Monday, September 23, 2013

The Case for Owls





In the battlefield that is the question of America's future foreign policy, there seems to exist a sharp and clear divide between "Hawks" and "Doves." For those unfamiliar with foreign policy nomenclature, Hawks and Doves are terms that have been used to describe politicians since the early days of American history. Hawks advocate for a hard line foreign policy centered around military force, and Doves typically advocate for more diplomatic solutions to issues. In today's polarized world, there seems to be no room for a middle ground in the foreign policy debate. The peripheries of the political spectrum--which are radical--have become the driving force of all American policies, to great detriment to our nation. You are either Conservative or Liberal; Keynesian or Austrian; Hawk or Dove.

However, I'd argue that both Doves and Hawks hold relatively unrealistic foreign policies. Hawks typically jump towards any sort of chance to flex American foreign policy. Obviously, this is a dangerous mindset. Entanglement, imperial overreach, debt, and a tired military are the results of such a mentality. And we have seen this happen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What was initially a mission to root out extremists turned into a decade long struggle to build a central government in Afghanistan. Iraq was an ill-conceived war based out of bad intelligence, neoconservative lobbying, and post-9/11 paranoia. At the same time, you do a reemergence of doves within the parties. Notably, Ron Paul advocates the ludicrous position of withdrawing all 900 military bases abroad. Rand Paul, his son, offers similar, if not less extreme, defense policies as well.

Instead of being a Hawk or a Dove, we should strive to be owls (to keep with the bird theme). A magnificent creature, the owl patiently watches the forest. It never unnecessarily gets involved physically, but watches closely to sense impending dangers. When it sees an interest at stake--say, a potential lunch--it ferociously lunges with mighty talons to swoop up its prey. This simple creature can be the example for the future of American foreign policy. Our core defense policies, in my opinion, should be based around three pillars: First, we should not directly embroil ourselves militarily in a situation where the use of such force is either unwarranted or ineffective. Instead, we should look at other tools in a foreign policy box. Such as sanctions, diplomatic engagement, or even covert operations to support an ally (there are military options that do not have to directly embroil us in a conflict; intelligence or SF support, for example). Second, we should maintain a powerful intelligence apparatus to keep track of current and potential threats. Third, we should maintain a powerful military force as to defend our interests as needed.

While the term Owl may not be a politician's first choice for a foreign policy label, it's certainly the best one in today's world. An over-dependence on military resources has undermined American interests abroad, and has made us lose sight of how effective diplomacy, soft power, and economic engagement can be. At the same time, our prior mistakes with military force shouldn't scare us from using it in situations that call for such action.

--Tom

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Transgenderism in the Military

Recently, I came across an interesting study on transgenderism in the military. According to the Williams Institute, transgendered Americans are twice as likely to join the military compared to the rest of the country. Which is, all things considered, an amazingly hilarious dose of irony. Easily, the most underrepresented and discriminated against social group in America is also one of the most likely to risk their lives for our country. Amidst the patriotic chants, pro-American fund raisers, and cries of anti-Americanism, that permeates much of the radical right movement today, a group that they consider a danger to the social fabric of the United States is also more than willing to protect our nation.

Now, I don't why they are so likely to join the military. At it's core, transgenderism goes against the social norms in the America. Whereas the military is about uniformity, the status quo, and (often) implementing policies that reflect such social norms. However, I do have a theory. Like the African American and Japanese American units during World War Two, which are among the most decorated, transgender individuals want to prove themselves. Even if they have to be quiet about who they are.

Disgustingly, though, their high rates of service are also coupled with a high rate of discrimination by the military (and society, too). Transgendered service members are prohibited from serving openly under mental health policies, which consider non-conformative gender identities to be a mental illness. These policies disregard the fact that transgenderism hasn't been considered a mental illness in over twenty years by either the American Psychological or Psychiatric Associations.

Hopefully, bans on service members being transgender will be lifted in the coming years. The major issues surrounding their service, in my mind, lies mostly in issues that are easily solvable. Plenty of distinguished people have served in the closet, and the military is doing itself no favors by polarizing a potential source of talent.

--Tom

Sunday, September 15, 2013

Diplomacy, War, and Syria

The situation in Syria has seemingly taken a turn for the better. Following Kerry's non-literal remarks on how Syria could avoid military strikes by turning over its chemical weapons, the Russian and Syrian foreign ministers came out and endorsed the plan. Which is an exciting, but almost sad, development. The diplomatic route was viewed by the Obama Administration incredulously, given that the State Department quickly clarified Kerry's proposal as being one that illustrated the absurdity of Assad's regime, and wasn't to be taken seriously.

No doubt, this the development seems to be the result of our willingness to use force. The behavior of Assad's regime has seemingly been altered due to our threats, something that I thought was unlikely to occur. So I will congratulate the Obama administration for being willing to use force. Without that, Assad probably wouldn't have gone to the negotiating tables, and a plan to deal with the national security threat emanating from the instability of the war would have never begun to be drafted by major international players.

Now, this isn't to imply that the Obama administration deserves a round of applause for its Syrian policies in general. When it comes down to it, this diplomatic stratagem was not the endgame of our threatened use of force; rather, it was an accidental byproduct of an interview coupled with Syrian fears over our planned strikes. The Obama administration never intended for this to happen, and thus, we shouldn't consider this as an incident of competent and out-of-the-box foreign policy thinking from Obama. Instead, we should question why our leaders never seriously pursued this route in the first place following our initial threats.

Of course, negotiations are still in the early phases. And there are myriad of logistical, security, and political complexities surrounding getting those chemical weapons. For all we know, Assad might leave negotiations. Or, he might not hand over all his weapons. For now, though, I'm glad that Kerry accidentally came up with a good idea.

--Tom

Sunday, September 1, 2013

How Would American Credibility Really Be Affected If We Backed down?

Whether we like politics or not, it's the defining factor in conducting military action. The utilization of force upon other nations absent political objectives is a dangerous game, which will oftentimes lead to a complex foreign entanglement or a failed military operation all together. We've seen this in multiple U.S. military operations over the past 15 years: both Operation Desert Fox and Operation Infinite Reach are prime examples that relate closely to our current predicament in Syria. Lobbing 25, 50, or even 100 missiles doesn't really do much to persuade another nation to submit to your will, especially when you're targeting infrastructure that isn't crucial to ongoing operations. All it does is make it look as if your administration is doing something tough. Given that this is the administration's current position--looking tough--I am against military strikes

However, many proponents of strikes against Syria argue that we need to "look tough" against Assad just to maintain regional credibility. This is a valid point. Credibility is important, especially for a hegemonic power like the United States. Without it, the effectiveness of American diplomacy falters as nations begin to question our word. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini might question American commitment to keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Given the climacteric importance of that issue right now in regional politics, it's obviously important to maintain our credibility in the eyes of Iran.

What advocates lose track of, though, is the fact that threats are partially validated by a nation's interests in a given scenario, and partially validated by the resources placed by that nation in the region. Our interests in preventing Assad from using chemical weapons on a small scale are questionable, and the resources we deployed to the region were primarily to protect allies--like Turkey--from being hit by chemical missiles; hence, why Assad flouted our threat.

Yes, the United States doesn't want a precedent for widespread use to be set. But Assad's use thus far hasn't begun to set such a precedent. His chemical attacks have been far less devastating than Saddam's gas attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, and are on par with the Egyptian artillery bombardments during the North Yemen Civil War. Neither country was punished for their actions, and, miraculously, no precedent for widespread use was set. So what makes two incidents of use by Assad any different? It doesn't. Unless Assad starts to conduct massive, World War One scale attacks on rebel positions, I'd say that he isn't changing the overall international dynamic on the use of chemical weapons.

Let's compare this to a nuclear Iran. Not only would that shift the power dynamic in the Middle East towards their favor, it would also give them more negotiating power in diplomatic talks. It would act as an anvil over the head of America that would decrease our ability to deal with their sponsorship of terrorism. There's also a good possibility that nuclear proliferation would become rampant in the Middle East, and a regional cold war could develop. Our credibility in the region would definitely be shot then, as the promise to keep Iran nuke free is crucial to our relationships. Then, of course, you have the potential use of a nuclear weapon against Israel, wiping out one of our closest allies. So it's obvious that we have major interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons, and backing down from our Syrian strikes doesn't change that obvious fact.

Furthermore, backing down from Syria wouldn't change the reality that we have a massive military force in the region posited towards striking Iran. Nor would it lessen the seriousness of the most stringent sanctions we have recently passed against Iran. Not only is it clear that American interests in preventing Iran from getting weapons exist, it's also clear that we are more than willing to use force to make sure that interest is met.

So while American credibility will be damaged, it will not be destroyed. We have shown time and time again that we will intervene on behalf of our interests, whether it be in the form of a drone strike, aerial intervention, or a cross border raid. Countries like Iran realize this, and thus backing down from striking in a situation where we have no interests will not existentially endanger our regional vision for the Middle East.

--Tom