China's Air Defense Identification Zone

Recently, there's been a flurry of activity surrounding China's establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. The ADIZ covers the disputed Senkaku Islands, South Korea's research facility on Socotra Rock and overlaps into Japan's own ADIZ (and more recently, South Korea's ADIZ). The move has been seen by many to be a belligerent attempt to exercise control over the air traffic above the Senkaku Islands, especially since China requires all planes to identify themselves if requested. Contrast this with Japan, which only requires planes on a vector to Japanese territory to identify themselves. Given the number of airspace violations by the Russian and Chinese governments, Tokyo officials seem especially justified in their exercise of an ADIZ.

The move by Beijing is another example of China throwing its weight in the region, especially over territorial disputes. Over the past several years, the Chinese government has increased maritime operations in these disputed zones. China has enforced an all but officially declared blockade of the Scarborough Shoal. Coast Guard vessels have been routinely sent into the waters around disputed Sino-Japanese islands. But this recent move seems to be an escalation of the disputes to a new domain: the air.

However, there is also another trend in Chinese behavior. In many respects, this new emphasis on foreign disputes could be seen as an attempt by the Communist Party to spark nationalistic tendencies over their domestic population. Following the most recent plenum, the Chinese government established its own State Security Council--which is structured around our National Security Council. This development partially reflects the Communist Party's growing apprehension over unrest in semi-autonomous regions like Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as its general non-autonomous population. As economic liberalization and growth continues to grow, China will have to balance out the inevitable demand for more political power in the population with maintaining the state's political control. More likely than not, this will take the form of appeals to nationalism coupled with extensive and harsh mechanisms to deal with internal dissents.

As Daniel Drezner notes, Authoritarian Capitalism typically doesn't work. It becomes too hard for the state to justify its harsh policies as the society gains more economic power, becomes more educated, and realizes that authoritarianism is in many ways holding them back. So, the question for regional players becomes apparently obvious: if the power of the Communist Party in China is under threat, will they instigate conflict in order to consolidate power through nationalism? It largely depends on how China perceives our intended response to aggression. The United States has the capability to completely sink the Chinese economy, which would reciprocally severely endanger the CCP's grasp on power. However, would the United States really engage in such a war with China over, say, a small ambush on a Japanese patrol? Would such a small flashpoint rally Chinese nationalism and focus? To former of the two, the answer is unlikely. To latter, probably. There were riots after Japan bought the Senkaku Islands from their private owners, imagine the outrage if Japanese and Chinese planes went head to head in combat.

So China is probably unlikely to engage in a large military operation in the East China Sea, especially given the economic consequences of full-fleged American action. At the same time, a small flashpoint might be a good way to focus domestic discontent on a foreign enemy, while also minimizing the chance of large scale America reprisal. As the United States continues its pivot towards the Pacific, leaders need to remember that the risk of China launching an A2/AD campaign in the Pacific is rather low. War is more likely to occur from a series of escalatory actions, which could start out with a small battle between Japanese and Chinese planes or patrol ships.



--Tom

Defining Security Sector Reform

Before I go too in depth on the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR) on this blog, it's probably important to try defining the term. That's easier said than done. Security Sector Reform is a rather contemporary idea that arose out of attempts to reform the internal security and defense establishments within post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Even though it lacks a formal definition, most experts agree that it is integral in stabilizing post-conflict states emerging from violent inter-state war or internal turmoil.

Security Sector - Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the security sector has been continually expanded in its width. Security is no longer just about military structures, it encompasses a wide array of issues pertaining to public safety. For the time being, I'm going to define this as government institutions tasked with maintaining the safety of both the people and state. This includes intelligence agencies, police forces, gendarmerie, border officials, and the military. Arguably, there are also de facto institutions tasked with providing for the security of the people and state as well. Paramilitary groups can be useful allies to the state, and serve as a first line of defense for vulnerable communities. Furthermore, if there a divide in the trust between the people and state, pro-government militias can act as an intermediary.

Security Sector Reform - In essence, Security Sector Reform is about ensuring that the security sector is not only capable of protecting the state, but also the people living under it. In most transitioning nations, security forces were previously tasked with ensuring the security of the state. This means that their policies and doctrines will likely reflect hardline approaches that aren't generally concerned with the wellbeing of the people. The police in an authoritarian state typically don't have to worry about getting warrants, respecting the rights of a citizen, or going through with a fair judicial system. The military is more equipped to kill innocents passively resisting the state or implement scorched earth policies than adequately conduct combat operations. Therefore, reforming these policies and creating better relationships between the security sector and people reflect the primary goals of SSR

So that's the definition that I will be using for the time being. If any reader wants to add anything or correct my definition, please feel free to do so in the comment section below!

--Tom

On the Iranian Deal

While I would say that the general consensus on the recent Iranian deal has been positive, there are certainly a number of unhappy campers. And I'm sure that their numbers will only increase as the week drags on. Typical arguments include rehashed comparisons of Munich, lots of cries about appeasement, the Iranians made no concessions, etc.

Right off the bat, it's important to note that this is a tentative interim deal designed to build up trust between America and Iran. Hence, why its provisions only extend for half a year. It lays a foundation for further talks, something rather historic when you consider that this is the first time since 1979 that Iranian and American diplomats have left the tables not frustrated with each other.

 The deal freezes uranium enrichment past 5% for the next six months and chemically dilutes their 20% stockpiles. Couple that with the IAEA inspectors that will now be present at their facilities (including Arak), and you have a framework that prevents weaponization for at least the next six months. That can hardly be construed as a failure, unless you hold the outlandish and unrealistic expectation that Iran can be pushed to dismantle their entire program without regime change (which would probably come after a nasty civil war, no less) or invasion. Both of those scenarios are bad for American interests, obviously.

There are certain critics that believe that goodwill won't matter to the regime, but I disagree. The Iranians are worried that the United States is seeking regime change, which makes sense after: the coup in 1953, being labelled as apart of the 'axis of evil' in 2002, the invasion of Iraq which created fear of strategic encirclement, and Bush refusing a genuine nuclear deal in '03 because his administration thought that Iran was on the brink of collapse. Put yourself in the shoes of an Iranian politician. In your eyes, America isn't looking just for a deal to remove your nuclear weapons capability, they're looking for a deal that would remove a possible instrument of national power in order to pursue regime change. If you sign a deal, then your biggest fear is the American government reimposing sanctions, which would prevent you from ever rebuilding your nuclear capacity. This puts you in position where you're even more worried about forced regime change by the American government. Especially since the United States government has a long history of supporting coups--including one against your own country. You need some sort of tentative deal to test the waters. 


Now, put yourself in the shoes of an American diplomat. Iran has a long history of regional destabilization. They use their conventional forces to exert pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, and use unconventional forces to gain geopolitical capital globally. You're afraid that by relenting too much, the Iranians will quickly go back on their word and develop a nuclear bomb. Therefore, sanctions on their oil and banking assets need to remain in place. That way, the pressure on the regime is still a present threat to their long term economic and political health.


That's why the deal is rather provisional. Neither party trusts each other completely, and needs an easy exit if the other retracts on their side of the deal. It's hardly appeasement, and it's even worse to compare it to Munich. Appeasement would be lifting all sanctions on their assets and allowing them to continue enrichment. Thus far, we have not been doing that. The lifted sanctions give them roughly 7 billionUSD in assets while keeping in place the most stringent sanctions. This isn't the end of the world, but it is moving towards a better precedent for cooperation between America and Iran. I think we can all agree that is a positive development.

-- Tom

Security Sector Reform

Following the advice of Diana Weuger, I'm going to begin focusing most of my posts on a single issue. For the time being, that's going to be Security Sector Reform. I'm writing an essay on Security Sector Reform in transitioning democratic countries for a U.S. Institute of Peace contest, so it'll go hand in hand together with my project. I won't post my essay up here until late April, when the contest is over. However, between now and then I be will post my musings and ideas on the subject. So expect me to blog more and more on this issue in the coming weeks.

For now, I have an idea of how I think Security Sector Reform should go:

First, the international community should seek to create strong civilian oversight. The military is often seen as the most competent body in many transitioning countries, especially since they were probably the strongest branch of the government prior to whatever crisis caused the collapse of the indigenous political system. It's tempting to place them in charge, but you then run the risk of a military junta or dictatorship. Similar to what we've seen throughout South America or Egypt today.

Second, there needs to be dedicated advisors and units that form long lasting bonds with their counter parts in the host countries. Bringing back the same officers and units to these transitioning nations recurrently for bilateral operations and advising missions creates a group that understands the challenges the host country faces. Not only this, but the bonds build upon themselves. That way, the host country does not have to form new relationships with officers and NCOs they will never see again after six to twelve months.

Third, gender and security sector reform closely intertwined. Most men don'tt understand women's issues, let alone care about solving them in post-conflict countries. Obviously, women are affected by conflict just as men are. Rape is frequently used as a tool of war, and there aren't many opportunities for women in transitioning countries to begin with. This necessitates some sort of female oversight or involvement to get the job done (not to say that men shouldn't be involved in solving women's issues, of course). Moreover, women offer their own unique take on a variety of issues. Gender affects our perception of things, which in turn makes women very relevant in Security Sector Reform.

Fourth, the job of local security forces is to facilitate political, economic, and social engagement, by creating an atmosphere of security in the host country. This requires close cooperation between political and military entities. The overall goal is to create long-lasting stability, but this does not occur through the military alone. If the underlying socio-economic issues are not addressed, then the host country is doomed to a perpetual cycle of conflict.

That's just what I have for now. I'll go into more depth later on!

--Tom

Making Mountains Out of Mole Hills

It's that time of year again, folks. People are busting out their ornate decorations, I have to wear my ridiculously cool German camouflage jacket to stay warm, and the leaves are turning into wonderful shades of orange and red. Of course, my favorite part of Autumn is the holiday of freight: Halloween. There isn't anything better than busting out my copy of The Blair Witch Project on October 31st to give myself the spooks.

When I was a young boy, the frightful costumes of my sister's friends would scare me. I didn't necessarily understand that behind the masks, they were just regular people. So my Halloween fun was drowned out by my fear of empty threats. I think this has a valuable lesson for the national security apparatus; sometimes states and groups seem much scarier than they actually are. You have to peel back their mask in order to get a good look at who they really are. America has a tendency to over-exaggerate the seriousness of a potential adversary, resulting in either an unnecessary response or ill-placed resources.

The primary threat I usually like to talk about is terrorism. While terrorism is in no way an empty threat, the ungodly amount of resources we devote towards mitigating its effects is ridiculous. We've sunk tens of billions into creating massive domestic spying systems, over a trillion dollars in Afghanistan, and another trillion into various counter-terrorism Department of Homeland Security programs. None of this makes since economically, of course. As the Economist pointed out in 2011, to justify current levels of DHS-CT spending, we would have to prevent well over 1,500 domestic terrorist attacks per year. To give you some context, this would make us a more dangerous terrorist safe-haven than Pakistan. So if the United States government underestimated the threat emanating from terrorism prior to 9/11, then we have certainly overestimated its seriousness in the post-9/11 security environment. This has resulted in an atrophy of resources to our domestic ills. We've neglected basic duties of government--such as highway matinance, the lack of which kills 14,000 per year--in order to deter a literal boogeyman from attacking us again.

In reality, a sensible and economical counter-terrorism program would absolutely gut DHS spending, end NSA domestic spying, and withdraw conventional American forces from Afghanistan. Instead of massive, conventional responses, the U.S. government ought to further invest into indirect action, building partnership capacity programs, drone strikes, and an energetic diplomatic campaign to encourage multilateral solutions to complex problems. Despite my problems with Obama's foreign policy, he has put far more emphasis on creating such a strategy than his predecessor did.

However, there are certainly other examples. In 1953, one of the worst foreign policy mistakes of the Cold War was made as the U.S. government decided to aid Britain in its coup d'etat of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh. The British were motivated by oil interests in Iran, and managed to convince Eisenhower that there was a link between Mossaddegh and the Communists. There was, but the threat was far overstated. The Tudeh Party of Iran and the National Front had a mutual interest in liberating Iranian oil from the clutches of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but nothing more. Mossedegh desperately needed a political ally to support his goal of nationalization, and the Tudeh happened to be that ally. However, the relationship was fragile and weak at best. The long term viability of the Tudeh in Iran was nil, and Mossedegh pursued the relationship out of necessity.

Economically, Mossaddegh's vision was to put Iran on a level in which it could profit from selling oil, and allow for open, competitive markets to form in Iran. Politically, he wanted to fully democratize the Iranian government. Neither of which is particularly in line with Communist thinking. Unfortunately, the Red Scare mentality permeated American foreign policy thinking. Instead of adapting to the new political change in Iran, accepting the economic benefits of Iranian nationalization, lowering the incentive to work with  Communists by offering an olive branch, and attempting to mediate a diplomatic solution to British-Iranian disagreements, we decided to implement forced regime change. This set the undertones for the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which created the Iranian government we now have to contend with as a major strategic adversary.

So ultimately, while threats should never be understated, overstating their significance and threat is equally as dangerous. Whether it be from the fear of a terrorist suicide bombing in the U.S., or political change in another country. It is important for rationality to dominate policy making, and for the intelligence community to peel back the masks of our enemies. Otherwise, we risk deadly foreign entanglements and unnecessary conflicts abroad.

--Tom

The Case for Owls

In the battlefield that is the question of America's future foreign policy, there seems to exist a sharp and clear divide between "Hawks" and "Doves." For those unfamiliar with foreign policy nomenclature, Hawks and Doves are terms that have been used to describe politicians since the early days of American history. Hawks advocate for a hard line foreign policy centered around military force, and Doves typically advocate for more diplomatic solutions to issues. In today's polarized world, there seems to be no room for a middle ground in the foreign policy debate. The peripheries of the political spectrum--which are radical--have become the driving force of all American policies, to great detriment to our nation. You are either Conservative or Liberal; Keynesian or Austrian; Hawk or Dove.

However, I'd argue that both Doves and Hawks hold relatively unrealistic foreign policies. Hawks typically jump towards any sort of chance to flex American foreign policy. Obviously, this is a dangerous mindset. Entanglement, imperial overreach, debt, and a tired military are the results of such a mentality. And we have seen this happen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What was initially a mission to root out extremists turned into a decade long struggle to build a central government in Afghanistan. Iraq was an ill-conceived war based out of bad intelligence, neoconservative lobbying, and post-9/11 paranoia. At the same time, you do a reemergence of doves within the parties. Notably, Ron Paul advocates the ludicrous position of withdrawing all 900 military bases abroad. Rand Paul, his son, offers similar, if not less extreme, defense policies as well.

Instead of being a Hawk or a Dove, we should strive to be owls (to keep with the bird theme). A magnificent creature, the owl patiently watches the forest. It never unnecessarily gets involved physically, but watches closely to sense impending dangers. When it sees an interest at stake--say, a potential lunch--it ferociously lunges with mighty talons to swoop up its prey. This simple creature can be the example for the future of American foreign policy. Our core defense policies, in my opinion, should be based around three pillars: First, we should not directly embroil ourselves militarily in a situation where the use of such force is either unwarranted or ineffective. Instead, we should look at other tools in a foreign policy box. Such as sanctions, diplomatic engagement, or even covert operations to support an ally (there are military options that do not have to directly embroil us in a conflict; intelligence or SF support, for example). Second, we should maintain a powerful intelligence apparatus to keep track of current and potential threats. Third, we should maintain a powerful military force as to defend our interests as needed.

While the term Owl may not be a politician's first choice for a foreign policy label, it's certainly the best one in today's world. An over-dependence on military resources has undermined American interests abroad, and has made us lose sight of how effective diplomacy, soft power, and economic engagement can be. At the same time, our prior mistakes with military force shouldn't scare us from using it in situations that call for such action.

--Tom

Transgenderism in the Military

Recently, I came across an interesting study on transgenderism in the military. According to the Williams Institute, transgendered Americans are twice as likely to join the military compared to the rest of the country. Which is, all things considered, an amazingly hilarious dose of irony. Easily, the most underrepresented and discriminated against social group in America is also one of the most likely to risk their lives for our country. Amidst the patriotic chants, pro-American fund raisers, and cries of anti-Americanism, that permeates much of the radical right movement today, a group that they consider a danger to the social fabric of the United States is also more than willing to protect our nation.

Now, I don't why they are so likely to join the military. At it's core, transgenderism goes against the social norms in the America. Whereas the military is about uniformity, the status quo, and (often) implementing policies that reflect such social norms. However, I do have a theory. Like the African American and Japanese American units during World War Two, which are among the most decorated, transgender individuals want to prove themselves. Even if they have to be quiet about who they are.

Disgustingly, though, their high rates of service are also coupled with a high rate of discrimination by the military (and society, too). Transgendered service members are prohibited from serving openly under mental health policies, which consider non-conformative gender identities to be a mental illness. These policies disregard the fact that transgenderism hasn't been considered a mental illness in over twenty years by either the American Psychological or Psychiatric Associations.

Hopefully, bans on service members being transgender will be lifted in the coming years. The major issues surrounding their service, in my mind, lies mostly in issues that are easily solvable. Plenty of distinguished people have served in the closet, and the military is doing itself no favors by polarizing a potential source of talent.

--Tom

Diplomacy, War, and Syria

The situation in Syria has seemingly taken a turn for the better. Following Kerry's non-literal remarks on how Syria could avoid military strikes by turning over its chemical weapons, the Russian and Syrian foreign ministers came out and endorsed the plan. Which is an exciting, but almost sad, development. The diplomatic route was viewed by the Obama Administration incredulously, given that the State Department quickly clarified Kerry's proposal as being one that illustrated the absurdity of Assad's regime, and wasn't to be taken seriously.

No doubt, this the development seems to be the result of our willingness to use force. The behavior of Assad's regime has seemingly been altered due to our threats, something that I thought was unlikely to occur. So I will congratulate the Obama administration for being willing to use force. Without that, Assad probably wouldn't have gone to the negotiating tables, and a plan to deal with the national security threat emanating from the instability of the war would have never begun to be drafted by major international players.

Now, this isn't to imply that the Obama administration deserves a round of applause for its Syrian policies in general. When it comes down to it, this diplomatic stratagem was not the endgame of our threatened use of force; rather, it was an accidental byproduct of an interview coupled with Syrian fears over our planned strikes. The Obama administration never intended for this to happen, and thus, we shouldn't consider this as an incident of competent and out-of-the-box foreign policy thinking from Obama. Instead, we should question why our leaders never seriously pursued this route in the first place following our initial threats.

Of course, negotiations are still in the early phases. And there are myriad of logistical, security, and political complexities surrounding getting those chemical weapons. For all we know, Assad might leave negotiations. Or, he might not hand over all his weapons. For now, though, I'm glad that Kerry accidentally came up with a good idea.

--Tom

How Would American Credibility Really Be Affected If We Backed down?

Whether we like politics or not, it's the defining factor in conducting military action. The utilization of force upon other nations absent political objectives is a dangerous game, which will oftentimes lead to a complex foreign entanglement or a failed military operation all together. We've seen this in multiple U.S. military operations over the past 15 years: both Operation Desert Fox and Operation Infinite Reach are prime examples that relate closely to our current predicament in Syria. Lobbing 25, 50, or even 100 missiles doesn't really do much to persuade another nation to submit to your will, especially when you're targeting infrastructure that isn't crucial to ongoing operations. All it does is make it look as if your administration is doing something tough. Given that this is the administration's current position--looking tough--I am against military strikes

However, many proponents of strikes against Syria argue that we need to "look tough" against Assad just to maintain regional credibility. This is a valid point. Credibility is important, especially for a hegemonic power like the United States. Without it, the effectiveness of American diplomacy falters as nations begin to question our word. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini might question American commitment to keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Given the climacteric importance of that issue right now in regional politics, it's obviously important to maintain our credibility in the eyes of Iran.

What advocates lose track of, though, is the fact that threats are partially validated by a nation's interests in a given scenario, and partially validated by the resources placed by that nation in the region. Our interests in preventing Assad from using chemical weapons on a small scale are questionable, and the resources we deployed to the region were primarily to protect allies--like Turkey--from being hit by chemical missiles; hence, why Assad flouted our threat.

Yes, the United States doesn't want a precedent for widespread use to be set. But Assad's use thus far hasn't begun to set such a precedent. His chemical attacks have been far less devastating than Saddam's gas attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, and are on par with the Egyptian artillery bombardments during the North Yemen Civil War. Neither country was punished for their actions, and, miraculously, no precedent for widespread use was set. So what makes two incidents of use by Assad any different? It doesn't. Unless Assad starts to conduct massive, World War One scale attacks on rebel positions, I'd say that he isn't changing the overall international dynamic on the use of chemical weapons.

Let's compare this to a nuclear Iran. Not only would that shift the power dynamic in the Middle East towards their favor, it would also give them more negotiating power in diplomatic talks. It would act as an anvil over the head of America that would decrease our ability to deal with their sponsorship of terrorism. There's also a good possibility that nuclear proliferation would become rampant in the Middle East, and a regional cold war could develop. Our credibility in the region would definitely be shot then, as the promise to keep Iran nuke free is crucial to our relationships. Then, of course, you have the potential use of a nuclear weapon against Israel, wiping out one of our closest allies. So it's obvious that we have major interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons, and backing down from our Syrian strikes doesn't change that obvious fact.

Furthermore, backing down from Syria wouldn't change the reality that we have a massive military force in the region posited towards striking Iran. Nor would it lessen the seriousness of the most stringent sanctions we have recently passed against Iran. Not only is it clear that American interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons exist, it's also clear that we are more than willing to use force to make sure that interest is met.

So while American credibility will be damaged, it will not be destroyed. We have shown time and time again that we will intervene on behalf of our interests, whether it be in the form of a drone strike, aerial intervention, or a cross border raid. Countries like Iran realize this, and thus backing down from striking in a situation where we have no interests will not existentially endanger our regional vision for the Middle East.

--Tom

Guest Post: American Drone Policy

Now, don’t get me wrong, I am strong supporter of drone strikes. I believe that they are, in fact, an effective means that efficiently eliminates a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties and without putting American boots on the ground. Indeed, they have been at the forefront of the elimination of various terrorists, including several high ranking members of al-Qaeda and their allies. 

Looking at this chart (here), we can get an idea of just how effective they are at eliminating a target whilst minimizing civilian casualties. Since 2006, some 2,500 members of various jihadist organizations have been killed while only 153 civilians have been killed. I say “only” like I don’t care about civilians dying—I do—it’s just the numbers are incredibly low when compared to how many actual, or suspected, militants we have killed. 

Let’s also look at Yemen’s chart: here. It should be noted that the drone program in Yemen is relatively new compared to the one in Pakistan. However, besides 2009, the same basic pattern continues. Please understand that the numbers in both of these charts are a very well educated guess. The reporting in Taliban or allied controlled areas is very minimal, at best. 

Drones also have another beneficial aspect to their use: The disruption of enemy movements. Drone strikes are incredibly good at shaking up enemy movements, which subsequently, hinder their ability to coordinate attacks either on the regional scale or the global scale. This disruption of enemy movement is, in itself, a good thing; however, like my good friend and colleague Tom (military theorist) points out: 

“While it's useful in that is constantly disrupts A.Q. and insurgent leadership, there are situations where a strike may do more harm than good. Especially when you are dealing with strikes on low level peons and the such. 

Killing terrorists isn't the endgame in itself, but rather a method to mitigate the effects of a terrorist organization. The endgame is to render the group operationally neutered and to significantly lower growth. That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization. Sometimes this isn't always possible, so the drone strikes at the very least disrupt operations.”

I could not agree more with his assessment. While impacting movements disrupts operations, it does nothing for our end goals. Before I move on to why my opinion is changing, I’d like to elaborate on what he said here: “That generally entails encouraging an effective government that is capable of asserting control over its territory and economic revitalization”. This is, in essence, what needs to happen in order to successfully counter the terrorism threats; however, like he also pointed out, that isn’t always possible. Take Pakistan, for example, either out of unwillingness or incompetency, they do not do hardly enough to curtail the jihadist threat they face in their country—which often spills over into Afghanistan. In places like Pakistan, it may be in our best interests to use drones to try and curb the jihadists, rather than to wait and rely on Pakistan to do it themselves. 

However, like Mr. Bill Roggio points out in the first link, our drone policy has essentially become a substitute for an actual comprehensive strategy to deal with terrorism. Under the Obama Administration, the drone program has increased substantially, when compared to when it was first started in 2002. To quote Mr. Roggio: “One problem I have with the administration’s view on this is that it seems to think that just killing some of al Qaeda’s top leaders will cause al Qaeda to collapse. But the organization just isn’t going away - it’s evolved over time to include other terrorist groups …”. This couldn’t be truer in how the current Administration sees the use of drones and our current strategy. 

While drones have taken out a multitude of terrorists, including senior leaders, have the groups disbanded or otherwise collapsed? Not really. So where does that leave us? It leaves us with a severe conundrum in our counter-terrorism strategies. Either continue the over-reliance on drones or form a new, comprehensive strategy that entails every aspect of terrorism and how drones may be used appropriately. With our over-reliance on drones, it leaves us with a few disadvantages. 

First off, like Mr. Rodriguez (former CIA) points out here: click
As the result of our cancellation of the detainee program and because we no longer capture anyone, we’ve instead turned to killing everyone. Because of this, we can no longer obtain valuable information from held militants. This information can include anything from future plots, coordination, key players, relationships between terrorist organizations, and a wide range of other questions—all of which, we can no longer ask. Mr. Rodriguez brings up the Boston Bombings and how if we could question those held at G-Bay or if we still captured people, we could then cross-reference what held militants know in correlation to Tameralan Tsarnaev or the larger North Caucasian jihadist movement. He ends the article by saying: “The U.S. also cannot ask recently captured terrorists whether they have heard of Tsarnaev, whether they have seen anyone matching his description or whether they know of any of his associates. We can’t do any of these because we don’t capture terrorists anymore. In order to avoid the challenges of detention and interrogation – and to escape the harsh judgment of human rights activists – by and large we simply kill them.”. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg. 

Drone strikes can also encourage sympathy for terrorist organizations, which in turn, can lead to recruitment opportunities for the very same groups we’re targeting. Not to mention, they are an excellent propaganda piece for AQ and Co (plus all the public anger that is attributed to drone strikes. But, one should know, that while leaders in Pakistan or Yemen publicly denounce the strikes, they secretly support them or even sign off on them—source). 

Let me reiterate before I end: I am not calling for an end to the drone program, as I am big supporter of their utilization. Instead, I am calling for a change in drone policy; one that looks at certain considerations when using drones and how to appropriately use them. Our over-reliance on drones might have more long-term strategic consequences than what various figures in the Obama Administration may think. A serious change needs to happen in our counter-terrorism policies, and the first step is creating a comprehensive strategy: Something the last two administrations have failed at doing. 

Interoperability Between U.S. and Japanese Forces

With the rising tide of the People's Republic of China in the Pacific region, and a movement in Japan's LDP government to increase defense, it seems paramount that U.S. and Japanese forces be able to properly operate with each other during a combat scenario. For a strong and visible shield against China to exist, the United States must be able to work closely with each ally--a close defense cooperation between Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, America, Australia and New Zealand would be ideal, but is unlikely due to unfortunate political realities. So, it seems as if America will have to settle with being able to individually work with each nation.

This month is a testament to the idea of interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, as each nation's respective maritime forces are collaborating with each other to improve bilateral capacity to conduct amphibious operations. According the key U.S. and Japanese defense officials, building up Japan's ability to conduct amphibious operations is crucial to maintaining a strong defense amid territorial disputes--this includes a possible Island Assault Unit.

So far, it seems as if the future of Japanese and American interoperability will focus on three things: being able to operate coherently to defeat mainland China's navy (and air force), to recapture an island seized by the PRC Army or Marine Corps and missile defense.

The United States and Japanese navies have long been able to cooperate together, showing a theoretical ability to coherently conduct operations during wartime. The American and Japanese air forces are working together to achieve interoperability. While chief strategists have agree'd on the future of American and Japanese strategy--America is working on its Joint Operational Access Concept and Japan has its Dynamic Defense. All in all, the militaries seem to be to set up a strong defense network capable of facing, and hopefully defeating, China's navy and air force.

That said, peace time operations are crucial to readiness for actual wartime. Japan's role in its strategic partnership with the United States should increase focus on surveillance operations in the South China Sea. Furthermore, America should also defend increased strategic reach by Japan on the global stage. Japan has multiple interest riding in, for example, the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both the United States and Japan if the JMDSF deployed minesweepers to conduct operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

The focus on cooperation between America and Japan has historically been focused on maritime strategy, not ground combat. The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force has typically focused on disaster relief and peacekeeping operations--both have been proven in actual scenarios. Now that China has a substantial ability to possibly seize an island, Japan is mulling over the need for an amphibious force. Establishing their own branch for amphibious is likely unnecessary, but creating their own "Expeditionary Force" is a good option Japanese politicians are considering. Ultimately, though, any sort of amphibious strategy should take into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of the American and Japanese militaries (and possibly other nations like the United Kingdom and Australia, which would likely participate in combat operations).

Finally, you have the issue of missile defense. In the author's opinion, missile defense is a crucial aspect of regional defense that needs to be worked on. In several war games, China has been able to gain the upper hand, close down the South China Sea, and push America back to San Diego by utilizing their missile forces. Since the author isn't extremely well read on how to fix this problem, he encourages readers to throw ideas out there in the comment section below.

--Tom

Should the United States Intervene in Syria?

In the author's previous post on Syria, he explained the utilization of naval forces in establishing a no-fly zone over Syria and the costs associated with such an endeavor. Now, he will explain his opinion on intervention into the country.

America has strategic interests in Syria, of that there is no doubt. Not only does the collapse of Assad's regime knock out a major terrorist supporter in the Middle Eastern region, it also undermines Iranian influence in a time where the clerics in Tehran trying to establishing the groundwork for a hegemony in the Middle East. Moreover, the flood of terrorist groups into the country is cause for worry in policymakers. The last thing the United States wants is another Afghanistan, where non-state actors roam the countryside unopposed, giving them large swathes of area to organize, train, and plot attacks or even offensives in other countries. Therefore, we have an inherent interest to insure that order is restored and moderate militias within the Free Syrian Army take control of the nascent government.

However, policy should be constrained by harsh political, economic, and military realities. Having strategic interests doesn't mean that you should pursue them. Engaging in a conflict where your strategic goals are unobtainable is foolhardy, and often results in your own national security being further undermined.

At this point, the so-called golden opportunity for American intervention has passed. Extremist groups have seeped their way into the country, and are now providing a host of services to the local people, from food stores to security to governance. Had Obama gotten involved earlier, and provided arms to the more moderate groups, the presence of extremist groups could have largely been mitigated. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Initially, the U.S. used Qatar and Saudi Arabia as middlemen to supply weapons to the rebels. The C.I.A. has even been reported by the Economist to have helped ensure these transactions went smoothly. While this sounds beneficial, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both have goals in post-Assad Syria that are counter-intuitive to American interests. The majority of supply given to the rebels by the emirates are to extremist organizations.

That said, there is still potential for the West to gain the upper-hand. Salim Idris, Chief-of-Staff for the Free Syrian Army, has been outspoken about his wishes from the United States and her allies: first, he wants the establishment of a no-fly zone. Second, he wants more arms. Doing both drastically helps the moderates in the opposition. We could also go farther than that by training militias with moderate attitudes. Al-Nursa provides bread to the hungary masses? We give them meat. Giving moderates more provisions that help local populations greatly helps their image, thus undermining extremists.

So yes, the author believes that the United States should become more involved in helping rebels. At the very least, U.S. forces should supply weapons and copious amounts of food to vetted militias.

The Rising Sun

Riding upon the euphoria of Abenomics and nationalism, Japan
is scheduled for a massive shift in it's national security paradigm

In the political world, not many people get second chances, especially if they are dealt the hand Abe had when he resigned in 2007. Now, six years later, Shinzo Abe is getting second chance--with a standing ovation from the people of Japan. Currently, he is enjoying the benefits of having a 76% approval rating, breaking a decade long mold for past Prime Ministers. By stirring up nationalism and issuing a provocative "three arrow" plan to solve Japan's two decade long economic stagnation, Abe is offering a route for Japan to become the influential and unwavering power that it is capable of becoming.

What's most striking about Prime Minister Abe is his focus on national security. Abe's plans for defense policy strongly disrupts the status quo. The Liberal Democratic Party aims to amend the constitution, allowing the Japanese to take out the "Self" in "Japanese Self Defense Force" A gesture that in part may be symbolic; a reference to a new commitment to a tougher stance on issues relating not only to its immediate geographic area, but to the greater globe as well.

Of course, making a symbolic gesture doesn't always mean that actual action will occur. Abe's plans also involve pragmatic evolutions to both Japan's defense and foreign policies. Not only does Abe want a military that's more capable of deterring China's increasing rise, he also wants one that can project Japanese force abroad and affirm Japan's position as an international player capable of protecting its global interests.

This is a fairly rapid shift from the country, which has been isolationist since the end of World War Two. The JSDF has only deployed small contingents of service members overseas. Two notable deployments were the soldiers deployed to Iraq in 2003 and the destroyers currently deployed on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. It will be interesting to see if Japan, which has one of the most capable navies in the world, begins to sign mutual defense treaties with other nations, deploys more troops overseas or acts more aggressively with its military in the coming years.

Summer Vacation and the Blog

In approximately 20 minutes, I will be let out of school for summer vacation. For the most part, I will be relatively free the entire summer. However, it is very likely that I will be gone for 2-3 weeks for Sea Cadet trainings. If this is the case, I will do my best to set up a system with a friend to post pre-written blog posts. My main goal is to increase the amount I post, hopefully to maybe two or even three posts a week. Anyways, just a PSA.

- Tom

How Much Resources Should We Put Into Europe?

As the author established in his previous post, the strategic necessity of Europe is rather questionable in the post-9/11 era. As of late, the United States military has roughly 70,000 service members stationed in a variety of posts around the country. Aside from the taxing cost of these soldiers in a time of fiscal austerity, one must also consider the reorientation of the United States from West to East and our inability to project enough resources to cover immediate areas of concern globally. If the United States has learned anything in the past decade, it's that good tactical cohesion is useless unless a large scale strategic vision is properly implemented. So even if our troops are exceptionally trained, they aren't being applied in a manner that provides the U.S. with benefits when stationed in Europe.

For the most part, our forces in Italy can stay. Combat aircraft, naval bases, and Airborne infantry forces have provided a large array of strategic options to U.S. commanders in regards to the surrounding region. Aircraft and naval assets based in Italy were exceptionally useful in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. With the environment in Syria heating up, these units may prove to be useful again (the author will address this in a future post). Further, these units periodically deploy in bilateral training exercises with NATO members in an attempt to foster interoperability. As we learned from Libya, creating a system that allows for joint missions to occur when using different technologies is crucial to NATO success during a wartime operation.

As ComNavOps pointed out in a comment, our bases in Europe provide the U.S. strategists with assets close enough to the Middle East to be used, but far enough to be safe. The author agree's with the Commander's analysis, but believes the utility of Europe offensively extends itself to countries bordering the Mediterranean (Libya, Syria, Egypt, etc.)* While European based forces (EUCOM) were involved in operations in Iraq (and simultaneously the Balkans, if memory serves), was the geographic proximity essential to operational success? In the author's opinion, it was not. The majority of EUCOM's substantial contributions to the Iraq mission were in the post-invasion environment. Geographic origin of the deploying unit didn't matter, because low intensity conflict doesn't require rapid deployment of troops within a short amount of time (on the strategic level), as opposed to the high intensity scenarios we might have faced with the Soviets during the Cold War.

This isn't to say that bases in countries like Germany aren't useful at times. The U.S. Armed Forces hospital in Landstuhl, Germany offers a close, but secure, level four hospital to send our critically injured soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan. Ramstein Airbase offers NATO forces in general a nice logistical hub for operations abroad. Assets like these would ideally be kept. However, the vast majority of the 50,000 soldiers stationed in Germany can be relieved of their duties. As can the 10,000 service members in the United Kingdom.

So then, this is how the author thinks U.S. forces in Europe should be spread out:

Germany: 15,000-20,000 (Mainly Air Force and SOF personell)
Spain: 1,000 (The USMC QRF and naval personell)
Italy: 10,000 (Naval, Air Force, and Army Airborne personell)
Black Sea Rotational Force: 500 (SP-MAGTF to continue training countries around the Black Sea Area)**
Other: 1,000-5,000 (to conduct minor roles in various countries)
Total: 27,500-36,000 personell

The author strongly suggests anybody with operational experience to comment on the feasibility of such a structure. Obviously, the author has no military experience, and has a tendency to overestimate the utility small logistical outposts in supporting wartime operations.

*ComNavOps is an extremely experienced individual, the author is not. Remember that, readers.
**Make note that the BSRF isn't deployed 365 days a year, it's generally deployed for six month increments.

Rest in Peace, Kenneth Waltz

This morning, one of the world's foremost thinkers in the field of international relations passed away. Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013) contributed greatly to his field, and will be sorely missed by those both inside and outside the I.R. community. Waltz is best known for his books Man, the State, and War (1959) and  Theory of International Politics (1979).  I wish his family peace during their time of grieving. Kenneth Waltz was 88 years old.

Is Europe Worth the Trouble?

While the author is certainly not a proponent of garrison-minded isolationism, where the United States retreats to the imaginary safety of its own borders (which do not serve as impenetrable barriers, mind you), it has come to his attention that Europe is more of a strategic drain than a valuable resource in the post-Cold War era. While there are certainly bases that serve our strategic interests in the region and greater globe, in an policy age where we don't have enough assets to cover major strategic needs, Europe is certainly low on the priority list.

The first folly pursuit that springs into the author's mind is the European Missile Shield. The entire policy is positioned against two  perceived"threats" to Europe. The first is the impotent Russian bear, which should no longer be viewed as a nuclear threat to the security of its European neighbors. The second is Iran, which doesn't pose itself as a missile threat to Europe. Even if they did fire a nuclear armed missile at a European nation, it would be intercepted by AEGIS armed warships in the Mediterranean. This negates any sort of need for a ground based missile shield. From a strategic point of view, these systems would be better served in the Middle East, where conventional Iranian missiles pose a threat to allies and American forces in the region. While it certainly makes sense to aid in the defense of allies from legitimate threats, this does not mean that the United States should give up critical military capital to soothe the paranoia of European nations like Poland.

The second policy that should be cause for concern is the amount of forces we have in the region. Currently, we have around 70,000 service members stationed in Europe. What exactly are they doing? Are they strategically crucial to ongoing American success abroad? Apparently, training nations like Slovenia, which has a proud military of 7,600 men and women, for operations they'll never conduct is integral to achieving global security. Obviously, bases like Italy have proved to be useful in American operations. U.S. air force and naval assets based in the country were instrumental in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011. However the vast majority of U.S. forces can be deployed somewhere else. Or even better, brought back home. 

This sets up the stage for another post about what America should do in Europe to achieve an equilibrium in the economics of force. Phrased differently, what the U.S. should do to ensure that strategic demand is met with an appropriate amount of supply.

-Tom

Establishing a No Fly Zone in Syria

USS Kearsarge launching a U.S. Marine Corps Harrier

With the security situation in Syria quickly degrading, American politicians are bickering over the question of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria. Obviously, there are legitimate concerns about this policy. There are financial costs to consider, worries of mission creep, allegations that U.S. intervention could further destabilize the country, and broader region, and making the us the potential target of terrorism. Furthermore, no one should rationally expect this to end up as another Libya, where the U.S. can "lead from behind." The European militaries involved with that operation exhausted their military reserves. By the end of the NATO led operation, the French air force was forced to drop concrete blocks on targets. Moreover, not only is France busy with Mali, but they also are facing heavy austerity measures. As I've pointed out before, France is the leading military power in the E.U. (other than the U.K., which distances itself from European Union most of the time) If Hollande doesn't take the initiative, it's doubtful that other European nations will intervene alongside America. Therefore, any intervention will mostly be bilateral between Israel and the United States.

So then, if we do decide to establish a NFZ, how should the military go about it in a way that minimizes economic costs while still fulfilling the policy requests of interventionists on Capitol Hill? First off, the author is going to presume that the political objectives of Washington are simple: to neuter the capabilities of the Syrian Air Force. Secondly, the scenario also presumes that the United States is willing to send enough assets to accomplish their stated goals (looking at past interventions involving no or little ground intervention, this assumption isn't too much of a logical jump).

If we wish to establish a no-fly zone over Syria, the first step is one that must be accomplished by American diplomats. Ambassadors must get the support of key regional actors to facilitate our needs for a military intervention.  According to an analysis done on no-fly zones by Stanford's Journal of Strategic Studies, support of key actors is vital to successfully establishing a NFZ. Certain countries like Turkey and Israel (despite a mutual despise for each other) are already on board with intervention. The major block in the road of intervention is the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent members must agree on intervention before it occurs. France and Britain will obviously back us, but Russia and China are different matters.

In regards to Moscow, officials are worrying that regime change will damage key Russian interests. This comes during a point in time where Russian policy revolves around reestablishing influence globally. Russian soft power isn't extensive or influential to begin with, and Syria is one of the few countries that the Kremlin could convince to work with them in the disaster that was the Russian Federation during the 90s and early 2000s. Since Putin took office, Russian influence in the Middle East has declined. Therefore, any change in the status quo that damages Russian influence regionally is something that the Kremlin is going to fight against. Moreover, the port of Tartus is the only Mediterranean port the Russians have, and is in many respects the only Russian naval facility capable of adequately force projecting (other than Avacha Bay).

Therefore, American officials should remind Russia that Assad will lose regardless of Western intervention. Supporting a no-fly zone, which is one of the only major demand the FSA has, gives America massive cookie points with the opposition. Among other things, America can easily get guarantees that the FSA council will allow the Russian port of Tartus to remain. The United States should strive to convince the Russians that the only way they can protect their interests is to work with the U.S. Moreover, officials should offer Putin a behind the scenes agreement to share intelligence on potential terrorist operations that aim to attack Russia for their initial support for Assad.

China is a much different case. The author has been unable to find any solid information of the underlying motivations of the PRC. There seems to be, however, a variety of theories. Some believe that China is protect its oil reserves in the country. Others believe that by protecting Assad, they are maintaining Iranian influence in the region, making Tehran less susceptible to invasion. It's also important to note that China was Syria's third largest importer in 2010. Whatever the reason, one should hope that the Chinese are articulating whatever strategic concern they have to U.S. officials.

Now then, for the purposes of this scenario, the presumption is that A. China and Russia stepped on board with the U.S. or B. the U.S. went honey badger and stopped giving a shit. Most likely, if any intervention is to occur, it will result from option A rather than B. So, how should the U.S. proceed with a no-fly zone?

According to Todd Harrison, there exists two forms of NFZs. The first is control, where patrols dominate the skies 24/7, exerting their will on hostile units below. An example of this is Iraq in the 1990s or, more recently, Libya in 2011. This gives the U.S. a wide range of options, including escalating intervention into striking ground units massacring civilians in cities. However, it is extremely costly, and creates the large possibility of mission creep. Moreover, it also involves striking down Syrian anti-air systems, which is arguably the most dense in the region. While many point to the fact that Israel was able to conduct strikes, this was done through crafty maneuvering through gaps in Syrian radar. A no-fly zone bent around control requires patrolling the entire country (or the parts you want to control), not just the areas where radar presence is weak.

The second, and more operationally and fiscally appealing, option is denial. Instead of exerting control over the battle space, just deny the enemy the use of it. This entails completely grounding the Syrian Air Force by attacking bases being used to house aircraft. At this point, the Syrian military has only 50 operational fixed aircraft, most of which aren't being used due to maintenance problems. Instead trainer aircraft are preferred. Then, you have maybe 90 helicopters that are fit for operation. Denying the Syrian Air Force use of these air craft, then, isn't all too difficult. Deploy naval assets and begin firing cruise missiles down at bases in the country. Chris Harmer, a naval analyst, estimates that it would take about 250 TLAMs to eradicate the Syrian's air power. In terms of cost, this would be about $350,000,000. While that seems like a scary, big number, it's actually quite cheap when you consider the benefits of the strikes.

Therefore, establishing a no-fly zone over Syria should center around denial, not control. Not only does this solve the issue of the Syrian Air Force, but it lessens the likelihood of mission creep. However, there still remains the question of if the United States should get involved in the violence. That's a question that policymakers must decide--and quickly. The United States has already missed the golden opportunity to get involved. Deciding to intervene 6 or 9 months might be too late to do anything productive.

--Tom

A History of Afghanistan from 1973 to 1989

Afghanistan has always been known for being on the cutting edge of military technology

Afghanistan has, since the 1980's when Operation Cyclone began, been a series of American policy failures committed by the Reagan, Bush Senior, Clinton, Bush Junior, and, most recently, Obama administrations--the failures on the parts of the first three led to the September 11th attacks, whereas the failures of the latter two have led us to a questionable future for joint Afghan and American security.

Therefore, I have decided to start on the first post of a saga dedicated to the very unique situation of Afghanistan: A History of Afghanistan from 1973 to 1989, History of Afghanistan from 1989 to September 11th, 2001, Analyzing the Failures of the Afghan War from 2001 to Today, and Creating a Viable Post-2014 Afghan Strategy. Remember, I am NOT an expert on Afghanistan, and I would suggest you read some kind of book on the history of Afghanistan if given the chance. With that said, enjoy.

Lead Up to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979

Most Americans know little about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, even fewer know about the events preceding the Soviet intrusion (or, depending on how you look at it, intervention), and a very minuscule amount know about anything before that.

Basically, for a very, very, very long time, Afghanistan was united under a monarch--that is, a king. Yes, Afghanistan had a royal family. In fact, it still has one today (in a sense; I attached a link to the current head of Barakzai House below). Actually, before the United States established a new Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, we seek'd out and received the graces of the previously exiled ruler, King Zahir Shah (1914-2007), whom we viewed as the official head of the Afghan state at the time. What happened, though? How was he exiled, and why?

In the summer of 1973, King Zahir Shah was enjoying the luxury of, well, being the head of the Afghan state. While playing a friendly game of volleyball, Zahir was accidentally hit in the eye, requiring him to be flown into London to receive treatment for the subsequent eye hemorrhage. After the operation was complete, Zahir decided to take a well deserved vacation. While the recovering monarch was in Italy, Daoud Khan, the former Prime Minister of Afghanistan and retired military officer, took advantage of the King's leave of absence to painlessly overthrow the regime in a bloodless coup after receiving the backing of the Afghan Army.

Over the next 5 years, the situation of Afghanistan deteriorated quickly. Daoud tried to maintain the government as a strong, central force that efficiently ran the country. Unfortunatrely for Daoud, though, his efforts produced few fruits. The very basis of the Afghan government for 50 years before Daoud was one that was Pashtun led. His coup shook the very foundations of the political structure of the entire country. Government relies on the people respecting authority (either through fear or admiration), which Daoud was unable to create in the unstable political climate of the country.

In April 1978, Daoud's luck ran out when a famous Communist leader, Mir Akbar Khyber, was assassinated by government forces. In response, over 15,000 activists attended Mir's funeral, protesting and demanding justice for his death. Daoud responded in the worst way possible: by infuriating even more people. Afraid, he began to round up various leaders within communist communities, inciting even further outrage.

In response to all this, a small corp of Army and Air Force officers organized the second coup of the decade (called the Saur Revolution), this time with more blood. During the short rebellion, Daoud was killed, and the military handed control of the country to the Revolutionary Council headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki on April 30th. Taraki's first decree was reestablishing the government as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Alas, another communist country now graced the earth, and the Afghan people lived happily ever after, united by a picture of Lenin in every of home.

If only.

Moscow responded to this change in power by sending the fledging communist government a myriad of various weapons: AK-47s, pistols, Armored Personnel Carriers, etc. The overall goal of the Kremlin was to stabilize the internal situation within Afghanistan by giving the D.R.A. the proper tools and resources to maintain control. However, factional warfare become widespread, and Taraki began utilizing military forces to brutally crush revolts, conduct mass arrests, torture civilians, and preform executions on a colossal level (Hm, looks like he really got the Commie thing down pat, huh?). One by one, the Kunar Province, Hindu Kush, and Badakshan Province became fortresses for anti-government Pashtun fighters unhappy with the change in the status quo.

As security continued to deteriorate, Afghanistan soon became a hellish place; even for those that lived behind the physical and figurative walls of immunity: Ambassadors. In 1979, Adolph Dubs, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan was captured by Islamic militants and killed after a botched attempt by Afghan policemen to rescue the diplomat.

Finally, after the 17th Afghan Division, sent to contain a series of violent demonstrations in Herat, became nonexistent in all but name due to mass desertions, Taraki pleaded with the U.S.S.R. for military assistance. The Soviets responded by promising weapons and military advisors to be sent into the country.

The Soviet War in Afghanistan

Damn camels.

While Soviet officials were mulling over a possible intervention staged by military forces, the situation in Herat continued to spiral downwards. Rebels had seized control of the city, and began a brutish hunt for government officials and weapons stockpiles. When Afghan Army finally managed to secure the city again after 3 days of brutal fighting, casualties on all sides had neared the 5,000 mark.

In September, Taraki was arrested and summarily executed by Hafizullah Amin, an Afghan politician. Amin subsequently rose to power as the new Afghani President. Unfortunately for him, the tenure wouldn't last long. Previously, Soviet Union had made it publicly aware that they did not wish to see Amin lead Afghanistan through Pravda (the official government newspaper). While in private, Russian officials agree'd that he was too lenient towards the west, and believed (very incorrectly) that he had contacts with the C.I.A. The distrust finally came to an epitaph when, after weeks of deliberation, the Soviet Union finally sent an intervening force to Afghanistan on Christmas Eve of 1979.

By December 27th, 50,000 Russian troops were in the Afghanistan theater of war. The proverbial snowball accumulated fast and took down all who stood in the disgruntled bear's way. KGB special forces infiltrated and then attacked the Afghan presidential palace, killing Amin. Quickly, the Soviet Union put in place Brabrak Karamal to lead the government, who addressed the nation shortly after Amin was killed via radio.

Moscow and Kabul initially tried to unite the Afghan peoples, and win their alligience through deeds of goodwill. Karamal released thousands of political prisoners who were unfairly arrested by Taraki and Daoud, restored the religiously significant green stripe to the Afghan flag, appointed non party members to government, and swore alliegence to Islam. However, Soviet and D.R.A. attempts at forging unity and implementing a long term state building plan were futile in effort. U.S. intelligence officials concluded the Afghan government and its people were separated by "a vast [cultural and a geographic] gulf" Worse, economic conditions in the country quickly attenuated after the Soviet invasion.

For me, I think the aspect that most people ignore while studying this war is the economic conditions that fermented under the Soviet watch. Absolutely no successful efforts were made to foster economic vitality in the infant government, resulting in the stunting of the Afghan economy. Major demographic movements (brought on by violence in the rural areas) harmed agricultural markets and supply when many former farmers moved to the cities. The healthcare system was overburdened, resulting in high rates of sickness to occur. And, to make matters even worse, skilled laborers and academics quickly left the country en masse to protect themselves and their families.

While the social and economic situations in the country continued to degrade, the Soviets began implementing their security plan to improve to ability of the Afghan government to establish and maintain control. The plan was modeled off the Soviet's recipe for success in the realm of domestic surpression: to create a strong military force, and a robust secret police corps.

Much like ISAF forces today, the Soviets dealt with a local military that was plagued by factionalism and low morale, creating an inefficiency that prevented the army from being an operationally capable force. The largest loss of manpower wasn't even from combat most of the time, it was from desertion. Each year, the Afghan military lost 20,000 soldiers to desertion. According to the head of the Afghan Beurea for ISI (Pakistani intelligence services, basically), the Soviets were relying on an indeginious army that had to lock their soldiers in to prevent them from deserting. By the mid 80's, the Afghan Army was a hollowed force, standing at a mere 30,000 out of their original 90,000 soldiers.

The failures of Afghanistan's army to properly deal with the muhjideen problem prompted a military surge by Russian commanders in 1980. Soviet forces flooded into major cities to establish control over the troubled country. However, stabilization was not the end result. Instead, it began what is considered to be the most successful insurgency in modern times.

The Soviets managed to secure major Afghan cities, creating a safe haven for Afghan and Russian soldiers. However, the Soviet Union failed in creating a secure environment around the more rural. Areas, even after 2 years of fighting, the D.R.A. controlled less than 15% of rural territory (remember that large "gulf" U.S. analysts were talking about?).

The Soviets struggled to even militarily control these rural areas, with military "success" generally coming the machine guns of an Mi-24. Helicopters are incapable of controlling ground, for that, you need ground soldiers. However, Soviet incursions into these areas were oftentimes meet with humiliating defeat. For example, Soviet commanders longed tried to control the Panjshir Valley, but every attempt to go in a wrestle control from the "Lion of the Panjshir" (aka Ahmed Massoud) ended in a long line of smoldering armored vehicles and dead soldiers.

The Mujihideen was finding itself increasingly victorious against their Communist foes, a fact that always strike'd me as interesting. The Mujihideen wasn't necessarily a singular, cohesive movement. Rather, it was a loose conglomerate of 7 major parties (nicknamed the Peshawar Seven) that mostly dispised each other. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, the one thing they hated more than each other were the Russian aggressors that had invaded their homeland (or, for many members who were foreign born, their muslim brother's homeland). Of course, a majority of this military victory was spurred by the continuous supply flooding in from Pakistan and the United States.

For Pakistan, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was apart of what they viewed as a much larger plan to establish another sphere of regional control. The ISI General Akhtar Khan told Pakistani president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq that Afghanistan was the stepping stone towards invading his precious country. Moved by the existential prophecy of destruction, Zia-ul-Haq authorized a massive expansion of the ISI and allowed them to launch a variety of cover operations into Afghanistan. Special Paki teams swarmed the country, covertly supply, training, and aiding the Mujihideen in their ongoing struggle against their unholy foe.

Primarily, the Mujihideen's "holy" struggle relied on two tactics. The first of which was the raid, and the second of which was the ambush. The guerrilla strategy of "Death by a thousand cuts", as Mohammad Yousaf called it, was the only way for an ill trained and equipped group of Afghan tribesman to defeat the Eurasian superpower. Trained primarily for a conventional war against NATO, Soviet conscripts were extremely vulnerable to frequent and deadly attacks by the Afghan "ghosts".

The Soviet's overall strategy in the embattled country hinged on military might, which was extremely inefficient and ineffective. The majority of military analysts now say that in order for the Soviets to have had even a remote chance of military victory against the Mujihideen, they would have needed more than 300,000 soldiers actively conducting operations.

Further stacking the cards against the Soviet Union were the victories made by the Mujihideen in gathering popular support in the local areas. Soviet commanders continued to alienate the local population, failing to ever win even the remotest amounts of support. Arguably, this was the greatest failure of the Soviet military, as they failed to recognize the overall question of an insurgency: "Who deserves to have political rule?" Insurgents rely heavily on local support in order to sufficiently operate, to take away this support is to remove their operational lifeline.

If the Soviets were to have taken anything from the experiences of the United States in Vietnam, it should have been the strategy employed by the United States Marine Corps to undermine the Viet Cong early on into the war. In order to weaken the hold the V.C. had on South Vietnamese villages, commanders placed in every village a Marine squad to erect and support a local village fighting for to counter V.C. in the area. Of course, in order to do that, one must first when over these communities, which is easier said than done. However, attempting to improve economic conditions and refraining from killing Afghans and/or their property en masse would have been a good start.

In 1985, the United States, thanks to the eccentric Charlie Wilson, increased its support of the Mujihideen to $250,000,000 in military equipment, with most influential of this support coming from the infamous Stinger missile. The FIM-92 Stinger missile undermined the only thing the Soviets had going for them: air support.  Equipped with large amounts of these anti air weapons, the Mujihideen was able to adequately fight the deadly Hinds with devastating effectiveness.

Well armed by Pakistani and U.S. agencies, the Peshawar Seven became a very slow bleed on the Soviet economy. Very limited resources were pooled together and sent towards winning the losing fight in Afghanistan, leaving empty shelves of food and other essential goods for citizens back in the Motherland. Finally, in 1988, the Soviet Union began a massive pull out of Afghanistan, with all forces withdrawn by February of 1989. Of course, the vicious Afghan fighters never gave the Soviets the benefit of the doubt, launching continual attacks on Soviet forces as they withdrew from the country, inflicting upwards to over 500 killed in action on Russian forces.

I want to point out a reoccurring theme in all of these escapades by both internal and external forces in the country: the attempt to create a central government that successfully exerted control over all corners of the country. The basis of an Afghan government that's successful, in my opinion, is one that accepts the realistic condition of warlordism in the tribal areas and Southern Afghanistan. In other words, the Afghan government must convince various tribal chiefs and warlords to align themselves to the Afghani government in exchange for money and semi-autonomy. But more on that later.

- Tom

Sources
 In the Graveyard of Empires by Seth Green
 Afghanistan: An Entire Military History from Alexander the Great to the Taliban by Stephan Tanner
Various websites that I will link to later