Revising Georgian Maritime Strategy and Policy

In 2008, Georgia launched a massive military operation into South Ossetia, igniting a political firestorm within the Russian government. Quickly, the military mobilized a large intervention force to respond to Georgian aggression. The ground component, which was already poised for such an intervention beforehand, swept quickly into the belligerent country.

A Russian Naval Infantry BTR-80 disembarking during an exercise

However, what is often lost in the shuffle of tanks, artillery, and infantrymen, is the role that Russia's Black Sea Fleet played in the conflict, and the poor performance of Georgia's military in combating this naval force, allowing what could have been a disastrous blow to the Russian Navy slip through their fingers.

Moreover, what is also often forgotten, is that the damage the Russian Navy did to their Georgian counter-parts was devastating. Due to the loss of the majority of their 19 ship fleet, the Navy was officially disbanded and absorbed into the Coast Guard in 2009.

If Georgia hopes to be able to advance it's territorial and political goals, both of which conflict with the Russian's vision for the future of the Caucaus region, then it must be able to deter Russian military forces by being able to inflict large amounts of damage to Russian force structure (AKA being too big of a trouble to deal with; asymmetrical warfare).

Naval Operations During the South Ossetian War of 2008

The job of the Russian Navy was two fold: First, it would impose a naval blockade on Georgia's coastline (preventing military hardware from seeping through), and second, it would support combat operations in Abkhazia by landing combat troops.

In regards to the former, the Russian blockade was quite successful. There really isn't much to say about it, actually.

As for the latter, it is currently disputed how many troops were deployed by amphibious ships. The Georgian government claims that over 4000 soldiers were deployed by ship, and met up with their vehicles being brought in by train. However, some analysts, such Dmitry Gorenburg of Harvard University,  dispute this claim by saying that several hundred troops were deployed from ships (Most likely the 2 BSF Marine battalions that took part in the war, which is what I assume was the case).

Details about the naval engagement itself remain blurry, but from what I've gathered from various sources, the Russian Navy was en route to or in the middle of landing operations at the port of Ochamchira when a small Georgian flotilla, composed of two patrol boats and two auxiliary vessels, breaching the security zone set forth by the Russian ships was picked up by the radar of the patrol ship Mirazh.

After failing to adhere to radio messages ordering the ships to turn back, and warning shots fired by the Russian fleet, the task force was ordered to engage the Georgian patrol boats. The Mirazh opened fire on the ships, sinking one patrol boat, all hands presumed lost, and damaging another. Following the attacking, the remainder of the Georgian flotilla returned to their home port of Poti.

Russian warship vs trawler. Who will win?

The two Russian Black Sea Fleet Marine battalions disembarked from their amphibious ships and met up with their equipment being brought in via railroad. One battalion reinforced Ochamchira from a possible Georgian attack, while the other seized Poti.

Russian forces at Poti proceeded to destroy the naval vessels anchored there. The officers and sailors manning these boats, luckily, were allowed to leave their ships before the engineers sunk them. Of course, there weren't many that had to leave. The majority of the Georgian Naval and Coast Guard forces manning Poti routed before the Russians even arrived! Total, the Russians sank 6 Georgian Naval and Coast Guard vessels at Poti, according to imagery from the United Nations Operational Satellite.

Georgian ships lost: At least 7, with others taken as war trophies.

- The Dioskuria; La Combattane II class French warship; Most powerful warship within the Georgian fleet
- The Tbilisi; Soviet 206MR missile boat
- Tskaltubo; unknown class
- Two patrol boats
- Two auxiliary vessels

Of course, it's not like the Georgian Navy was in exemplary shape before the war. According to some rumors, prior to the war, neither the Tbilisi or Dioskuria had missiles in their tubes.

What went wrong?

Within all naval disasters, there exists some reasons as to why defeated, well, lost. In Georgia's case, there are 2 principle reasons for the disaster against the Black Sea Fleet: 1. Lack of motivated crew and 2. Improper force structure.

1. Lack of Motivated service members

As I mentioned before, by the time the Russians arrived at Poti, the majority of the crew members manning the Georgian fleet had left. Meaning, that even if they wanted to, there was no possible way for the Georgian command echelon to even utilize their navy. Leaving them with a mere two patrol boats and auxiliary to use for combat operations. Even then, the likelihood of those boats being loaded with missiles is unlikely to poor funding of the Navy.

The U.S. soldiers and Marines that were mentoring the Georgian Army noted that while they were motivated in terms of the 'Warrior's Spirit', they lacked the proper training and equipment to actually fight the Russians.

The same, then, could be extended to the Navy, minus that warrior spirit aspect. To my immediate knowledge, the Georgian Navy, unlike their Army counter parts, did not receive extensive training by U.S. forces, and were even more ill equipped.

Let's say that you are a Georgian sailor, okay? If you have the greater part of the Black Sea Fleet bearing down your step, and lack proper training and equipment, are you seriously going to try to take on those crazy drunken, bears? Unlikely.

2. Improper Force Structure and Equipment

In Great Naval Blunders, author Geoffrey Regan notes that there are three crucial elements that a warship must have in balance: Protection, Speed, and Firepower. Likewise, a fleet, if a country decides to pursue a mainline fleet, should have those three aspects as well.

This hypothetical fleet, in theory, should be able to protect itself from the threat they are most likely going to face, have the capability to quickly respond to the threat in a timely manner, and possess proper firepower to neutralize this threat.

Georgia's fleet was incapable of accomplishing any of these goals. The majority of the fleet was sunk in port, the response to Russia's sprint towards their shores was absolutely ghastly, and it didn't even have the missiles to engage the Russian fleet.

Being realistic, Georgia will never be able to fashion a conventional fleet to take on Russia and obtain command of the sea. There is really no sense in trying to make a fleet of such strength, either. The structure of Georgia's Navy was obviously inappropriate to take on the Russian foes--even if they had missiles for their ships it would be inadequate. They have simply too little there to destroy their large neighbors.

Future maritime strategy

Obvious answer: Train a fleet of sharks with lasers. Feed them Russian blood when they're young, so that they'll develop a taste for Russian sailors in combat

In 2002, the American military conducted a massive war-game called Millennium Challenge 2002. The goal of the war-game was to reaffirm military commanders faith in network centric operations as members of the Bush began talking about a possible war with Iraq.

This war-game was one of the largest in American history, costing billions and three years in preparations. It utilized a combination of real world units conducting maneuvers and high end computers to conduct combat simulations.

The commander of the Red team, whose military resembled and Iraq-Iran hybrid, but remained unnamed officially, launched a pre-emptive attack on the Blue (U.S.) fleet, destroying the majority of the task force, and killing an estimated 20,000 imaginary soldiers.

Retired Marine General Paul Riper utilized an interesting strategy Blue force commanders weren't expecting--an asymmetrical strategy that focused heavily on the utilization of ground based missiles. Riper sent a volley of missiles from a combination of ground launchers and small missile boats in the Strait of Hormuz, overwhelming AEGIS missile defense systems.

Then, while the fleet was in disarray, Riper sent a fleet of small boats and propeller planes filled with explosives to destroy the remainder of the fleet. I, personally, consider it one of the best uses of indirect action in both real life and simulation. B.H. Liddell would have been proud of General Paul van Riper.

The point that I'm trying to get across is that the asymmetrical strategy Iranian commanders have chosen  has effectively put them at an equal operational level with the Americans in the Strait of Hormuz. Sure, it doesn't give them command of the sea, but it does deny the Americans use of the Strait while inflicting heavy military and economic damages.

Thus, Georgia should strive to create an effective cruise missile capability. Russian warships have very little missile defense capability, and would thus be very susceptible to such an attack. A large force isn't necessary, given the small(ish) size of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

Moreover, one of the most effective units during the South Ossetian War of 2008 was the air defense missile corp. Surprisingly, they shot down several Russian planes, acted professionally in combat, and prevented the Russian military from obtaining full aerial dominance for the entirety of the conflict.

Therefore, the Georgian Army Missile Corp, which has proven itself to be one of the most professional branches in the Army, should be expanded to include sea denial missions. While I understand that there are differences in the anti-air and anti-naval missile operations, the learning curve won't be incredibly steep.

Of course, this doesn't mean that I think the Georgian Navy should be entirely abandoned. There still exists the need for naval operations that a missile force is incapable of conducting. Operations include, but are not limited to, anti-terrorism on the sea, protection of SLOCs(Sea Lines of Communication), and participation in NATO operations and exercises (Georgia is trying to obtain membership).

Added onto this, a future and revamped Georgian Navy could aid in my vision of a Georgian asymmetrical strategy. These missile boats could rapidly launch missiles in support of ground launchers, much like Riper did in Millennium Challenge '02.

Currently, Georgia's Special Forces branch has a unit similar to our SEALs, in that it is specifically designed force naval oriented warfare. I have no idea what their current training regiment is. However, if it isn't already, I would suggest training this force for base infiltration in order to sabotage Russian naval assets at Sevastopol. Rather akin to a football player making a Hail Mary pass, this unit would attempt to gain access and make Russian ships inoperable. Thereby reducing the capability of the BSF.

A Georgian Special Forces sniper team

Another nice aspect that could be useful, but it'll likely stretch the budget, is the ability to lay mines around Georgian waters, preventing Russian naval forces from entering into their water. Ideally, this would be a vessel specifically designed for such a task. Of course, procurement costs might be too much. Plus, a surface vessel of that sort might be too vulnerable to Russian detection and subsequent elimination.

Next, if at all possible, Georgian air force units should be equipped and trained to conduct limited ASuW (Anti-Surface Warfare) operations to an extent. I understand that the primary purpose of the G.A.F. is to conduct aerial operations against other air forces and support ground operations, but versatility is nice. Especially in the form of a deterrent, or as a combatant force if a Russian carrier gets involved

Next, the Georgian Navy should actively seek to receive training from their U.S. counterparts in order to increase combat capabilities.

Finally, strengthen relations with the Ukraine. Russia and the Ukraine already have sketchy relations as is, and after the South Ossetian War, the Ukrainian Navy was ordered by the then Chief of Naval Operations to prevent Russian ships returning from the South Ossetian conflict to reach Sevastopol. Capitalizing on these tense relations could add a combat ally to their side.

Army Missile Corp and Naval Force Structure by 2025

x3 Missile Boats
x6 Patrol boats
x30-50 anti-ship missiles + launchers (I.E. A conventionalized version of the BGM-109G)
x1 Minelaying vessel
x4 Auxiliary vessels

- Tom

Sources

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_048.pdf

http://www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1262

http://rt.com/politics/crimea-black-sea-fleet/