Revising Georgian Maritime Strategy and Policy

In 2008, Georgia launched a massive military operation into South Ossetia, igniting a political firestorm within the Russian government. Quickly, the military mobilized a large intervention force to respond to Georgian aggression. The ground component, which was already poised for such an intervention beforehand, swept quickly into the belligerent country.

A Russian Naval Infantry BTR-80 disembarking during an exercise

However, what is often lost in the shuffle of tanks, artillery, and infantrymen, is the role that Russia's Black Sea Fleet played in the conflict, and the poor performance of Georgia's military in combating this naval force, allowing what could have been a disastrous blow to the Russian Navy slip through their fingers.

Moreover, what is also often forgotten, is that the damage the Russian Navy did to their Georgian counter-parts was devastating. Due to the loss of the majority of their 19 ship fleet, the Navy was officially disbanded and absorbed into the Coast Guard in 2009.

If Georgia hopes to be able to advance it's territorial and political goals, both of which conflict with the Russian's vision for the future of the Caucaus region, then it must be able to deter Russian military forces by being able to inflict large amounts of damage to Russian force structure (AKA being too big of a trouble to deal with; asymmetrical warfare).

Naval Operations During the South Ossetian War of 2008

The job of the Russian Navy was two fold: First, it would impose a naval blockade on Georgia's coastline (preventing military hardware from seeping through), and second, it would support combat operations in Abkhazia by landing combat troops.

In regards to the former, the Russian blockade was quite successful. There really isn't much to say about it, actually.

As for the latter, it is currently disputed how many troops were deployed by amphibious ships. The Georgian government claims that over 4000 soldiers were deployed by ship, and met up with their vehicles being brought in by train. However, some analysts, such Dmitry Gorenburg of Harvard University,  dispute this claim by saying that several hundred troops were deployed from ships (Most likely the 2 BSF Marine battalions that took part in the war, which is what I assume was the case).

Details about the naval engagement itself remain blurry, but from what I've gathered from various sources, the Russian Navy was en route to or in the middle of landing operations at the port of Ochamchira when a small Georgian flotilla, composed of two patrol boats and two auxiliary vessels, breaching the security zone set forth by the Russian ships was picked up by the radar of the patrol ship Mirazh.

After failing to adhere to radio messages ordering the ships to turn back, and warning shots fired by the Russian fleet, the task force was ordered to engage the Georgian patrol boats. The Mirazh opened fire on the ships, sinking one patrol boat, all hands presumed lost, and damaging another. Following the attacking, the remainder of the Georgian flotilla returned to their home port of Poti.

Russian warship vs trawler. Who will win?

The two Russian Black Sea Fleet Marine battalions disembarked from their amphibious ships and met up with their equipment being brought in via railroad. One battalion reinforced Ochamchira from a possible Georgian attack, while the other seized Poti.

Russian forces at Poti proceeded to destroy the naval vessels anchored there. The officers and sailors manning these boats, luckily, were allowed to leave their ships before the engineers sunk them. Of course, there weren't many that had to leave. The majority of the Georgian Naval and Coast Guard forces manning Poti routed before the Russians even arrived! Total, the Russians sank 6 Georgian Naval and Coast Guard vessels at Poti, according to imagery from the United Nations Operational Satellite.

Georgian ships lost: At least 7, with others taken as war trophies.

- The Dioskuria; La Combattane II class French warship; Most powerful warship within the Georgian fleet
- The Tbilisi; Soviet 206MR missile boat
- Tskaltubo; unknown class
- Two patrol boats
- Two auxiliary vessels

Of course, it's not like the Georgian Navy was in exemplary shape before the war. According to some rumors, prior to the war, neither the Tbilisi or Dioskuria had missiles in their tubes.

What went wrong?

Within all naval disasters, there exists some reasons as to why defeated, well, lost. In Georgia's case, there are 2 principle reasons for the disaster against the Black Sea Fleet: 1. Lack of motivated crew and 2. Improper force structure.

1. Lack of Motivated service members

As I mentioned before, by the time the Russians arrived at Poti, the majority of the crew members manning the Georgian fleet had left. Meaning, that even if they wanted to, there was no possible way for the Georgian command echelon to even utilize their navy. Leaving them with a mere two patrol boats and auxiliary to use for combat operations. Even then, the likelihood of those boats being loaded with missiles is unlikely to poor funding of the Navy.

The U.S. soldiers and Marines that were mentoring the Georgian Army noted that while they were motivated in terms of the 'Warrior's Spirit', they lacked the proper training and equipment to actually fight the Russians.

The same, then, could be extended to the Navy, minus that warrior spirit aspect. To my immediate knowledge, the Georgian Navy, unlike their Army counter parts, did not receive extensive training by U.S. forces, and were even more ill equipped.

Let's say that you are a Georgian sailor, okay? If you have the greater part of the Black Sea Fleet bearing down your step, and lack proper training and equipment, are you seriously going to try to take on those crazy drunken, bears? Unlikely.

2. Improper Force Structure and Equipment

In Great Naval Blunders, author Geoffrey Regan notes that there are three crucial elements that a warship must have in balance: Protection, Speed, and Firepower. Likewise, a fleet, if a country decides to pursue a mainline fleet, should have those three aspects as well.

This hypothetical fleet, in theory, should be able to protect itself from the threat they are most likely going to face, have the capability to quickly respond to the threat in a timely manner, and possess proper firepower to neutralize this threat.

Georgia's fleet was incapable of accomplishing any of these goals. The majority of the fleet was sunk in port, the response to Russia's sprint towards their shores was absolutely ghastly, and it didn't even have the missiles to engage the Russian fleet.

Being realistic, Georgia will never be able to fashion a conventional fleet to take on Russia and obtain command of the sea. There is really no sense in trying to make a fleet of such strength, either. The structure of Georgia's Navy was obviously inappropriate to take on the Russian foes--even if they had missiles for their ships it would be inadequate. They have simply too little there to destroy their large neighbors.

Future maritime strategy

Obvious answer: Train a fleet of sharks with lasers. Feed them Russian blood when they're young, so that they'll develop a taste for Russian sailors in combat

In 2002, the American military conducted a massive war-game called Millennium Challenge 2002. The goal of the war-game was to reaffirm military commanders faith in network centric operations as members of the Bush began talking about a possible war with Iraq.

This war-game was one of the largest in American history, costing billions and three years in preparations. It utilized a combination of real world units conducting maneuvers and high end computers to conduct combat simulations.

The commander of the Red team, whose military resembled and Iraq-Iran hybrid, but remained unnamed officially, launched a pre-emptive attack on the Blue (U.S.) fleet, destroying the majority of the task force, and killing an estimated 20,000 imaginary soldiers.

Retired Marine General Paul Riper utilized an interesting strategy Blue force commanders weren't expecting--an asymmetrical strategy that focused heavily on the utilization of ground based missiles. Riper sent a volley of missiles from a combination of ground launchers and small missile boats in the Strait of Hormuz, overwhelming AEGIS missile defense systems.

Then, while the fleet was in disarray, Riper sent a fleet of small boats and propeller planes filled with explosives to destroy the remainder of the fleet. I, personally, consider it one of the best uses of indirect action in both real life and simulation. B.H. Liddell would have been proud of General Paul van Riper.

The point that I'm trying to get across is that the asymmetrical strategy Iranian commanders have chosen  has effectively put them at an equal operational level with the Americans in the Strait of Hormuz. Sure, it doesn't give them command of the sea, but it does deny the Americans use of the Strait while inflicting heavy military and economic damages.

Thus, Georgia should strive to create an effective cruise missile capability. Russian warships have very little missile defense capability, and would thus be very susceptible to such an attack. A large force isn't necessary, given the small(ish) size of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

Moreover, one of the most effective units during the South Ossetian War of 2008 was the air defense missile corp. Surprisingly, they shot down several Russian planes, acted professionally in combat, and prevented the Russian military from obtaining full aerial dominance for the entirety of the conflict.

Therefore, the Georgian Army Missile Corp, which has proven itself to be one of the most professional branches in the Army, should be expanded to include sea denial missions. While I understand that there are differences in the anti-air and anti-naval missile operations, the learning curve won't be incredibly steep.

Of course, this doesn't mean that I think the Georgian Navy should be entirely abandoned. There still exists the need for naval operations that a missile force is incapable of conducting. Operations include, but are not limited to, anti-terrorism on the sea, protection of SLOCs(Sea Lines of Communication), and participation in NATO operations and exercises (Georgia is trying to obtain membership).

Added onto this, a future and revamped Georgian Navy could aid in my vision of a Georgian asymmetrical strategy. These missile boats could rapidly launch missiles in support of ground launchers, much like Riper did in Millennium Challenge '02.

Currently, Georgia's Special Forces branch has a unit similar to our SEALs, in that it is specifically designed force naval oriented warfare. I have no idea what their current training regiment is. However, if it isn't already, I would suggest training this force for base infiltration in order to sabotage Russian naval assets at Sevastopol. Rather akin to a football player making a Hail Mary pass, this unit would attempt to gain access and make Russian ships inoperable. Thereby reducing the capability of the BSF.

A Georgian Special Forces sniper team

Another nice aspect that could be useful, but it'll likely stretch the budget, is the ability to lay mines around Georgian waters, preventing Russian naval forces from entering into their water. Ideally, this would be a vessel specifically designed for such a task. Of course, procurement costs might be too much. Plus, a surface vessel of that sort might be too vulnerable to Russian detection and subsequent elimination.

Next, if at all possible, Georgian air force units should be equipped and trained to conduct limited ASuW (Anti-Surface Warfare) operations to an extent. I understand that the primary purpose of the G.A.F. is to conduct aerial operations against other air forces and support ground operations, but versatility is nice. Especially in the form of a deterrent, or as a combatant force if a Russian carrier gets involved

Next, the Georgian Navy should actively seek to receive training from their U.S. counterparts in order to increase combat capabilities.

Finally, strengthen relations with the Ukraine. Russia and the Ukraine already have sketchy relations as is, and after the South Ossetian War, the Ukrainian Navy was ordered by the then Chief of Naval Operations to prevent Russian ships returning from the South Ossetian conflict to reach Sevastopol. Capitalizing on these tense relations could add a combat ally to their side.

Army Missile Corp and Naval Force Structure by 2025

x3 Missile Boats
x6 Patrol boats
x30-50 anti-ship missiles + launchers (I.E. A conventionalized version of the BGM-109G)
x1 Minelaying vessel
x4 Auxiliary vessels

- Tom

Sources

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_048.pdf

http://www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1262

http://rt.com/politics/crimea-black-sea-fleet/

Rest in Peace, Schwarzkopf

A moment of silence, please, for the late General Norman Schwartzkopf, who died earlier today. He was 78.

- Tom

The Syrian Crisis

Ridiculously Photogenic Syrian Rebel: A Weapon of Mass Seduction

Engulfed within a violent civil war, Syria has been the scene of massive instability for the past 18 months. This instability has allowed for various terrorist organizations to seep into the country and set up operations unopposed (*cough**cough*Al-Qeada Iraq*cough**cough*). Despite the looming fiscal cliff, and illogical partisan stratification, Washington can not afford to ignore the situation developing within Syria.

This potential for the country to become another Afghanistan post-Assad is becoming more and more likely as each day passes, due to the frightening amount of units within the Free Syrian Army that have violently different ideologies of governance. This glue of, 'I'm only allies with this fellow FSA unit because we have a common goal' does not necessarily set the foundation for a stable government once the last remnants of the Syrian Army, Navy, and Air Force surrender.

Even worse, the U.N. recently came out and said that the conflict was, "Overtly sectarian" Which, in many respects, is a bit of an understatement. The levels of violence between religious sects has skyrocketed to the levels similar to Iraq during 2006-07.

Moreover, this sectarian violence has been spilling over into neighboring country, Lebanon. Sparking several deadly clashes between religious factions killing dozens of people. And Iraq is viewing the conflict with suspicion, fearing that violence will spill over into their borders, thrusting them once again into the terrible domestic violence that they faced during the Surge in 2006 and 2007.

History as an example

Contrary to popular belief, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan wasn't an organization filled with people who loved and agree'd with each other. It was a loose conglomerate of different groups that hated one another's guts and had vastly different plans for how Afghanistan should have been ruled after the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan fell.

Their alliance quickly fell apart within a year of the fall of the D.R.A., again thrusting the country into Civil War. As Charlie Wilson and co. popped champaign bottles and cheered that the Soviet Union fell, the environment that led to the rise of the Taliban was slowly developing.

If allowed to fester, these unmediated disagreements could lead to the creation of a second, longer civil war that see's the rise of a Taliban like group rise in Syria. Allowing for terrorist organizations to take root and grow, and find the perfect source of recruitment in the dystopic state. Instability is the fuel for the terrorist's fire, and civil wars are never filled with anything less than copious amounts of instability.

An Overview of the Situation Developing Within Syria

I hope I don't need to tell you that this is Syria, given that the country has 'Syria' in big, bold letters

In March, 2011, Syrian civilians peacefully took to the streets, inspired by the peaceful success in Tunisia and Egypt. What started out as peaceful(ish) protests soon devolved into a flurry of spats between Syrian protesters and police forces, culminating in the deployment of the Syrian army in April.

Brutally, the Syrian military began to forcefully shut down these protests with deadly proficientcy. Soon, bodies and blood caked the streets of cities and towns within Syria. Military units created a virtual siege of major cities, and started to gun down protesting civilians on sight.

After several moths of besiegement, protesters slowly turned into an armed insurgency, composed of civilians, foreign fighters, and Syrian defects. Since then, the Free Syrian Army has gone from an unorganized group of rebels that shot at each other for religious reasons, to an organized group of rebels who have agree'd to band together over the common enemy (and what happens when that common enemy falls...?)

Currently, countries in the Gulf Cooperative Community (G.C.C.), Turkey, and Western countries have been giving everything from monetary support, to advisement, to weapons. Moreover, NATO pressure on Syria has spiked recently.

After the Syrian military shot down the Turkish jet in May, Turkey has been campaigning for a NATO presence to protect its borders. Pleas which have recently been meet by the deployment of Patriot Missile Systems from Germany, United States, and the Netherlands. Furthermore, Turkey is playing host to a number of Syrian refugees and rebel fighters, giving them training and weaponry for their fight against Assad.

German Patriot Missile Systems

Worrisome, though, is the sheer amount of deadly weaponry that is present in the hands of the dying regime. Within the past few weeks, the Syrian military has prepped chemical weaponry to be used through aerial and missile platforms, while Scud missiles have been landing in Aleppo, a city near the turkish border.

Intelligence analysts estimate that Assad owns roughly 400 short and medium ranged ballistic missiles, all of which can obviously been used for chemical and biological warfare.

This brings up two questions: First, if NATO has intelligence that government forces are about to use chemical weapons on the Syrian populace, would the Patriot batteries stationed in Turkey attempt to shoot them down? Second, if this attack was massive (like, 120 missiles), would the NATO task force be able to neutralize the threat?

In regards to the latter of the two, there have already been concerns raised about the training of the Dutch troops manning the Patriot systems. According to a military trade union in the Netherlands, roughly 20% of the soldiers being deployed have no formal training in the system.

However, there have been no concerns raised about the efficiency of the German and U.S. forces being deployed, reaffirming the task force's ability to defend the Turkish border (along with the Syrian people themselves, hopefully).

A good info graphic on how the Patriot missile system works

Western Response

1. Western nations should find a group or groups that would best represent their interests, and begin arming them.

The moment Assad's dead body is paraded through the street of Damascus, is the moment a violent arms race begins for the establishment of a proxy dominance of Syria's new political system. The four primary belligerents in this new war will undoubtably be the United States and Israel, Russia, Iran, and the Gulf Cooperative Community.

The geopolitical significance of Syria is irrefutable. For Russia, it's viewed as an important forward operating base to launch it's naval presence into the Mediteranean and beyond. With various international restrictions put in place on the Turkish Straits, the Black Sea fleet is restricted in terms of ability to project power. Making Tartus an important sea base for the Russian Navy in terms of force projection and remaining relevant within the global sphere.

For Iran, Syria is a crucial part of it's plan to establish a regional hegemony and an important ally. Moreover, the Iranians use it as a counter weight to Israeli influence and a cover for their plethora of terrorist operations. Further, with a Naval blockade put in place on Gaza, Syria's coastline offers a perfect route by which arms can come in and be shipped off to Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations working for Tehran. It's also important to realize the asymmetrical significance of Syria in relation to Iranian grand strategy.

Syria is practically a stones-throw away from the European theater, and with its mass missile supply in reserve, it has the ability to wreck havoc on American and allied units operating in the Med. Sea and Europe. Utilized correctly, the Syrian missile force could very possibly inflict grave damage to NATO forces operating within the European hemisphere.

The collapse of the Syrian regime offers an opportunity to counter an Iranian power surge within the Arab world. If the US-Israeli alliance managed to establish a government that is resistant to Iranian interests, the overall security of Israeli and American interests in increased, and the Iranians lose their shipping point for supplies to anti-israeli terrorist organizations.

The G.C.C. probably see this both as an opportunity and a threat. On one hand, this revolution will most likely end in poorly for Iranian interests, propel forward Israeli interests. Though curbed by pressure by the United States, the alliance aren't too wild about the "Zionist Plague" Doha recently gave 250 million dollars to Palestinian militants, while Saudi gave 100 million dollars to the Palestinian Authority in order to alleviate their economic woes.

Currently, the Russians and Iranians have been arming the Syrian military in their pitched fight against the FSA. I haven't read any reports by news agencies talking about them arming any rebel groups in anticipation for a post-war power grab. Meaning, that we could be a step ahead of them when the various components within the FSA fracture and fall into conflict with each other.

The group that is best armed in this fight will likely be sustaining the least casualties, thus putting them ahead in terms of fire and manpower in this pessimistic view of Syria's future.

Therefore, finding a group that matches our goals post-Assad and funding them will allow us to hit the ground running when the various groups of the FSA begin fighting for power of the Syrian government. Our superior funding and weaponry should allow us to catch to the headstart the G.C.C. has in terms of influence. However, it is imperative we start soon.

Now then, what exactly should be our goals be for Syria? I think it's a tad unrealistic to expect a government that respects Israel and recognizes their legitimacy as a sovereign nation. However, it is within realistic possibility that a government that fights against Iranian influence and support for Hamas in Hezbollah in the the country. So, whatever group is the most compliant with this goal should be the group the United States supports specifically (which will be referred to from now on in this post as 'group x').

2.  Promise Russia that their port in Tartus will remain intact 

A Russian Naval Infantryman (Marine) during field exercises 

The Russians have made it blatantly obvious that they care not so much about propping up the dying Syrian regime, but rather maintaining their naval base in Tartus. It actually seems as if Moscow has abandoned the prospect of Assad surviving, stating in June that it would allow for the overthrow of the incumbent regime, "...if that's what the Syrians want" Followed soon after by a contingent of Marines and Amphibious Transports to reinforce the security at Tartus. If the United States were to promise the  Russian government that we'd ensure that their base would remain, my guess is that the extent to which they'd get involved would be likely be lessened significantly.

3. Send SOF to support the FSA we decide to support 

Though cliche in the military world, the utilization of special forces is probably the best asset to the United States in this conflict. As I've pointed out in previous posts, Special Forces met outstanding success in supporting indigenous forces in their struggles against oppressive regimes.

In 2001, for example, Coalition Special Forces were extremely successful in their operations against the Taliban. They organized and supported the operations of the Northern Alliance, and with the aid of air support, were able to overthrow the Taliban regime before the primary ground force arrived for combat operations.

While in 2003, SOCOM and CIA paramilitary units embedded with Pershmerga forces decimated Ansar Al Islam forces in the village Biyara. Moreover, they served as a block to Saddam's 5th Army Corps, saving hundreds of coalition lives during the invasion.

These units would provide tactical and strategic advice to the commanders of group X, technical training in the weapon systems the U.S. would be supplying them with, intelligence, combat support, and act as diplomats representing our interest for a post-Assad world.

4. Eliminate Chemical storage facilities.

Locations of Chemical storage and production centers

As a top priority, securing or destroying these facilities should be of the utmost importance to the United States of America. At the very least, we do anything, it should be the creation of a task force that will go in and destroy these facilities if needed. We're already late to the game, as Syria has loaded some of these chemical assets into prepared weapons for use at a moment's notice.

However, what should this task force be composed of? There are multiple avenues by which the United States could destroy these security threats. Combined naval and air strikes could be utilized in fashion that see's the elimination of these compounds.

That said, such overt and direct attacks could see a deadly escalation of the conflict. As we've seen before with the Turkish jet, the Syrians are more than capable of shooting down planes, and their missile forces are among the most robust in the Middle East. Such a force presents itself as a large threat to the security of an attack force operating off the coast.

Of course, Tomahawk cruise missiles have the operational range of about 1,200 miles, while the Trident Ballistic missiles have an operational range of over 7,000 miles. Both far outside the range of Syrian cruise missiles. Though, this doesn't necessarily prevent the Syrians from attacking civilian shipping or allied naval vessels in the area. But, we are in the midst of deploying Patriot Missile Systems capable of shooting these cruise missiles. However, they were rather ineffective at shooting down cruise missiles during the First Gulf War and Invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Therefore, such a strike should only be utilized as a last resort against these weapons from being used or falling into terrorist hands. Otherwise, the capture or destruction of these facilities should be left to SOF operating in the country. A much less direct, and diplomatically friendly course of action. However, we should be prepared to use air or naval forces in necessary.

U.S. ship firing a missile during Operation Odyssey Dawn

Anyways, thanks for reading the post! This is one of my poorer written ones, but I still think it's rather enjoyable. Merry Christmas, mates!

- Tom

The Emergence of Al-Qaeda in Mali and Western Response

Tureg rebels posing for the shot

The Situation

Within the past couple of months, an Al-Qeada contingent has seized control of northern Mali, whose area of land is roughly the size of Texas, giving A.Q. a new base to operate in without the harassment of a stable government or U.S. backed force.

The question policy makers of NATO and the African nations are now asking themselves is, "How should we respond?" The U.S. is in the middle of trying to draw back its foreign presence and military spending, the European Union is facing an existential economic crisis, and Africa, well, is Africa. Each possible responder is caught in various problems of their own, delaying or preventing a proper response from happening.

The Economic Community of West Africa has already pledged to send in a 3,300 man task force, which won't be ready to be sent in for another year while military officers and politicians decide what their strategic goals are, amass logistical capability, and train the force.

In deliberation with these African leaders are France, who has given a fairly large amount of attention to the matter, and the United States. So far, the French have offered to the Malian military and West African force training, aerial, communications, and intelligence support. While the U.S. has been reported to offer intel gathering equipment and logistical support.

While all of this is great, especially the aerial support, it remains questionable wether or not this multinational force could accomplish the job. The framework for the operation is based upon the success the United States has had in Somali by backing its army and the African force operating there in their battle against Al-Shabab.

However, as Edward Cody and Sudarsan Raghavan note in the Washington Post, the Somalian's had neighbors more than willing to back them up. While the Economic Community of West Africa is hesitant at best, and disagrees on actual strategy. The African Union and Ethiopia contributed a combined total of 22,000 soldiers to help Somalia, who is/was facing an enemy numbering around 5,000-7,000. The insurgency is Mali is as large as 15,000 militants, which is completely outnumbering the 3,300 strong task force.

Northern Mali is in grey

Somalia

Plus, the United States offered a bunch of help in terms of air superiority with our drones. This aspect is one of the most crucial for me, because proper amounts of air support can truly win battles. While over exaggerated, Colonel Oumar Dao of the UMalian army had a point when he said, “Even if we had 1,000 soldiers, but with a big air component, it will solve the problem.”

What should be done?

1. Flex American Air Power

In 2001, Operation Crescent Wind was the American and British air operation in Afghanistan from October to December. During the highly successful op, over 6,000 taliban insurgents were killed in what I think is an extremely underrated operation of the Afghan war. 

Now, I understand that the extend to which the U.S. can operate is limited by the political and economic situation here at home, and that therefore the likelihood of a large air campaign is nonexistent, this does not necessarily mean that we cannot send some attack planes, helicopters, and UAV attack drones.

This proposed combined air task force could hypothetically turn the tide of the battle in favor of Mali, because the very nature of America's COIN strategy in Afghanistan lied within the utilization of various air assets. This use of our air power is one of, if not the, largest contributor to American success in the country (Don't be fooled, I still think Afghanistan is still a questionable situation).

An MQ-9 Reaper drone in Nevada, USA

2. Give intelligence support

Without a doubt, the strongest intelligence force in the world is the United States of America. We have a bolstering 16 intelligence agency strong force within our arsenal, and the key to any counter insurgency is having a strong intelligence foundation. Otherwise, your force is likely going to be patrolling waywardly in the desert, hoping that they come across an enemy force by chance.

Therefore, we should sent a substantial intelligence contingent to provide the Malian and West African troops with a variety of signals, imagery, and human intelligence assets, capable of both collection and analyzation. Another worthwhile asset that could be useful is C.I., or counter intelligence. While the collection, analyzation, and dissemination of information among allied forces is no doubt crucial, another useful asset is spreading incorrect information among the enemy's ranks in order to hurt his operating capability. 

3. Provide logistics 

I forgot who said it, but it goes something along the lines of, "Good logistics will never win battles, but bad logistics will sure as hell lose them." Even though the infantryman is the backbone to any combat operation, the success of said infantryman comes from the ability to utilize him in the field--logistics. Thusly, the next crucial element for a victory against rebels in Mali is providing the force with an appropriate amount of ground and aerial logistics.

4. Provide training 

Next on the list is to provide the African and Malian troops the knowledge needed to fight. After 11 years of fighting two brutal insurgencies, the United States has enough experienced officers and NCOs to send for a combination of training and advisement.

In fact, the Marine Corps has a special team that is designed to train other nations. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces have been extremely active within Africa since the emergence of Operation Enduring Freedom, providing hands on training to a host of various nations in the art of kick-ass combat. Most recently, I believe we sent a SP-MAGTF to assist soldiers who were getting ready to deploy against the L.R.A.

A Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force member with
the Burundi Defense Force

Of course, some of the best advisors and trainers come from the elite SOCOM force. Most people don't know that SF and SOF are oftentimes embedded within native forces in order to train and fight with them. Most notably, the horseback riding soldiers and sailors who worked with the Northern Alliance in collapsing the Taliban regime. With the aid of air support, the Special Forces/N.A. duo managed to overthrow the incumbent government before ground force arrived for the action. Speaking of which...

5. Deploy SF/SOF to the country

As I mentioned above, Special Forces are malleable units that can conform to the environment that they're in. Through a combination of hands on action (Hollywood style, kick down the door, operations) and training of local forces, the SpecOp recipe for success has a large chance of working here.

These specialized units can give local and American commanders the knife like ability to conduct surgical raids to capture insurgent commanders or supporters that the African regulars are unable to do due to lack of equipment, motivation, and training. 

This surgical strike ability will augment the intelligence support I mentioned above, Special Forces are often utilized as a method to obtain intelligence. They have the soft touch to flatter locals, and the hard touch to get information out of captured militants.

6. Deploy an African Union contingent/increase the Economic Community of West Africa's force

A 3,300 man force is hardly the size needed to undertake such a daunting task, a large scale multinational force is going to be needed in order to accomplish the goals set forth by the political and military echelons. While I think that it's unrealistic to expect 25,000 soldiers, I think a request of 15,000 AU and ECoWA troops is staying within realistic levels. Furthermore, the AU force would likely be composed of many veterans of Somalia who have experience in fighting this kind of war, making the West's job of supporting them that much easier.

I think that taking these 6 measures will allow chance for victory, while still realizing the political constraints currently in place on the political level. Of course, while I primarily mentioned the US most of the time, French aid for the implementation of this plan will be essential for victory.

- Tom

What the North Korean Missile Launch Means

I will watch this wall;
This evil North Korean wall.

Yesterday, the North Korean government successfully launched a missile, whose purpose, as defined by the North Korean government, was to launch a communications satellite into space. Western governments, along side Japan and South Korea, have been increasingly vocal against their launch--for good reason. Most, if not all, intelligence agencies believe that this launch is really a cover for ballistic missile testing, making it a breach of international law and a potential security risk for South Korea, Japan, the United States, and even China.

A communications satellite... right...

Okay, Japan, the US, and South Korea are fairly obvious, 'but China?', you might ask, 'Aren't they allies with North Korea?' Well, technically yes. But they have a tense alliance with Pyongyang. Due to a lack of allies in a region surrounded by countries who are fearful of Chinese growth, a need for a buffer zone between them and western ideals, and a historic relationship that if abandoned, would make China look weak. Their relationship with Kim Jong-Un is not one out of love; it's one out of necessity.

For me, this development has one of three possible outcomes, all of which are negative for China.

1. North Korea continues missile development, gains enough confidence (for silly reasons, mind you), and instigates a war with South Korea. China decides to support their neighbor and goes to war with S.K. and the United States.

Result: Currently, China has a very robust missile defense shield that, if used, has the potential to inflict mass damage upon the United States' navy and her allies operating in the region. Effectively, their shield, coupled with the 100,000 or so mines they have in their possession, can keep America at bay for a long time. Further, the Chinese, in theory, should be able to decimate U.S. response capability. In numerous war-games, the team representing China has been able to establish air superiority by attacking U.S. runways and plane hangers, rendering them both useless.

In a study by the RAND corporation, the Chinese were able to decimate all of our aerial forces in the immediate area of Taiwan, with the US being able to scramble up a few F-22s. While they destroyed over 48 Chinese planes, they ultimately crashed after running out of fuel when Chinese fighters knocked out the KC-130 sent to re-fuel them.

Even more depressing is a study conducted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Even if every missile the US would have at its disposal hit its target, the Chinese would still have enough assets to destroy US tankers, command and control, and intel gathering aircraft. More troubling is that every aircraft in Guam and Okinawa was destroyed within the first 30 minutes of the exercise.

Yikes.

Despite early victories, however, China is incapable of sustaining a long term war. Oil's the word. Importing 50% of its oil, with 75% of this coming in via the sea, China's greatest vulnerability is their massive energy consumption. China's surface fleet is not able to sufficiently operate outside the second island chain. Meaning, it will be unable to protect all the oil coming in. The U.S. will declare an embargo on China, sinking any ship that dares to try sail towards their waters.

Moreover, while China temporarily would establish control over the area extending to the second island chain, there will undoubtably be US submarine assets at work within these waters. Launching a guerrilla war on sea against Chinese forces, and, this is my guess, executing missile strikes against off and inshore oil installations belonging to China.

Without a sufficient amount of oil, their war effort will slowly grind to halt. And once China falls, North Korea will succumb too (I'll go into detail about invading North Korea down below). Leaving China with a shot up navy, shortage of oil, and an economy in shambles.

The first and second island chains

2. North Korea's confidence boosts, it goes to war, China stays out of the conflict.

This would be a fairly straight forward outcome, the North Koreans idiotically try something, and are pulverized. I haven't read too many studies about a US-Korean conflict, but I have heard that the South Koreans would be pushed back a few weeks until the US could mobilize a response. However, once we do, it will be a long grind to the Pyongyang.

In Defiant Failed State, a book by Bruce Bechtol, the author talks about how North Korean SOF would likely serve three purposes: 1. Recon 2. An insurgent movement within North Korea, mimicking the tactics used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and 3. Wrecking havoc behind enemy lines.

The North Korean navy is mostly a costal, but has the potential to be deadly. In 2010, a N.K. submarine successfully sank a South Korean ship without being detected. In 2002, two North Korean ships engaged their South Korean counterparts in a small naval skirmish. Inflicting 4 casualties, with a South Korean ship sinking on route to port. Now, while it's ability to match the ferociousness of the U.S. Navy is questionable, this doesn't necessarily negate the fact that it has the potential of being deadly.

Moreover, since we're talking about potential uses of the DPRK Navy, the North Koreans could always insert SOF into South Korea via submarine. This has merit, considering that the North Koreans delivered a 25 man force in 1996 to South Korea. Sure, it didn't work. But South Korea wasn't busy at the time fighting off an invasion.

Furthermore, and take this next bit with a grain of salt, since I found this on wikipedia page whose source was a book from 1988, they could deliver up to 7,000 SOF to each of ROK coastlines through amphibious craft. However, presuming that their surface craft, I doubt the efficiency of these boats to evade detection.

In terms of Air Force, there is very little the North Koreans could pull together. Most of their frames are upwards to 50 years old, hardly a match for the F-35 the military is planning to phase. I doubt that they will be able to do much damage. But maybe another reader could correct me. I think one of their better assets is the AN-2; as a small biplane, the aircraft can carry about 10 SOF troops below radar into South Korea. Further augmenting the already decent capability of North Korea's SOF

Their Army, put on the defensive, would likely dig in and fight to the death. According to most estimates, the DPRK Ground Force has something along the lines of 1.1 million men--all of whom are are more than willing to die for Dear Fat-Boy Leader Kim Jong-Un. Their greatest asset until US air assets arrive is their artillery forces, which are dug in and within range of Seoul. However, after US sorties begin punning their positions, I doubt much will left. Making the trek to Pyongyang that much easier.

Of course, making that air attack on North Korean positions is easier said than done. N.K. has an extremely thick shell of anti aircraft missiles, protecting the various military units it will rely on for strategic attack. Though highly susceptible to electronic warfare, it would inflict heavy damage to NATO air forces before destroyed.

The greatest asset to North Korea is their vast and seemingly never ending supply of missiles. Estimates put North Korea's ballistic missile force at upwards to 1000 units; some of these can even reach as far as Japan and Guam. They have even more tactical missiles, which could present themselves as deadly to naval forces operating off the coast of Korea.

Transporter Erector Launcher, the mobile platform by which Korea launches most of its missiles

3. North Korea's confidence is boosted, but it doesn't go to war

This is the most likely outcome. Pyongyang is just going to get more boisterous and provocative with their new capability, giving the US all the more reason to put forces in the Pacific. This, of course, undermines China's military capability, thus eroding the weight they might have on negotiating tables. 

The strategy of most U.S. enemies is not to be able to obtain full military victory, but be able to pay the price tag. The price tag is a term I use to describe the amount of lives the U.S. is willing to during a conflict. If an enemy can reach or go beyond this price tag, then they have substantially more weight on the negotiating tables against America.

In any event, this is interesting stuff. Oh, btw, most posts won't be this long. I just got bored during Algebra today because we weren't doing anything, and thus had some free time.

- Tom

For further reading about North Korea and China, I recommend the follow PDFs and Books

1. Defiant Failed State by Bruce Bechtol 
2. The Great Wall at Sea by Bernard Cole; it goes throughly into detail about the Chinese Navy, their strategy, weaknesses, and strengths 
3. http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/02/21/index1.html; Great study by RAND that focusses on a war between China and the US over the Taiwan Straits
4. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG915.pdf; Great study by RAND that reviews Chinese Air Force doctrine

Goma and the Failure of the UN

A Uruguayan patrol in the Congo. Look at those nice, easy to spot blue helmets!

As I'm sure many of you are aware, M23 rebels recently seized, and relinquished shortly thereafter, control of the Congolese city of Goma. Now, given the poor shape of the Congolese army, and the fact that this group was likely supplied by Rwanda, it shouldn't come as a surprise that Congo's army contingent routed as the 1,000 man rebel force came pouring into the city.

However, what is shocking, is that the UN force assigned to protect the city, roughly 1,500 men out of the 19,000 man force stationed in the country, retreated as well. What's worse, is that this UN force was modernized and supported by gunships, tanks, mortars, and artillery. Apparently, the commander there felt as if he should leave if there was no Congolese force to support, and just let the rebels march into the city, flag in hand. Hardly seems like the never-say-never attitude of the besieged Irish force deployed to the Congo in the 60's, fighting until they ran out of ammo after their camp was attacked.

Of course, maybe we shouldn't sit here, baffled by the actions of the superior UN force? Peacekeeping forces deployed by the United Nations have had a long history of routing in the face of combat, due to a potent combination of an unwilling force and asinine rules of engagement by the upper echelon of the United Nations.

For example, remember the Bosnian genocide back during the mid 90's? Dutch troops retreated from their positions without firing a single shot when the Serbian Scorpians came into Bosnia, some even surrendering. The Serbian paramilitants then took the uniforms from their prisoners and fooled hundreds of civilians into thinking they were UN peacekeepers, luring them into mass warehouses where they would gun the poor souls down.

I guess, though, this might have worked out in the United State's favor. The Dutch were quick to jump into combat operations in Afghanistan, yearning for chance to redeem themselves after their shameful performance in Srebrenica . But that's neither here nor there.

In any event, I wrote this post partly out of anger. A classmate of mine was arguing earlier today that the UN is more than capable of playing world police. Never mind the fact that the UN is NOT the League of Nations, and is intended to be a convention where nations utilize diplomacy before war, not to be the police commissioner of the world's problems.

Oh well, what you think about the current situation developing in the Congo, and the abysmal performance of the UN peacekeepers there?

- Tom

Hello World!

Hello world! Welcome to the wonderful world of my blog. Here, I will write about whatever strikes my fancy, which will mostly pertain to military or policy oriented subjects. As a high school student, I claim no measure of professional knowledge in these areas, but I do hope that this blog will help expand my ideas, and readers will challenge the current notions I have on the global scene.

I might do a post detailing my life a little bit, but until then, cheers!

- Tom