The Externalization of American Security

*Make note, externalization in this context refers to the attempt by American officials to create an outside image of security, rather than admit and then seal critical flaws

I think that one of the most astute observations one can draw from our 11 year long struggle with terrorism is the the following: The primary problem with American security culture is that it externalizes  security in an attempt to paint an image of security; that is, officials either publicly or privately admit to others that America's security infrastructure is fine, when in reality it suffers from several glaring flaws.

Our country, on multiple levels, not just militarily, attempts to convince itself of safety. Due to the bureaucratic nature of our security system, we are left with a massive organization unwilling or unable to adapt to emerging threats until it is oftentimes too late.

Bureacracies are designed to combat or conduct an operation in a certain way all the time. Thusly, certain Standard Operating Procedures are developed and refined, followed by indoctrination of these principles to the employees of the organization; these SOPs effectively become the gospel to these workers within the beuracratic hive.

The problem, though, is that our security environment demands perpetual adaption to a variety of existential and non-existensial threats to our country's interests and way of life. Standard Operating Procedures only work if the threat is constant or slow changing, something that is virtually nonexistent in our world today.

For example, the idea of an attempt akin to 9/11 was scoffed at by the upper echelons of military and civilian leadership. It was thought that no adversary would attempt such a daring attack on our country; and even if it did try, our military was certainly prepared enough to rapidly respond to and eliminate the terrorist entity before the attack would finish.

However, the communications between the White House, F.A.A., and Air Force was absolutely terrible. There existed a lack certain strategies in place to deal with the terrorist threat that officials knew about, but were too stubborn to adapt to. C.I.A. agents warned officials months prior that such an attack could possibly take place a few months before 9/11. The response was weak, nonchalant even. There was no way the U.S. could be attacked like that? Right? Wrong.

Fast forward a little over a decade, officials still seem to ignore glaring gaps in our security (there are exceptions, luckily), with little regards to large weaknesses in our defense. The most existential to our country, of course, is our cyber infrastructure.

Panetta recently commented that our nation was in a pre-9/11 moment in terms of cybersecurity, and that the United States needed to subsequently close this gap. Given that most of our infrastructure runs on computer networks, an attack to, say, our electrical grid could be potentially devastating to our economy. Yet, there have been no large initiatives by our government to actually seal this gap in our security, instead placing emphasis on non-critical issues (Though not apart of our government, Mitt Romney fits this role in his obsession with naval size; Obama, no doubt, is guilty of placing emphasis on noncritical issues as well).

However, applied to a purely military level, you see that our leaders in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp suffer from the same problem. In recent history, U.S. Army leaders initially tackled the insurgency problem in Iraq the same way they tackled the Iraqi Army, with little disregard to the massive differences between the two types of conflict.

For example, from an intelligence perspective, the military analyzed the composition of the terrorist cells after post-2003 invasion in the same the way they analyzed the composition of artillery, armored, infantry, and air units of the Iraqi military. Of course, this is grossly inappropriate for counter insurgency. The insurgent groups operate on a vastly different level, and one must consider the economic, social, and cultural conditions leading to these groups being manned in the first place.

Classical military theory lay'd down by Carl von Clausewitz in On War dictates that military force is the extension of political policy; meaning that military victory should lead to political victory as well. However, counter insurgency completely dislodges this school of thought. Military victory in the battlespace, as we now know, doesn't always translate into an accomplishment of our goals set forth by political leaders.

The failure of our military to accept this reality of what is called by William S. Lind as 4th Generational Warfare led us to the brink of disaster in both Afghanistan and Iraq. If it wasn't for Petraeus' bold questioning of American military decisions, the situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan might be vastly different.

Of course, the Army wasn't very receptive of Petraeus at first. In 2005, they send him to Combined Arms Center (ironically, a similar thing happened to Clausewitz when Prussian military leaders send him to krieg's academy after questioning his military ideals). Luckily for us, Petreaus fought against conformationism in our military, taking this time to develop COIN doctrine now used by our military.

In conclusion, America's security culture is in many respects unwilling to accept the various realities of new age threats. Instead, it insists on externalizing (or feigning) security to the public by creating a false image of security. Worse, there is an active struggle against innovation. Military commanders are promoted on basis of assimilation, not merit.

-Tom

Sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_generation_warfare
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/12/panetta-cyber-threat-is-pre-911-moment/
From the Ground Up (p 138) by Emile Sampson
http://www.federalnewsradio.com/473/3110944/On-cyber-defense-US-stuck-at-the-starting-line