How Much Resources Should We Put Into Europe?

As the author established in his previous post, the strategic necessity of Europe is rather questionable in the post-9/11 era. As of late, the United States military has roughly 70,000 service members stationed in a variety of posts around the country. Aside from the taxing cost of these soldiers in a time of fiscal austerity, one must also consider the reorientation of the United States from West to East and our inability to project enough resources to cover immediate areas of concern globally. If the United States has learned anything in the past decade, it's that good tactical cohesion is useless unless a large scale strategic vision is properly implemented. So even if our troops are exceptionally trained, they aren't being applied in a manner that provides the U.S. with benefits when stationed in Europe.

For the most part, our forces in Italy can stay. Combat aircraft, naval bases, and Airborne infantry forces have provided a large array of strategic options to U.S. commanders in regards to the surrounding region. Aircraft and naval assets based in Italy were exceptionally useful in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. With the environment in Syria heating up, these units may prove to be useful again (the author will address this in a future post). Further, these units periodically deploy in bilateral training exercises with NATO members in an attempt to foster interoperability. As we learned from Libya, creating a system that allows for joint missions to occur when using different technologies is crucial to NATO success during a wartime operation.

As ComNavOps pointed out in a comment, our bases in Europe provide the U.S. strategists with assets close enough to the Middle East to be used, but far enough to be safe. The author agree's with the Commander's analysis, but believes the utility of Europe offensively extends itself to countries bordering the Mediterranean (Libya, Syria, Egypt, etc.)* While European based forces (EUCOM) were involved in operations in Iraq (and simultaneously the Balkans, if memory serves), was the geographic proximity essential to operational success? In the author's opinion, it was not. The majority of EUCOM's substantial contributions to the Iraq mission were in the post-invasion environment. Geographic origin of the deploying unit didn't matter, because low intensity conflict doesn't require rapid deployment of troops within a short amount of time (on the strategic level), as opposed to the high intensity scenarios we might have faced with the Soviets during the Cold War.

This isn't to say that bases in countries like Germany aren't useful at times. The U.S. Armed Forces hospital in Landstuhl, Germany offers a close, but secure, level four hospital to send our critically injured soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan. Ramstein Airbase offers NATO forces in general a nice logistical hub for operations abroad. Assets like these would ideally be kept. However, the vast majority of the 50,000 soldiers stationed in Germany can be relieved of their duties. As can the 10,000 service members in the United Kingdom.

So then, this is how the author thinks U.S. forces in Europe should be spread out:

Germany: 15,000-20,000 (Mainly Air Force and SOF personell)
Spain: 1,000 (The USMC QRF and naval personell)
Italy: 10,000 (Naval, Air Force, and Army Airborne personell)
Black Sea Rotational Force: 500 (SP-MAGTF to continue training countries around the Black Sea Area)**
Other: 1,000-5,000 (to conduct minor roles in various countries)
Total: 27,500-36,000 personell

The author strongly suggests anybody with operational experience to comment on the feasibility of such a structure. Obviously, the author has no military experience, and has a tendency to overestimate the utility small logistical outposts in supporting wartime operations.

*ComNavOps is an extremely experienced individual, the author is not. Remember that, readers.
**Make note that the BSRF isn't deployed 365 days a year, it's generally deployed for six month increments.