facilities (including Arak), and you have a framework that prevents weaponization for at least the next six months. That can hardly be construed as a failure, unless you hold the outlandish and unrealistic expectation that Iran can be pushed to dismantle their entire program without regime change (which would probably come after a nasty civil war, no less) or invasion. Both of those scenarios are bad for American interests, obviously.

There are certain critics that believe that goodwill won't matter to the regime, but I disagree. The Iranians are worried that the United States is seeking regime change, which makes sense after: the coup in 1953, being labelled as apart of the 'axis of evil' in 2002, the invasion of Iraq which created fear of strategic encirclement, and Bush refusing a genuine nuclear deal in '03 because his administration thought that Iran was on the brink of collapse. Put yourself in the shoes of an Iranian politician. In your eyes, America isn't looking just for a deal to remove your nuclear weapons capability, they're looking for a deal that would remove a possible instrument of national power in order to pursue regime change. If you sign a deal, then your biggest fear is the American government reimposing sanctions, which would prevent you from ever rebuilding your nuclear capacity. This puts you in position where you're even more worried about forced regime change by the American government. Especially since the United States government has a long history of supporting coups--including one against your own country. You need some sort of tentative deal to test the waters. 


Now, put yourself in the shoes of an American diplomat. Iran has a long history of regional destabilization. They use their conventional forces to exert pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, and use unconventional forces to gain geopolitical capital globally. You're afraid that by relenting too much, the Iranians will quickly go back on their word and develop a nuclear bomb. Therefore, sanctions on their oil and banking assets need to remain in place. That way, the pressure on the regime is still a present threat to their long term economic and political health.


That's why the deal is rather provisional. Neither party trusts each other completely, and needs an easy exit if the other retracts on their side of the deal. It's hardly appeasement, and it's even worse to compare it to Munich. Appeasement would be lifting all sanctions on their assets and allowing them to continue enrichment. Thus far, we have not been doing that. The lifted sanctions give them roughly 7 billionUSD in assets while keeping in place the most stringent sanctions. This isn't the end of the world, but it is moving towards a better precedent for cooperation between America and Iran. I think we can all agree that is a positive development.

-- Tom

Security Sector Reform

Following the advice of Diana Weuger, I'm going to begin focusing most of my posts on a single issue. For the time being, that's going to be Security Sector Reform. I'm writing an essay on Security Sector Reform in transitioning democratic countries for a U.S. Institute of Peace contest, so it'll go hand in hand together with my project. I won't post my essay up here until late April, when the contest is over. However, between now and then I be will post my musings and ideas on the subject. So expect me to blog more and more on this issue in the coming weeks.

For now, I have an idea of how I think Security Sector Reform should go:

First, the international community should seek to create strong civilian oversight. The military is often seen as the most competent body in many transitioning countries, especially since they were probably the strongest branch of the government prior to whatever crisis caused the collapse of the indigenous political system. It's tempting to place them in charge, but you then run the risk of a military junta or dictatorship. Similar to what we've seen throughout South America or Egypt today.

Second, there needs to be dedicated advisors and units that form long lasting bonds with their counter parts in the host countries. Bringing back the same officers and units to these transitioning nations recurrently for bilateral operations and advising missions creates a group that understands the challenges the host country faces. Not only this, but the bonds build upon themselves. That way, the host country does not have to form new relationships with officers and NCOs they will never see again after six to twelve months.

Third, gender and security sector reform closely intertwined. Most men don'tt understand women's issues, let alone care about solving them in post-conflict countries. Obviously, women are affected by conflict just as men are. Rape is frequently used as a tool of war, and there aren't many opportunities for women in transitioning countries to begin with. This necessitates some sort of female oversight or involvement to get the job done (not to say that men shouldn't be involved in solving women's issues, of course). Moreover, women offer their own unique take on a variety of issues. Gender affects our perception of things, which in turn makes women very relevant in Security Sector Reform.

Fourth, the job of local security forces is to facilitate political, economic, and social engagement, by creating an atmosphere of security in the host country. This requires close cooperation between political and military entities. The overall goal is to create long-lasting stability, but this does not occur through the military alone. If the underlying socio-economic issues are not addressed, then the host country is doomed to a perpetual cycle of conflict.

That's just what I have for now. I'll go into more depth later on!

--Tom