Should the United States Intervene in Syria?

In the author's previous post on Syria, he explained the utilization of naval forces in establishing a no-fly zone over Syria and the costs associated with such an endeavor. Now, he will explain his opinion on intervention into the country.

America has strategic interests in Syria, of that there is no doubt. Not only does the collapse of Assad's regime knock out a major terrorist supporter in the Middle Eastern region, it also undermines Iranian influence in a time where the clerics in Tehran trying to establishing the groundwork for a hegemony in the Middle East. Moreover, the flood of terrorist groups into the country is cause for worry in policymakers. The last thing the United States wants is another Afghanistan, where non-state actors roam the countryside unopposed, giving them large swathes of area to organize, train, and plot attacks or even offensives in other countries. Therefore, we have an inherent interest to insure that order is restored and moderate militias within the Free Syrian Army take control of the nascent government.

However, policy should be constrained by harsh political, economic, and military realities. Having strategic interests doesn't mean that you should pursue them. Engaging in a conflict where your strategic goals are unobtainable is foolhardy, and often results in your own national security being further undermined.

At this point, the so-called golden opportunity for American intervention has passed. Extremist groups have seeped their way into the country, and are now providing a host of services to the local people, from food stores to security to governance. Had Obama gotten involved earlier, and provided arms to the more moderate groups, the presence of extremist groups could have largely been mitigated. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Initially, the U.S. used Qatar and Saudi Arabia as middlemen to supply weapons to the rebels. The C.I.A. has even been reported by the Economist to have helped ensure these transactions went smoothly. While this sounds beneficial, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both have goals in post-Assad Syria that are counter-intuitive to American interests. The majority of supply given to the rebels by the emirates are to extremist organizations.

That said, there is still potential for the West to gain the upper-hand. Salim Idris, Chief-of-Staff for the Free Syrian Army, has been outspoken about his wishes from the United States and her allies: first, he wants the establishment of a no-fly zone. Second, he wants more arms. Doing both drastically helps the moderates in the opposition. We could also go farther than that by training militias with moderate attitudes. Al-Nursa provides bread to the hungary masses? We give them meat. Giving moderates more provisions that help local populations greatly helps their image, thus undermining extremists.

So yes, the author believes that the United States should become more involved in helping rebels. At the very least, U.S. forces should supply weapons and copious amounts of food to vetted militias.

The Rising Sun

Riding upon the euphoria of Abenomics and nationalism, Japan
is scheduled for a massive shift in it's national security paradigm

In the political world, not many people get second chances, especially if they are dealt the hand Abe had when he resigned in 2007. Now, six years later, Shinzo Abe is getting second chance--with a standing ovation from the people of Japan. Currently, he is enjoying the benefits of having a 76% approval rating, breaking a decade long mold for past Prime Ministers. By stirring up nationalism and issuing a provocative "three arrow" plan to solve Japan's two decade long economic stagnation, Abe is offering a route for Japan to become the influential and unwavering power that it is capable of becoming.

What's most striking about Prime Minister Abe is his focus on national security. Abe's plans for defense policy strongly disrupts the status quo. The Liberal Democratic Party aims to amend the constitution, allowing the Japanese to take out the "Self" in "Japanese Self Defense Force" A gesture that in part may be symbolic; a reference to a new commitment to a tougher stance on issues relating not only to its immediate geographic area, but to the greater globe as well.

Of course, making a symbolic gesture doesn't always mean that actual action will occur. Abe's plans also involve pragmatic evolutions to both Japan's defense and foreign policies. Not only does Abe want a military that's more capable of deterring China's increasing rise, he also wants one that can project Japanese force abroad and affirm Japan's position as an international player capable of protecting its global interests.

This is a fairly rapid shift from the country, which has been isolationist since the end of World War Two. The JSDF has only deployed small contingents of service members overseas. Two notable deployments were the soldiers deployed to Iraq in 2003 and the destroyers currently deployed on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. It will be interesting to see if Japan, which has one of the most capable navies in the world, begins to sign mutual defense treaties with other nations, deploys more troops overseas or acts more aggressively with its military in the coming years.

Summer Vacation and the Blog

In approximately 20 minutes, I will be let out of school for summer vacation. For the most part, I will be relatively free the entire summer. However, it is very likely that I will be gone for 2-3 weeks for Sea Cadet trainings. If this is the case, I will do my best to set up a system with a friend to post pre-written blog posts. My main goal is to increase the amount I post, hopefully to maybe two or even three posts a week. Anyways, just a PSA.

- Tom

How Much Resources Should We Put Into Europe?

As the author established in his previous post, the strategic necessity of Europe is rather questionable in the post-9/11 era. As of late, the United States military has roughly 70,000 service members stationed in a variety of posts around the country. Aside from the taxing cost of these soldiers in a time of fiscal austerity, one must also consider the reorientation of the United States from West to East and our inability to project enough resources to cover immediate areas of concern globally. If the United States has learned anything in the past decade, it's that good tactical cohesion is useless unless a large scale strategic vision is properly implemented. So even if our troops are exceptionally trained, they aren't being applied in a manner that provides the U.S. with benefits when stationed in Europe.

For the most part, our forces in Italy can stay. Combat aircraft, naval bases, and Airborne infantry forces have provided a large array of strategic options to U.S. commanders in regards to the surrounding region. Aircraft and naval assets based in Italy were exceptionally useful in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. With the environment in Syria heating up, these units may prove to be useful again (the author will address this in a future post). Further, these units periodically deploy in bilateral training exercises with NATO members in an attempt to foster interoperability. As we learned from Libya, creating a system that allows for joint missions to occur when using different technologies is crucial to NATO success during a wartime operation.

As ComNavOps pointed out in a comment, our bases in Europe provide the U.S. strategists with assets close enough to the Middle East to be used, but far enough to be safe. The author agree's with the Commander's analysis, but believes the utility of Europe offensively extends itself to countries bordering the Mediterranean (Libya, Syria, Egypt, etc.)* While European based forces (EUCOM) were involved in operations in Iraq (and simultaneously the Balkans, if memory serves), was the geographic proximity essential to operational success? In the author's opinion, it was not. The majority of EUCOM's substantial contributions to the Iraq mission were in the post-invasion environment. Geographic origin of the deploying unit didn't matter, because low intensity conflict doesn't require rapid deployment of troops within a short amount of time (on the strategic level), as opposed to the high intensity scenarios we might have faced with the Soviets during the Cold War.

This isn't to say that bases in countries like Germany aren't useful at times. The U.S. Armed Forces hospital in Landstuhl, Germany offers a close, but secure, level four hospital to send our critically injured soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan. Ramstein Airbase offers NATO forces in general a nice logistical hub for operations abroad. Assets like these would ideally be kept. However, the vast majority of the 50,000 soldiers stationed in Germany can be relieved of their duties. As can the 10,000 service members in the United Kingdom.

So then, this is how the author thinks U.S. forces in Europe should be spread out:

Germany: 15,000-20,000 (Mainly Air Force and SOF personell)
Spain: 1,000 (The USMC QRF and naval personell)
Italy: 10,000 (Naval, Air Force, and Army Airborne personell)
Black Sea Rotational Force: 500 (SP-MAGTF to continue training countries around the Black Sea Area)**
Other: 1,000-5,000 (to conduct minor roles in various countries)
Total: 27,500-36,000 personell

The author strongly suggests anybody with operational experience to comment on the feasibility of such a structure. Obviously, the author has no military experience, and has a tendency to overestimate the utility small logistical outposts in supporting wartime operations.

*ComNavOps is an extremely experienced individual, the author is not. Remember that, readers.
**Make note that the BSRF isn't deployed 365 days a year, it's generally deployed for six month increments.

Rest in Peace, Kenneth Waltz

This morning, one of the world's foremost thinkers in the field of international relations passed away. Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013) contributed greatly to his field, and will be sorely missed by those both inside and outside the I.R. community. Waltz is best known for his books Man, the State, and War (1959) and  Theory of International Politics (1979).  I wish his family peace during their time of grieving. Kenneth Waltz was 88 years old.

Is Europe Worth the Trouble?

While the author is certainly not a proponent of garrison-minded isolationism, where the United States retreats to the imaginary safety of its own borders (which do not serve as impenetrable barriers, mind you), it has come to his attention that Europe is more of a strategic drain than a valuable resource in the post-Cold War era. While there are certainly bases that serve our strategic interests in the region and greater globe, in an policy age where we don't have enough assets to cover major strategic needs, Europe is certainly low on the priority list.

The first folly pursuit that springs into the author's mind is the European Missile Shield. The entire policy is positioned against two  perceived"threats" to Europe. The first is the impotent Russian bear, which should no longer be viewed as a nuclear threat to the security of its European neighbors. The second is Iran, which doesn't pose itself as a missile threat to Europe. Even if they did fire a nuclear armed missile at a European nation, it would be intercepted by AEGIS armed warships in the Mediterranean. This negates any sort of need for a ground based missile shield. From a strategic point of view, these systems would be better served in the Middle East, where conventional Iranian missiles pose a threat to allies and American forces in the region. While it certainly makes sense to aid in the defense of allies from legitimate threats, this does not mean that the United States should give up critical military capital to soothe the paranoia of European nations like Poland.

The second policy that should be cause for concern is the amount of forces we have in the region. Currently, we have around 70,000 service members stationed in Europe. What exactly are they doing? Are they strategically crucial to ongoing American success abroad? Apparently, training nations like Slovenia, which has a proud military of 7,600 men and women, for operations they'll never conduct is integral to achieving global security. Obviously, bases like Italy have proved to be useful in American operations. U.S. air force and naval assets based in the country were instrumental in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011. However the vast majority of U.S. forces can be deployed somewhere else. Or even better, brought back home. 

This sets up the stage for another post about what America should do in Europe to achieve an equilibrium in the economics of force. Phrased differently, what the U.S. should do to ensure that strategic demand is met with an appropriate amount of supply.

-Tom

Establishing a No Fly Zone in Syria

USS Kearsarge launching a U.S. Marine Corps Harrier

With the security situation in Syria quickly degrading, American politicians are bickering over the question of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria. Obviously, there are legitimate concerns about this policy. There are financial costs to consider, worries of mission creep, allegations that U.S. intervention could further destabilize the country, and broader region, and making the us the potential target of terrorism. Furthermore, no one should rationally expect this to end up as another Libya, where the U.S. can "lead from behind." The European militaries involved with that operation exhausted their military reserves. By the end of the NATO led operation, the French air force was forced to drop concrete blocks on targets. Moreover, not only is France busy with Mali, but they also are facing heavy austerity measures. As I've pointed out before, France is the leading military power in the E.U. (other than the U.K., which distances itself from European Union most of the time) If Hollande doesn't take the initiative, it's doubtful that other European nations will intervene alongside America. Therefore, any intervention will mostly be bilateral between Israel and the United States.

So then, if we do decide to establish a NFZ, how should the military go about it in a way that minimizes economic costs while still fulfilling the policy requests of interventionists on Capitol Hill? First off, the author is going to presume that the political objectives of Washington are simple: to neuter the capabilities of the Syrian Air Force. Secondly, the scenario also presumes that the United States is willing to send enough assets to accomplish their stated goals (looking at past interventions involving no or little ground intervention, this assumption isn't too much of a logical jump).

If we wish to establish a no-fly zone over Syria, the first step is one that must be accomplished by American diplomats. Ambassadors must get the support of key regional actors to facilitate our needs for a military intervention.  According to an analysis done on no-fly zones by Stanford's Journal of Strategic Studies, support of key actors is vital to successfully establishing a NFZ. Certain countries like Turkey and Israel (despite a mutual despise for each other) are already on board with intervention. The major block in the road of intervention is the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent members must agree on intervention before it occurs. France and Britain will obviously back us, but Russia and China are different matters.

In regards to Moscow, officials are worrying that regime change will damage key Russian interests. This comes during a point in time where Russian policy revolves around reestablishing influence globally. Russian soft power isn't extensive or influential to begin with, and Syria is one of the few countries that the Kremlin could convince to work with them in the disaster that was the Russian Federation during the 90s and early 2000s. Since Putin took office, Russian influence in the Middle East has declined. Therefore, any change in the status quo that damages Russian influence regionally is something that the Kremlin is going to fight against. Moreover, the port of Tartus is the only Mediterranean port the Russians have, and is in many respects the only Russian naval facility capable of adequately force projecting (other than Avacha Bay).

Therefore, American officials should remind Russia that Assad will lose regardless of Western intervention. Supporting a no-fly zone, which is one of the only major demand the FSA has, gives America massive cookie points with the opposition. Among other things, America can easily get guarantees that the FSA council will allow the Russian port of Tartus to remain. The United States should strive to convince the Russians that the only way they can protect their interests is to work with the U.S. Moreover, officials should offer Putin a behind the scenes agreement to share intelligence on potential terrorist operations that aim to attack Russia for their initial support for Assad.

China is a much different case. The author has been unable to find any solid information of the underlying motivations of the PRC. There seems to be, however, a variety of theories. Some believe that China is protect its oil reserves in the country. Others believe that by protecting Assad, they are maintaining Iranian influence in the region, making Tehran less susceptible to invasion. It's also important to note that China was Syria's third largest importer in 2010. Whatever the reason, one should hope that the Chinese are articulating whatever strategic concern they have to U.S. officials.

Now then, for the purposes of this scenario, the presumption is that A. China and Russia stepped on board with the U.S. or B. the U.S. went honey badger and stopped giving a shit. Most likely, if any intervention is to occur, it will result from option A rather than B. So, how should the U.S. proceed with a no-fly zone?

According to Todd Harrison, there exists two forms of NFZs. The first is control, where patrols dominate the skies 24/7, exerting their will on hostile units below. An example of this is Iraq in the 1990s or, more recently, Libya in 2011. This gives the U.S. a wide range of options, including escalating intervention into striking ground units massacring civilians in cities. However, it is extremely costly, and creates the large possibility of mission creep. Moreover, it also involves striking down Syrian anti-air systems, which is arguably the most dense in the region. While many point to the fact that Israel was able to conduct strikes, this was done through crafty maneuvering through gaps in Syrian radar. A no-fly zone bent around control requires patrolling the entire country (or the parts you want to control), not just the areas where radar presence is weak.

The second, and more operationally and fiscally appealing, option is denial. Instead of exerting control over the battle space, just deny the enemy the use of it. This entails completely grounding the Syrian Air Force by attacking bases being used to house aircraft. At this point, the Syrian military has only 50 operational fixed aircraft, most of which aren't being used due to maintenance problems. Instead trainer aircraft are preferred. Then, you have maybe 90 helicopters that are fit for operation. Denying the Syrian Air Force use of these air craft, then, isn't all too difficult. Deploy naval assets and begin firing cruise missiles down at bases in the country. Chris Harmer, a naval analyst, estimates that it would take about 250 TLAMs to eradicate the Syrian's air power. In terms of cost, this would be about $350,000,000. While that seems like a scary, big number, it's actually quite cheap when you consider the benefits of the strikes.

Therefore, establishing a no-fly zone over Syria should center around denial, not control. Not only does this solve the issue of the Syrian Air Force, but it lessens the likelihood of mission creep. However, there still remains the question of if the United States should get involved in the violence. That's a question that policymakers must decide--and quickly. The United States has already missed the golden opportunity to get involved. Deciding to intervene 6 or 9 months might be too late to do anything productive.

--Tom