Establishing a No Fly Zone in Syria

USS Kearsarge launching a U.S. Marine Corps Harrier

With the security situation in Syria quickly degrading, American politicians are bickering over the question of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria. Obviously, there are legitimate concerns about this policy. There are financial costs to consider, worries of mission creep, allegations that U.S. intervention could further destabilize the country, and broader region, and making the us the potential target of terrorism. Furthermore, no one should rationally expect this to end up as another Libya, where the U.S. can "lead from behind." The European militaries involved with that operation exhausted their military reserves. By the end of the NATO led operation, the French air force was forced to drop concrete blocks on targets. Moreover, not only is France busy with Mali, but they also are facing heavy austerity measures. As I've pointed out before, France is the leading military power in the E.U. (other than the U.K., which distances itself from European Union most of the time) If Hollande doesn't take the initiative, it's doubtful that other European nations will intervene alongside America. Therefore, any intervention will mostly be bilateral between Israel and the United States.

So then, if we do decide to establish a NFZ, how should the military go about it in a way that minimizes economic costs while still fulfilling the policy requests of interventionists on Capitol Hill? First off, the author is going to presume that the political objectives of Washington are simple: to neuter the capabilities of the Syrian Air Force. Secondly, the scenario also presumes that the United States is willing to send enough assets to accomplish their stated goals (looking at past interventions involving no or little ground intervention, this assumption isn't too much of a logical jump).

If we wish to establish a no-fly zone over Syria, the first step is one that must be accomplished by American diplomats. Ambassadors must get the support of key regional actors to facilitate our needs for a military intervention.  According to an analysis done on no-fly zones by Stanford's Journal of Strategic Studies, support of key actors is vital to successfully establishing a NFZ. Certain countries like Turkey and Israel (despite a mutual despise for each other) are already on board with intervention. The major block in the road of intervention is the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent members must agree on intervention before it occurs. France and Britain will obviously back us, but Russia and China are different matters.

In regards to Moscow, officials are worrying that regime change will damage key Russian interests. This comes during a point in time where Russian policy revolves around reestablishing influence globally. Russian soft power isn't extensive or influential to begin with, and Syria is one of the few countries that the Kremlin could convince to work with them in the disaster that was the Russian Federation during the 90s and early 2000s. Since Putin took office, Russian influence in the Middle East has declined. Therefore, any change in the status quo that damages Russian influence regionally is something that the Kremlin is going to fight against. Moreover, the port of Tartus is the only Mediterranean port the Russians have, and is in many respects the only Russian naval facility capable of adequately force projecting (other than Avacha Bay).

Therefore, American officials should remind Russia that Assad will lose regardless of Western intervention. Supporting a no-fly zone, which is one of the only major demand the FSA has, gives America massive cookie points with the opposition. Among other things, America can easily get guarantees that the FSA council will allow the Russian port of Tartus to remain. The United States should strive to convince the Russians that the only way they can protect their interests is to work with the U.S. Moreover, officials should offer Putin a behind the scenes agreement to share intelligence on potential terrorist operations that aim to attack Russia for their initial support for Assad.

China is a much different case. The author has been unable to find any solid information of the underlying motivations of the PRC. There seems to be, however, a variety of theories. Some believe that China is protect its oil reserves in the country. Others believe that by protecting Assad, they are maintaining Iranian influence in the region, making Tehran less susceptible to invasion. It's also important to note that China was Syria's third largest importer in 2010. Whatever the reason, one should hope that the Chinese are articulating whatever strategic concern they have to U.S. officials.

Now then, for the purposes of this scenario, the presumption is that A. China and Russia stepped on board with the U.S. or B. the U.S. went honey badger and stopped giving a shit. Most likely, if any intervention is to occur, it will result from option A rather than B. So, how should the U.S. proceed with a no-fly zone?

According to Todd Harrison, there exists two forms of NFZs. The first is control, where patrols dominate the skies 24/7, exerting their will on hostile units below. An example of this is Iraq in the 1990s or, more recently, Libya in 2011. This gives the U.S. a wide range of options, including escalating intervention into striking ground units massacring civilians in cities. However, it is extremely costly, and creates the large possibility of mission creep. Moreover, it also involves striking down Syrian anti-air systems, which is arguably the most dense in the region. While many point to the fact that Israel was able to conduct strikes, this was done through crafty maneuvering through gaps in Syrian radar. A no-fly zone bent around control requires patrolling the entire country (or the parts you want to control), not just the areas where radar presence is weak.

The second, and more operationally and fiscally appealing, option is denial. Instead of exerting control over the battle space, just deny the enemy the use of it. This entails completely grounding the Syrian Air Force by attacking bases being used to house aircraft. At this point, the Syrian military has only 50 operational fixed aircraft, most of which aren't being used due to maintenance problems. Instead trainer aircraft are preferred. Then, you have maybe 90 helicopters that are fit for operation. Denying the Syrian Air Force use of these air craft, then, isn't all too difficult. Deploy naval assets and begin firing cruise missiles down at bases in the country. Chris Harmer, a naval analyst, estimates that it would take about 250 TLAMs to eradicate the Syrian's air power. In terms of cost, this would be about $350,000,000. While that seems like a scary, big number, it's actually quite cheap when you consider the benefits of the strikes.

Therefore, establishing a no-fly zone over Syria should center around denial, not control. Not only does this solve the issue of the Syrian Air Force, but it lessens the likelihood of mission creep. However, there still remains the question of if the United States should get involved in the violence. That's a question that policymakers must decide--and quickly. The United States has already missed the golden opportunity to get involved. Deciding to intervene 6 or 9 months might be too late to do anything productive.

--Tom