Monday, November 25, 2013

On the Iranian Deal


While I would say that the general consensus on the recent Iranian deal has been positive, there are certainly a number of unhappy campers. And I'm sure that their numbers will only increase as the week drags on. Typical arguments include rehashed comparisons of Munich, lots of cries about appeasement, the Iranians made no concessions, etc.

Right off the bat, it's important to note that this is a tentative interim deal designed to build up trust between America and Iran. Hence, why its provisions only extend for half a year. It lays a foundation for further talks, something rather historic when you consider that this is the first time since 1979 that Iranian and American diplomats have left the tables not frustrated with each other.

 The deal freezes uranium enrichment past 5% for the next six months and chemically dilutes their 20% stockpiles. Couple that with the IAEA inspectors that will now be present at their facilities (including Arak), and you have a framework that prevents weaponization for at least the next six months. That can hardly be construed as a failure, unless you hold the outlandish and unrealistic expectation that Iran can be pushed to dismantle their entire program without regime change (which would probably come after a nasty civil war, no less) or invasion. Both of those scenarios are bad for American interests, obviously.

There are certain critics that believe that goodwill won't matter to the regime, but I disagree. The Iranians are worried that the United States is seeking regime change, which makes sense after: the coup in 1953, being labelled as apart of the 'axis of evil' in 2002, the invasion of Iraq which created fear of strategic encirclement, and Bush refusing a genuine nuclear deal in '03 because his administration thought that Iran was on the brink of collapse. Put yourself in the shoes of an Iranian politician. In your eyes, America isn't looking just for a deal to remove your nuclear weapons capability, they're looking for a deal that would remove a possible instrument of national power in order to pursue regime change. If you sign a deal, then your biggest fear is the American government reimposing sanctions, which would prevent you from ever rebuilding your nuclear capacity. This puts you in position where you're even more worried about forced regime change by the American government. Especially since the United States government has a long history of supporting coups--including one against your own country. You need some sort of tentative deal to test the waters. 


Now, put yourself in the shoes of an American diplomat. Iran has a long history of regional destabilization. They use their conventional forces to exert pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, and use unconventional forces to gain geopolitical capital globally. You're afraid that by relenting too much, the Iranians will quickly go back on their word and develop a nuclear bomb. Therefore, sanctions on their oil and banking assets need to remain in place. That way, the pressure on the regime is still a present threat to their long term economic and political health.


That's why the deal is rather provisional. Neither party trusts each other completely, and needs an easy exit if the other retracts on their side of the deal. It's hardly appeasement, and it's even worse to compare it to Munich. Appeasement would be lifting all sanctions on their assets and allowing them to continue enrichment. Thus far, we have not been doing that. The lifted sanctions give them roughly 7 billionUSD in assets while keeping in place the most stringent sanctions. This isn't the end of the world, but it is moving towards a better precedent for cooperation between America and Iran. I think we can all agree that is a positive development.

-- Tom

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