China's Air Defense Identification Zone

Recently, there's been a flurry of activity surrounding China's establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. The ADIZ covers the disputed Senkaku Islands, South Korea's research facility on Socotra Rock and overlaps into Japan's own ADIZ (and more recently, South Korea's ADIZ). The move has been seen by many to be a belligerent attempt to exercise control over the air traffic above the Senkaku Islands, especially since China requires all planes to identify themselves if requested. Contrast this with Japan, which only requires planes on a vector to Japanese territory to identify themselves. Given the number of airspace violations by the Russian and Chinese governments, Tokyo officials seem especially justified in their exercise of an ADIZ.

The move by Beijing is another example of China throwing its weight in the region, especially over territorial disputes. Over the past several years, the Chinese government has increased maritime operations in these disputed zones. China has enforced an all but officially declared blockade of the Scarborough Shoal. Coast Guard vessels have been routinely sent into the waters around disputed Sino-Japanese islands. But this recent move seems to be an escalation of the disputes to a new domain: the air.

However, there is also another trend in Chinese behavior. In many respects, this new emphasis on foreign disputes could be seen as an attempt by the Communist Party to spark nationalistic tendencies over their domestic population. Following the most recent plenum, the Chinese government established its own State Security Council--which is structured around our National Security Council. This development partially reflects the Communist Party's growing apprehension over unrest in semi-autonomous regions like Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as its general non-autonomous population. As economic liberalization and growth continues to grow, China will have to balance out the inevitable demand for more political power in the population with maintaining the state's political control. More likely than not, this will take the form of appeals to nationalism coupled with extensive and harsh mechanisms to deal with internal dissents.

As Daniel Drezner notes, Authoritarian Capitalism typically doesn't work. It becomes too hard for the state to justify its harsh policies as the society gains more economic power, becomes more educated, and realizes that authoritarianism is in many ways holding them back. So, the question for regional players becomes apparently obvious: if the power of the Communist Party in China is under threat, will they instigate conflict in order to consolidate power through nationalism? It largely depends on how China perceives our intended response to aggression. The United States has the capability to completely sink the Chinese economy, which would reciprocally severely endanger the CCP's grasp on power. However, would the United States really engage in such a war with China over, say, a small ambush on a Japanese patrol? Would such a small flashpoint rally Chinese nationalism and focus? To former of the two, the answer is unlikely. To latter, probably. There were riots after Japan bought the Senkaku Islands from their private owners, imagine the outrage if Japanese and Chinese planes went head to head in combat.

So China is probably unlikely to engage in a large military operation in the East China Sea, especially given the economic consequences of full-fleged American action. At the same time, a small flashpoint might be a good way to focus domestic discontent on a foreign enemy, while also minimizing the chance of large scale America reprisal. As the United States continues its pivot towards the Pacific, leaders need to remember that the risk of China launching an A2/AD campaign in the Pacific is rather low. War is more likely to occur from a series of escalatory actions, which could start out with a small battle between Japanese and Chinese planes or patrol ships.



--Tom

Defining Security Sector Reform

Before I go too in depth on the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR) on this blog, it's probably important to try defining the term. That's easier said than done. Security Sector Reform is a rather contemporary idea that arose out of attempts to reform the internal security and defense establishments within post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Even though it lacks a formal definition, most experts agree that it is integral in stabilizing post-conflict states emerging from violent inter-state war or internal turmoil.

Security Sector - Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the security sector has been continually expanded in its width. Security is no longer just about military structures, it encompasses a wide array of issues pertaining to public safety. For the time being, I'm going to define this as government institutions tasked with maintaining the safety of both the people and state. This includes intelligence agencies, police forces, gendarmerie, border officials, and the military. Arguably, there are also de facto institutions tasked with providing for the security of the people and state as well. Paramilitary groups can be useful allies to the state, and serve as a first line of defense for vulnerable communities. Furthermore, if there a divide in the trust between the people and state, pro-government militias can act as an intermediary.

Security Sector Reform - In essence, Security Sector Reform is about ensuring that the security sector is not only capable of protecting the state, but also the people living under it. In most transitioning nations, security forces were previously tasked with ensuring the security of the state. This means that their policies and doctrines will likely reflect hardline approaches that aren't generally concerned with the wellbeing of the people. The police in an authoritarian state typically don't have to worry about getting warrants, respecting the rights of a citizen, or going through with a fair judicial system. The military is more equipped to kill innocents passively resisting the state or implement scorched earth policies than adequately conduct combat operations. Therefore, reforming these policies and creating better relationships between the security sector and people reflect the primary goals of SSR

So that's the definition that I will be using for the time being. If any reader wants to add anything or correct my definition, please feel free to do so in the comment section below!

--Tom

On the Iranian Deal

While I would say that the general consensus on the recent Iranian deal has been positive, there are certainly a number of unhappy campers. And I'm sure that their numbers will only increase as the week drags on. Typical arguments include rehashed comparisons of Munich, lots of cries about appeasement, the Iranians made no concessions, etc.

Right off the bat, it's important to note that this is a tentative interim deal designed to build up trust between America and Iran. Hence, why its provisions only extend for half a year. It lays a foundation for further talks, something rather historic when you consider that this is the first time since 1979 that Iranian and American diplomats have left the tables not frustrated with each other.

 The deal freezes uranium enrichment past 5% for the next six months and chemically dilutes their 20% stockpiles. Couple that with the IAEA inspectors that will now be present at their facilities (including Arak), and you have a framework that prevents weaponization for at least the next six months. That can hardly be construed as a failure, unless you hold the outlandish and unrealistic expectation that Iran can be pushed to dismantle their entire program without regime change (which would probably come after a nasty civil war, no less) or invasion. Both of those scenarios are bad for American interests, obviously.

There are certain critics that believe that goodwill won't matter to the regime, but I disagree. The Iranians are worried that the United States is seeking regime change, which makes sense after: the coup in 1953, being labelled as apart of the 'axis of evil' in 2002, the invasion of Iraq which created fear of strategic encirclement, and Bush refusing a genuine nuclear deal in '03 because his administration thought that Iran was on the brink of collapse. Put yourself in the shoes of an Iranian politician. In your eyes, America isn't looking just for a deal to remove your nuclear weapons capability, they're looking for a deal that would remove a possible instrument of national power in order to pursue regime change. If you sign a deal, then your biggest fear is the American government reimposing sanctions, which would prevent you from ever rebuilding your nuclear capacity. This puts you in position where you're even more worried about forced regime change by the American government. Especially since the United States government has a long history of supporting coups--including one against your own country. You need some sort of tentative deal to test the waters. 


Now, put yourself in the shoes of an American diplomat. Iran has a long history of regional destabilization. They use their conventional forces to exert pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, and use unconventional forces to gain geopolitical capital globally. You're afraid that by relenting too much, the Iranians will quickly go back on their word and develop a nuclear bomb. Therefore, sanctions on their oil and banking assets need to remain in place. That way, the pressure on the regime is still a present threat to their long term economic and political health.


That's why the deal is rather provisional. Neither party trusts each other completely, and needs an easy exit if the other retracts on their side of the deal. It's hardly appeasement, and it's even worse to compare it to Munich. Appeasement would be lifting all sanctions on their assets and allowing them to continue enrichment. Thus far, we have not been doing that. The lifted sanctions give them roughly 7 billionUSD in assets while keeping in place the most stringent sanctions. This isn't the end of the world, but it is moving towards a better precedent for cooperation between America and Iran. I think we can all agree that is a positive development.

-- Tom

Security Sector Reform

Following the advice of Diana Weuger, I'm going to begin focusing most of my posts on a single issue. For the time being, that's going to be Security Sector Reform. I'm writing an essay on Security Sector Reform in transitioning democratic countries for a U.S. Institute of Peace contest, so it'll go hand in hand together with my project. I won't post my essay up here until late April, when the contest is over. However, between now and then I be will post my musings and ideas on the subject. So expect me to blog more and more on this issue in the coming weeks.

For now, I have an idea of how I think Security Sector Reform should go:

First, the international community should seek to create strong civilian oversight. The military is often seen as the most competent body in many transitioning countries, especially since they were probably the strongest branch of the government prior to whatever crisis caused the collapse of the indigenous political system. It's tempting to place them in charge, but you then run the risk of a military junta or dictatorship. Similar to what we've seen throughout South America or Egypt today.

Second, there needs to be dedicated advisors and units that form long lasting bonds with their counter parts in the host countries. Bringing back the same officers and units to these transitioning nations recurrently for bilateral operations and advising missions creates a group that understands the challenges the host country faces. Not only this, but the bonds build upon themselves. That way, the host country does not have to form new relationships with officers and NCOs they will never see again after six to twelve months.

Third, gender and security sector reform closely intertwined. Most men don'tt understand women's issues, let alone care about solving them in post-conflict countries. Obviously, women are affected by conflict just as men are. Rape is frequently used as a tool of war, and there aren't many opportunities for women in transitioning countries to begin with. This necessitates some sort of female oversight or involvement to get the job done (not to say that men shouldn't be involved in solving women's issues, of course). Moreover, women offer their own unique take on a variety of issues. Gender affects our perception of things, which in turn makes women very relevant in Security Sector Reform.

Fourth, the job of local security forces is to facilitate political, economic, and social engagement, by creating an atmosphere of security in the host country. This requires close cooperation between political and military entities. The overall goal is to create long-lasting stability, but this does not occur through the military alone. If the underlying socio-economic issues are not addressed, then the host country is doomed to a perpetual cycle of conflict.

That's just what I have for now. I'll go into more depth later on!

--Tom

Making Mountains Out of Mole Hills

It's that time of year again, folks. People are busting out their ornate decorations, I have to wear my ridiculously cool German camouflage jacket to stay warm, and the leaves are turning into wonderful shades of orange and red. Of course, my favorite part of Autumn is the holiday of freight: Halloween. There isn't anything better than busting out my copy of The Blair Witch Project on October 31st to give myself the spooks.

When I was a young boy, the frightful costumes of my sister's friends would scare me. I didn't necessarily understand that behind the masks, they were just regular people. So my Halloween fun was drowned out by my fear of empty threats. I think this has a valuable lesson for the national security apparatus; sometimes states and groups seem much scarier than they actually are. You have to peel back their mask in order to get a good look at who they really are. America has a tendency to over-exaggerate the seriousness of a potential adversary, resulting in either an unnecessary response or ill-placed resources.

The primary threat I usually like to talk about is terrorism. While terrorism is in no way an empty threat, the ungodly amount of resources we devote towards mitigating its effects is ridiculous. We've sunk tens of billions into creating massive domestic spying systems, over a trillion dollars in Afghanistan, and another trillion into various counter-terrorism Department of Homeland Security programs. None of this makes since economically, of course. As the Economist pointed out in 2011, to justify current levels of DHS-CT spending, we would have to prevent well over 1,500 domestic terrorist attacks per year. To give you some context, this would make us a more dangerous terrorist safe-haven than Pakistan. So if the United States government underestimated the threat emanating from terrorism prior to 9/11, then we have certainly overestimated its seriousness in the post-9/11 security environment. This has resulted in an atrophy of resources to our domestic ills. We've neglected basic duties of government--such as highway matinance, the lack of which kills 14,000 per year--in order to deter a literal boogeyman from attacking us again.

In reality, a sensible and economical counter-terrorism program would absolutely gut DHS spending, end NSA domestic spying, and withdraw conventional American forces from Afghanistan. Instead of massive, conventional responses, the U.S. government ought to further invest into indirect action, building partnership capacity programs, drone strikes, and an energetic diplomatic campaign to encourage multilateral solutions to complex problems. Despite my problems with Obama's foreign policy, he has put far more emphasis on creating such a strategy than his predecessor did.

However, there are certainly other examples. In 1953, one of the worst foreign policy mistakes of the Cold War was made as the U.S. government decided to aid Britain in its coup d'etat of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddegh. The British were motivated by oil interests in Iran, and managed to convince Eisenhower that there was a link between Mossaddegh and the Communists. There was, but the threat was far overstated. The Tudeh Party of Iran and the National Front had a mutual interest in liberating Iranian oil from the clutches of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but nothing more. Mossedegh desperately needed a political ally to support his goal of nationalization, and the Tudeh happened to be that ally. However, the relationship was fragile and weak at best. The long term viability of the Tudeh in Iran was nil, and Mossedegh pursued the relationship out of necessity.

Economically, Mossaddegh's vision was to put Iran on a level in which it could profit from selling oil, and allow for open, competitive markets to form in Iran. Politically, he wanted to fully democratize the Iranian government. Neither of which is particularly in line with Communist thinking. Unfortunately, the Red Scare mentality permeated American foreign policy thinking. Instead of adapting to the new political change in Iran, accepting the economic benefits of Iranian nationalization, lowering the incentive to work with  Communists by offering an olive branch, and attempting to mediate a diplomatic solution to British-Iranian disagreements, we decided to implement forced regime change. This set the undertones for the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which created the Iranian government we now have to contend with as a major strategic adversary.

So ultimately, while threats should never be understated, overstating their significance and threat is equally as dangerous. Whether it be from the fear of a terrorist suicide bombing in the U.S., or political change in another country. It is important for rationality to dominate policy making, and for the intelligence community to peel back the masks of our enemies. Otherwise, we risk deadly foreign entanglements and unnecessary conflicts abroad.

--Tom

The Case for Owls

In the battlefield that is the question of America's future foreign policy, there seems to exist a sharp and clear divide between "Hawks" and "Doves." For those unfamiliar with foreign policy nomenclature, Hawks and Doves are terms that have been used to describe politicians since the early days of American history. Hawks advocate for a hard line foreign policy centered around military force, and Doves typically advocate for more diplomatic solutions to issues. In today's polarized world, there seems to be no room for a middle ground in the foreign policy debate. The peripheries of the political spectrum--which are radical--have become the driving force of all American policies, to great detriment to our nation. You are either Conservative or Liberal; Keynesian or Austrian; Hawk or Dove.

However, I'd argue that both Doves and Hawks hold relatively unrealistic foreign policies. Hawks typically jump towards any sort of chance to flex American foreign policy. Obviously, this is a dangerous mindset. Entanglement, imperial overreach, debt, and a tired military are the results of such a mentality. And we have seen this happen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What was initially a mission to root out extremists turned into a decade long struggle to build a central government in Afghanistan. Iraq was an ill-conceived war based out of bad intelligence, neoconservative lobbying, and post-9/11 paranoia. At the same time, you do a reemergence of doves within the parties. Notably, Ron Paul advocates the ludicrous position of withdrawing all 900 military bases abroad. Rand Paul, his son, offers similar, if not less extreme, defense policies as well.

Instead of being a Hawk or a Dove, we should strive to be owls (to keep with the bird theme). A magnificent creature, the owl patiently watches the forest. It never unnecessarily gets involved physically, but watches closely to sense impending dangers. When it sees an interest at stake--say, a potential lunch--it ferociously lunges with mighty talons to swoop up its prey. This simple creature can be the example for the future of American foreign policy. Our core defense policies, in my opinion, should be based around three pillars: First, we should not directly embroil ourselves militarily in a situation where the use of such force is either unwarranted or ineffective. Instead, we should look at other tools in a foreign policy box. Such as sanctions, diplomatic engagement, or even covert operations to support an ally (there are military options that do not have to directly embroil us in a conflict; intelligence or SF support, for example). Second, we should maintain a powerful intelligence apparatus to keep track of current and potential threats. Third, we should maintain a powerful military force as to defend our interests as needed.

While the term Owl may not be a politician's first choice for a foreign policy label, it's certainly the best one in today's world. An over-dependence on military resources has undermined American interests abroad, and has made us lose sight of how effective diplomacy, soft power, and economic engagement can be. At the same time, our prior mistakes with military force shouldn't scare us from using it in situations that call for such action.

--Tom

Transgenderism in the Military

Recently, I came across an interesting study on transgenderism in the military. According to the Williams Institute, transgendered Americans are twice as likely to join the military compared to the rest of the country. Which is, all things considered, an amazingly hilarious dose of irony. Easily, the most underrepresented and discriminated against social group in America is also one of the most likely to risk their lives for our country. Amidst the patriotic chants, pro-American fund raisers, and cries of anti-Americanism, that permeates much of the radical right movement today, a group that they consider a danger to the social fabric of the United States is also more than willing to protect our nation.

Now, I don't why they are so likely to join the military. At it's core, transgenderism goes against the social norms in the America. Whereas the military is about uniformity, the status quo, and (often) implementing policies that reflect such social norms. However, I do have a theory. Like the African American and Japanese American units during World War Two, which are among the most decorated, transgender individuals want to prove themselves. Even if they have to be quiet about who they are.

Disgustingly, though, their high rates of service are also coupled with a high rate of discrimination by the military (and society, too). Transgendered service members are prohibited from serving openly under mental health policies, which consider non-conformative gender identities to be a mental illness. These policies disregard the fact that transgenderism hasn't been considered a mental illness in over twenty years by either the American Psychological or Psychiatric Associations.

Hopefully, bans on service members being transgender will be lifted in the coming years. The major issues surrounding their service, in my mind, lies mostly in issues that are easily solvable. Plenty of distinguished people have served in the closet, and the military is doing itself no favors by polarizing a potential source of talent.

--Tom