China's Air Defense Identification Zone

Recently, there's been a flurry of activity surrounding China's establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. The ADIZ covers the disputed Senkaku Islands, South Korea's research facility on Socotra Rock and overlaps into Japan's own ADIZ (and more recently, South Korea's ADIZ). The move has been seen by many to be a belligerent attempt to exercise control over the air traffic above the Senkaku Islands, especially since China requires all planes to identify themselves if requested. Contrast this with Japan, which only requires planes on a vector to Japanese territory to identify themselves. Given the number of airspace violations by the Russian and Chinese governments, Tokyo officials seem especially justified in their exercise of an ADIZ.

The move by Beijing is another example of China throwing its weight in the region, especially over territorial disputes. Over the past several years, the Chinese government has increased maritime operations in these disputed zones. China has enforced an all but officially declared blockade of the Scarborough Shoal. Coast Guard vessels have been routinely sent into the waters around disputed Sino-Japanese islands. But this recent move seems to be an escalation of the disputes to a new domain: the air.

However, there is also another trend in Chinese behavior. In many respects, this new emphasis on foreign disputes could be seen as an attempt by the Communist Party to spark nationalistic tendencies over their domestic population. Following the most recent plenum, the Chinese government established its own State Security Council--which is structured around our National Security Council. This development partially reflects the Communist Party's growing apprehension over unrest in semi-autonomous regions like Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as its general non-autonomous population. As economic liberalization and growth continues to grow, China will have to balance out the inevitable demand for more political power in the population with maintaining the state's political control. More likely than not, this will take the form of appeals to nationalism coupled with extensive and harsh mechanisms to deal with internal dissents.

As Daniel Drezner notes, Authoritarian Capitalism typically doesn't work. It becomes too hard for the state to justify its harsh policies as the society gains more economic power, becomes more educated, and realizes that authoritarianism is in many ways holding them back. So, the question for regional players becomes apparently obvious: if the power of the Communist Party in China is under threat, will they instigate conflict in order to consolidate power through nationalism? It largely depends on how China perceives our intended response to aggression. The United States has the capability to completely sink the Chinese economy, which would reciprocally severely endanger the CCP's grasp on power. However, would the United States really engage in such a war with China over, say, a small ambush on a Japanese patrol? Would such a small flashpoint rally Chinese nationalism and focus? To former of the two, the answer is unlikely. To latter, probably. There were riots after Japan bought the Senkaku Islands from their private owners, imagine the outrage if Japanese and Chinese planes went head to head in combat.

So China is probably unlikely to engage in a large military operation in the East China Sea, especially given the economic consequences of full-fleged American action. At the same time, a small flashpoint might be a good way to focus domestic discontent on a foreign enemy, while also minimizing the chance of large scale America reprisal. As the United States continues its pivot towards the Pacific, leaders need to remember that the risk of China launching an A2/AD campaign in the Pacific is rather low. War is more likely to occur from a series of escalatory actions, which could start out with a small battle between Japanese and Chinese planes or patrol ships.



--Tom

Defining Security Sector Reform

Before I go too in depth on the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR) on this blog, it's probably important to try defining the term. That's easier said than done. Security Sector Reform is a rather contemporary idea that arose out of attempts to reform the internal security and defense establishments within post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Even though it lacks a formal definition, most experts agree that it is integral in stabilizing post-conflict states emerging from violent inter-state war or internal turmoil.

Security Sector - Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the security sector has been continually expanded in its width. Security is no longer just about military structures, it encompasses a wide array of issues pertaining to public safety. For the time being, I'm going to define this as government institutions tasked with maintaining the safety of both the people and state. This includes intelligence agencies, police forces, gendarmerie, border officials, and the military. Arguably, there are also de facto institutions tasked with providing for the security of the people and state as well. Paramilitary groups can be useful allies to the state, and serve as a first line of defense for vulnerable communities. Furthermore, if there a divide in the trust between the people and state, pro-government militias can act as an intermediary.

Security Sector Reform - In essence, Security Sector Reform is about ensuring that the security sector is not only capable of protecting the state, but also the people living under it. In most transitioning nations, security forces were previously tasked with ensuring the security of the state. This means that their policies and doctrines will likely reflect hardline approaches that aren't generally concerned with the wellbeing of the people. The police in an authoritarian state typically don't have to worry about getting warrants, respecting the rights of a citizen, or going through with a fair judicial system. The military is more equipped to kill innocents passively resisting the state or implement scorched earth policies than adequately conduct combat operations. Therefore, reforming these policies and creating better relationships between the security sector and people reflect the primary goals of SSR

So that's the definition that I will be using for the time being. If any reader wants to add anything or correct my definition, please feel free to do so in the comment section below!

--Tom